Williams v. State
Decision Date | 05 May 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 39207,39207 |
Citation | 247 So.2d 425 |
Parties | John G. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Joseph F. McDermott, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Raymond Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a verdict and judgment convicting appellant John G. Williams, of the crime of rape (Fla.Stat. § 794.01, F.S.A.) without a recommendation of mercy by the jury. Jurisdiction of the appeal attached under Article V, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution, F.S.A. We affirm the judgment entered below.
The facts presented to the jury below included not only facts related to the commission of the rape offense for which appellant was convicted, but also facts pertaining to an unrelated murder committed by appellant shortly after he left the rape victim's home. 1 The propriety of connecting these events at trial is one of two issues on appeal; the other issue concerns the introduction of evidence over appellant's objection that the evidence was the result of an unconstitutional search and seizure.
The rape victim testified that she was awakened late at night in her Pinellas County home by the sounds of someone tripping over an electric fan placed in the doorway of her bedroom. She then heard a man say to her that 'she had been watched' and that he had 'come to make love to her.' This he did, twice, while holding her captive at gunpoint. The assailant left on foot shortly before the victim's mother, the only other occupant of the house, returned from a night out. The mother found her daughter in an hysterical condition. Fearful that the assailant was still in the area, the victim and her mother hid in the house for three-quarters of an hour before summoning help. During this time, they heard a gunshot in the distance.
Shortly after the time of night when the assailant left the rape scene, Mr. and Mrs. George Glasco heard noises outside their dwelling. They lived a block away from the rape victim's home. Mr. Glasco investigated. He was shot to death by the intruder, who vanished in the night.
The rape victim could not see her assailant well enough to identify has face because he kept the house in darkness and shied away from any light. But she could report the following: the assailant had 'dirty blond hair,' was close to six feet in height and was of medium build; he wore a white shirt, patched on one side, and dark trousers; his clothes were soiled; he had a pistol; he spoke of being in trouble with the police and of being in prison previously; and, finally, that he had been drinking.
Because of the last clue, the police checked the bars in the area. The proprietress of one bar readily identified the clothing as that having been worn by a patron earlier that evening. She said that the patron lived in the vicinity. Although she could not identify him by name, she did know that the patron was with a man named James Massey. The proprietress said that the patron appeared to have a tool of some kind in his back pocket because a handle was sticking out in the open.
Because the assailant kept the house in darkness, the victim could not identify him by his face; in fact, at preliminary proceedings, she identified the wrong man. The State was concerned with fulfilling its obligation of presenting a proper case, and it was realized that appellant had to be connected in time and place with the rape. Appellant's fingerprints and palm print were taken from the utility room where he had forced an entry into the house. But this showed only that he Had been there, not When he had been there. See Bryant v. State, 235 So.2d 721 (Fla.1970); Wilkerson v. State, 232 So.2d 217 (2nd D.C.A.Fla.1970); Ivey v. State, 176 So.2d 611 (3rd D.C.A.Fla.1965); Tirko v. State, 138 So.2d 388 (3rd D.C.A.Fla.1962). Pubic hair taken from the victim's bed had microscopic characteristics identical to appellant's pubic hair, but this is not conclusive as to identity. The ripple-soled shoe-print could also have been left at any time.
The State sought to establish appellant's presence by drawing upon evidence connected with the death of Mr. Glasco under the general rule that evidence of independent crimes is admissible to prove identity. Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479 (1925). Thus it was brought out at trial that while the victim and her mother were still hiding, they heard a shot fired somewhere in the neighborhood. It was also brought out that at this time, approximately three hundred yards away, Mr. Glasco was killed as he was investigating noises made by a prowler. Ballistics tests proved that the bullet which ended Mr. Glasco's life was fired from the pistol found in appellant's dwelling. Mrs. Glasco was allowed to testify briefly about the events leading to her husband's death.
A maneuver of this nature must be cautiously limited within the boundaries suggested by Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473 (Fla.1960), text 475, 476:
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