Williams v. State

• Decision Date: 05 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. WD 61791.,WD 61791.
• Parties: Richard WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

111 S.W.3d 556

Richard WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.

No. WD 61791.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

August 5, 2003.

Mark A. Grothoff, Columbia, MO, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., John M. Morris, III, and Richard A. Starnes, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

Before JAMES M. SMART, P.J., ROBERT G. ULRICH and LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JJ.

ROBERT ULRICH, Judge.

Richard Williams ("Mr.Williams") appeals the judgment of the motion court denying his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Williams sought to vacate his conviction for driving while intoxicated, section 577.010, RSMo 2000, and his sentence of eight years as a prior and persistent offender. Mr. Williams raises one point on appeal claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The judgment of the motion court is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural Background

Officer Shelley Jones of the Columbia, Missouri, Police Department was at a Break Time gas station on February 26, 2000, at about 11:00 p.m. when she observed Mr. Williams driving a blue minivan out of the parking lot without its headlights or tail lights turned on. Officer Jones followed Mr. Williams out of the parking lot and activated her emergency lights. When Mr. Williams did not pull his van over to the side of the road, Officer Jones activated the police vehicle's siren. Mr. Williams continued driving down the street, weaving and swaying within his lane of traffic. About a mile later, Mr. Williams pulled into a parking lot. He had been driving about 25 to 30 miles per hour in a 35 mile an hour speed zone.

Officer Jones told Mr. Williams to roll down his window. She had to repeat herself between five and ten times before Mr. Williams responded by yelling that the windows were electric. Officer Jones told Mr. Williams to start the ignition so that he could roll down the windows. She had to repeat herself several times. Another officer who had arrived on the scene used the public announcement system on his police car to tell Mr. Williams to roll down the windows of his vehicle and throw his keys outside the van. This officer had to repeatedly give the directive over the PA system before Mr. Williams responded. When Mr. Williams eventually complied, the officers rushed the van, opened the door, and pulled him out of the van.

Upon Mr. Williams exiting the vehicle, police observed that his speech was slurred, he appeared incoherent, his pupils were contracted, and his eyes were staring and bloodshot. At one point during the stop, Officer Jones observed Mr. Williams' eyes roll back so that she could see the whites of his eyes. Officer Jones testified that she believed that he was under the influence of a controlled substance because she did not smell any alcohol on him. She did not conduct a field sobriety test because Mr. Williams has a prosthetic leg.

Mr. Williams had difficulty walking and standing once he was outside his vehicle. He was swaying and wobbly. The officers at the scene had to assist him to keep him from falling. Officer Jones testified that she believed that his inability to stand without swaying was in excess of what she would expect from a person with a prosthetic leg. Mr. Williams exhibited major mood swings during the stop. He went from being cooperative to uncooperative and, at one point, became so violent officers had to restrain him. After placing him in the back seat of the patrol car, Officer Jones took him to the Columbia, Missouri, police station.

At the police station, Officer Jones advised Mr. Williams of his Miranda rights and the Missouri Implied Consent Law, section 577.041, RSMo 2000, and asked if he would submit to a chemical test of his urine. He consented to a urine test. When asked if he was on drugs, Mr. Williams admitted to having taken LSD. At that point, he became violent, yelling and screaming, and swinging his arms around. Officer Jones placed him in a holding cell until he calmed down. As he was being placed into the cell, Mr. Williams again admitted that he had taken LSD. After Mr. Williams calmed down, another officer, Mike Youtsey, took him from the cell and to the restroom to collect a urine sample. Once they were in the restroom, Officer Youtsey asked Mr. Williams to provide a urine sample. Mr. Williams did not respond. When Officer Youtsey asked Mr. Williams a second time if he would provide a urine sample, Mr. Williams loudly screamed twice that he would not give a sample. Both Officer Jones and Officer Youtsey testified that they believed that Mr. Williams was intoxicated and incapable of operating a motor vehicle.

Mr. Williams was charged by information with the Class D felony of driving while intoxicated, section 577.010, RSMo 2000. His cause was tried before a jury on January 23, 2001, in the Circuit Court of Boone County. The jury found Mr. Williams guilty of driving while intoxicated. A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. At the request of Mr. Williams' trial counsel, the Board of Probation and Parole did not interview Mr. Williams. Much of the information for the PSI report was taken from a PSI report in a previous case. The prior PSI report indicated that Mr. Williams had a significant history of psychiatric illness and hospitalization and suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. It also stated that he was a regular user of alcohol and had experimented with marijuana, LSD, MDA, opium, and cocaine. The trial court sentenced Mr. Williams as a prior and persistent offender to a prison term of eight years.

Mr. Williams filed a notice of appeal of his conviction on March 8, 2001. This court affirmed his conviction on November 27, 2001, pursuant to Rule 30.25(b). State v. Williams, 62 S.W.3d 97 (Mo.App. W.D., 2001).

On December 20, 2001, Mr. Williams filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his judgment or sentence. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended motion, alleging, inter alia, that Mr. Williams' trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental illness and present evidence of his mental illness as an alternative explanation for his behavior on February 26, 2000. An evidentiary hearing on Mr. William's postconviction relief motion was held on May 10, 2002. Mr. Williams, his trial counsel, and Dr. Bruce Harry, a staff psychiatrist at Fulton State Hospital, testified at the hearing. The motion court submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law denying Mr. Williams' motion on June 13, 2002. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of the denial of a postconviction motion is limited to determining whether the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous. Middleton v. State, 80 S.W.3d 799, 804 (Mo. banc 2002); Rule 29.15(k). Findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made. Barnum v. State, 52 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Mo.App. W.D.2001) (citing Moore v. State, 827 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Mo. banc 1992)). The motion court's findings are presumed correct. Potts v. State, 22 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Mo.App. W.D.2000) (citations omitted).

The movant has the burden of proving the movant's claims for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 29.15(i). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant must show that trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under similar circumstances and that he was prejudiced thereby. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Both prongs must be satisfied. Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791, 795-96 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 804 (1990). Failure to satisfy either prong results in the reviewing court not considering the other. Id.

A movant has a heavy burden in establishing the first prong of the test because there is a strong presumption that counsel provided competent assistance. Gardner v. State, 96 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Mo.App. W.D. 2003) (citing Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Mo. banc 2002)). To satisfy the first prong, a movant must demonstrate that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 426 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674). A movant can do this by pinpointing specific acts or omissions of counsel that resulted from unreasonable professional judgment. Id. As to the second prong, a movant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Wolfe v. State, 96 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Mo. banc 2003) (citing State v. Hall, 982 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Mo. banc 1998)). A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Analysis

Mr. Williams' sole point on appeal claims that the motion court clearly erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental condition. Specifically, he claims that his trial counsel had a duty to investigate whether he had a mental illness because she suspected that he had a learning disability. Mr. Williams asserts that an investigation would have revealed that he suffered from schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. He contends that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to investigate his mental illness because she could have presented his mental illness to the jury as an alternative explanation for his behavior. Mr. Williams claims that such evidence would have led to his acquittal.

Trial counsel's failure to investigate Mr. William's mental illness does not automatically entitle Mr. Williams to...