Williams v. State
| Decision Date | 26 November 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. PD-0470-07.,PD-0470-07. |
| Citation | 270 S.W.3d 140 |
| Parties | Arthur Lee WILLIAMS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Eric T. Berg, Conroe, for Appellant.
Gail Kikawa McConnell, Assistant District Atty., Conroe, Jeffrey L. Van Horn, State's Atty., Austin, for State.
MEYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which WOMACK, KEASLER, HERVEY, and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined.
Appellant, Arthur Lee Williams, was convicted of tampering with physical evidence under section 37.09(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code and sentenced to twenty-five years of confinement.1 Appellant appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. We granted review to consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We will affirm.
A police officer patrolling a high-crime neighborhood followed a car occupied by Appellant and Darrell Fields. Fields parked on the wrong side of the street in front of a house known by the officer to be a crack house. The officer, Michael Stowe, stopped behind the car. As Officer Stowe approached the car, he observed Appellant in the front passenger seat, moving his hands around his waistband, which caused Officer Stowe to suspect that Appellant could be concealing a weapon. Officer Stowe performed a weapons pat-down on both Fields and Appellant. During the pat-down of Appellant, Officer Stowe heard an object hit the ground. Looking down, Officer Stowe recognized the fallen object as an intact crack pipe. In that instant, Appellant stomped on the crack pipe, breaking it into pieces.
At trial, the State presented the pieces of the pipe Officer Stowe was able to collect that night, including a copper mesh filter and broken glass. The State also offered, as a demonstrative exhibit, an intact crack pipe to show the jury how the remnants appeared in their former physical state. The jury convicted Appellant of tampering with physical evidence, and the court assessed a sentence of twenty-five years of confinement. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). Appellant appealed, arguing seven issues, four of which addressed the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence establishing that he knew the crack pipe was evidence in the investigation and that the crack pipe was destroyed within the meaning of the law. Williams v. State, No. 09-06-103-CR, 2007 WL 416543, 2007 Tex.App. LEXIS 892 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Feb.7, 2007, pet. granted) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court, concluding that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant knew the crack pipe was evidence in the investigation-in-progress, and that the crack pipe was destroyed within the meaning of the law. Id.
We granted Appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the following two points: (1) Appellant's knowledge that a crack pipe was evidence in the criminal investigation that was in progress, and (2) that Appellant destroyed evidence, specifically a crack pipe, within the meaning of the law.
In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty of all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). The due-process guarantee demands that we reverse and order a judgment of acquittal if a rational jury would entertain a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Swearingen, 101 S.W.3d at 95.
Three elements define the offense of tampering with physical evidence: (1) knowing that an investigation or official proceeding is pending or in progress, (2) a person alters, destroys, or conceals any record, document, or thing, (3) with intent to impair its verity, legibility, or availability as evidence in the investigation or official proceeding. § 37.09(a)(1).
The three elements of section 37.09(a)(1) include "two different culpable mental states" — knowledge and intent. Stewart v. State, 240 S.W.3d 872, 874 (Tex. Crim.App.2007). The statute requires the knowledge of an investigation and the intent to impair a thing's availability as evidence. As defined by the Texas Penal Code, "[a] person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect ... to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware ... that the circumstances exist." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2003). In contrast, "[a] person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect ... to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to ... cause the result." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2003).
Appellant's indictment specifically alleged the following: "knowing that an investigation was in progress, to-wit: checking [Appellant] for weapons, [Appellant] intentionally and knowingly destroy[ed] drug paraphernalia, to-wit: a crack pipe, with intent to impair its verity and availability as evidence in the investigation."
Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence establishing his knowledge that the crack pipe was evidence in the criminal investigation that was in progress. He asserts that the State failed to prove that an investigation was in progress in which the broken crack pipe might have served as evidence. Using the analysis presented in Pannell v. State, 7 S.W.3d 222 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. ref'd), Appellant argues that when stepping on the crack pipe, he could not have intended to impair its availability as evidence in the investigation because he did not know that a drugs investigation was in progress. In Pannell, the Fifth Court of Appeals acquitted an appellant who threw marihuana out of a car window during a traffic investigation, concluding that section 37.09(a)(1) required the appellant to "be aware that the thing he altered, destroyed, or concealed was evidence in the investigation as it existed at the time of the alteration, destruction, or concealment." Id. at 223. The court reasoned that there was no investigation, pending or in progress, in which the marihuana could have served as evidence. Id. at 224.
In this case, the court of appeals accepted Pannell's statutory interpretation, requiring Appellant's awareness that the crack pipe was evidence in a criminal investigation that was in progress. In order to find this element satisfied, the court of appeals decided that the investigation-in-progress transformed from a weapons investigation to a drugs investigation the moment the crack pipe fell from Appellant's pants. Williams, 2007 WL 416543, at *4, 2007 Tex.App. LEXIS 892 at *7. Therefore, when Appellant stepped on the crack pipe, the investigation was no longer a weapons investigation, but was, at that point, a drugs investigation; and, Appellant would have been "aware" that the crack pipe was evidence in the investigation as it existed at the time of destruction. By categorizing the investigation in this way, the court harmonized the evidence destroyed, a crack pipe, with the investigation-in-progress, "an investigation for drugs and/or drug paraphernalia." Id.
Other cases following Pannell have similarly analyzed the events leading up to the alteration, destruction, or concealment of evidence in order to classify the investigation. See Whitlock v. State, No. 12-05-00206-CR, 2006 WL 1699597, at *3, 2006 Tex.App. LEXIS 5301, at *7 (Tex.App.-Tyler June 21, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Dooley v. State, 133 S.W.3d 374, 378 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd); Lumpkin v. State, 129 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd). This effort makes sense when the indictment does not specifically allege the type of investigation-in-progress. See Lumpkin, 129 S.W.3d at 662; Lewis v. State, 56 S.W.3d 617, 624 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
But the indictment in this case is not silent as to the title of the investigation. The problem with the court's analysis is that it ignores the language of the indictment, which specifically names the investigation-in-progress a "weapons" investigation, not "an investigation for drugs and/or drug paraphernalia."2 Williams, 2007 WL 416543, at *4, 2007 Tex.App. LEXIS 892 at *7. We do not need to change the title of the investigation from a weapons investigation to a drugs investigation in order to find Appellant in violation of section 37.09(a)(1). Pannell requires that change, but the statute does not. Pannell grafts a fourth element onto section 37.09(a)(1), and a narrow reading of the statute does not support Pannell's conclusion that a person must be "aware that the thing he altered, destroyed, or concealed was evidence in the investigation as it existed at the time of the alteration, destruction, or concealment." Pannell, 7 S.W.3d at 223. First, contrary to Pannell's interpretation, the statute includes two, not three, mental-state requirements: the knowledge of an investigation and the intent-the conscious objective-to impair a thing's availability as evidence in the investigation. Pannell's insertion of a fourth element adds a mental-state requirement not present in the language of the statute. Second, Pannell's additional element presumes that an offender will have evaluated and correctly assessed a thing's evidentiary status upon its destruction. By not requiring an exercise in evidentiary theory, the statute is more reflective of investigatory reality, envisioning an offender who intends for, but is not necessarily aware of, the impairment of something's role as evidence in the investigation.
In conclusion, Appellant's challenge depends upon an additional element to section 37.09(a)(1),...
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... ... Crim. App. 1997). An exception to this doctrine required the State to prove the surplusage as alleged where the indictment contained an extra or unnecessary allegation which only described something that was otherwise legally essential to charge the crime. See Williams v. State , 270 S.W.3d 140, 144 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ; Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 250 ; Eastep , 941 S.W.2d at 134 n.7. However, the surplusage doctrine, and its exception, was overruled in Gollihar when the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a hypothetically correct charge need not ... ...
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Tafel v. State
... ... Crim. App. 1997). An exception to this doctrine required the State to prove the surplusage as alleged where the indictment contained an extra or unnecessary allegation which only described something that was otherwise legally essential to charge the crime. See Williams v. State , 270 S.W.3d 140, 144 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ; Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 250 ; Eastep , 941 S.W.2d at 134 n.7. However, the surplusage doctrine, and its exception, was overruled in Gollihar when the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a hypothetically correct charge need not ... ...
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Tafel v. State
... ... Crim. App. 1997). An exception to this doctrine required the State to prove the surplusage as alleged where the indictment contained an extra or unnecessary allegation Page 38 which only described something that was otherwise legally essential to charge the crime. See Williams v ... State , 270 S.W.3d 140, 144 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 250; Eastep , 941 S.W.2d at 134 n.7. However, the surplusage doctrine, and its exception, was overruled in Gollihar when the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a hypothetically correct charge need not ... ...
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Tafel v. State
... ... Crim. App. 1997). An exception to this doctrine required the State to prove the surplusage as alleged where the indictment contained an extra or unnecessary allegation Page 38 which only described something that was otherwise legally essential to charge the crime. See Williams v ... State , 270 S.W.3d 140, 144 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Gollihar , 46 S.W.3d at 250; Eastep , 941 S.W.2d at 134 n.7. However, the surplusage doctrine, and its exception, was overruled in Gollihar when the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a hypothetically correct charge need not ... ...