Middleton v. State, SC 83909.

Citation80 S.W.3d 799
Decision Date11 June 2002
Docket NumberNo. SC 83909.,SC 83909.
PartiesJohn J. MIDDLETON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

William J. Swift, Asst. Public Defender, Columbia, for Appellant.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Shaun J. Mackelprang, Asst. Attorney General, Jefferson City, Respondent.

DUANE BENTON, Judge.

A jury convicted John J. Middleton of two counts of first-degree murder and two counts of armed criminal action, for shooting Randy Hamilton and Stacey Hodge. The jury assessed two death sentences, which the circuit court imposed. This Court affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Middleton, 998 S.W.2d 520 (Mo. banc 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1167, 120 S.Ct. 1189, 145 L.Ed.2d 1094 (2000).

Defendant then moved for post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. Rule 29.15. This Court has exclusive jurisdiction of the appeal. Mo. Coast. art. V, sec. 10; order of June 16, 1988. Affirmed.

I. Facts

On direct appeal, this Court stated the following facts.

In 1995, several drug dealers were arrested in northern Missouri. Defendant, also a drug dealer, worried that informants would implicate him. He said there were "some snitches that should be taken care of," because he did not want to go back to prison. He mentioned several names, including Randy "Happy" Hamilton.

The next day, defendant and his friend, Maggie Hodges, met the two victims on a gravel road. Defendant shot Randy Hamilton in the back once with an SKS rifle. Defendant shot Stacey Hodge in the back three times. Defendant then shot Hamilton in the head, killing him. Defendant's friend killed Hodge by shooting her in the head with another SKS rifle. Both bodies were placed in the trunk of Hamilton's car. Defendant drove the car, looking for a place to dispose of the bodies. Defendant's friend followed in a truck.

Driving around, defendant saw Danny Spurling. Defendant — covered in blood and driving Hamilton's car — said that he had "taken care" of Hamilton. He asked Spurling what to do with the bodies, indicating that he might burn them in Hamilton's old house. The next morning, defendant gave Spurling the stereo from Hamilton's car, saying "they were really going to freak out when they found those two." Defendant had a written list of names, and asked if Spurling knew anyone on the list.

A week and a half later, defendant stated "there was a narc around and they were going to take care of it." He mentioned his "hit list," and several names on it, including Hamilton, Alfred Pinegar,1 and William Worley. Defendant offered a mutual acquaintance $3,500 to set up a meeting with Worley.

On June 25, 1995, John Thomas and defendant discussed informants at defendant's home. Defendant listed several people who "needed to be taken care of," including Hamilton, Pinegar, and Worley. Thomas noticed two SKS rifles and a box belonging to Hamilton. When Thomas asked about the box, defendant replied: "the guy who owned that box wouldn't be needing it no more."

About the same time, defendant told an Iowa friend: "I'd knowed `Happy' for 15 [years]. He knew enough to put me away for life. I done `Happy.'" Defendant also gave the Iowa friend several guns, including two SKS rifles, which the police later recovered.

Defendant was arrested for another murder (Pinegar's) in late June 1995. In July, Hamilton's car was found in the woods where it had been abandoned. The car stereo was missing. In the trunk were the victims' bodies. Bullet fragments from Stacy Hodge's body displayed class characteristics consistent with the SKS rifles that defendant gave away.

Awaiting trial in the county jail, defendant confessed to a fellow inmate. The inmate testified that defendant described the murders, admitted killing Hamilton and Hodge because they were informants, and acknowledged hiding their bodies and taking the rifles to Iowa.

II. Standard of Review

In this Rule 29.15 case, defendant must prove his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Rule 29.15(i). This Court reviews, for clear error, the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rule 29.15(k); Moss v. State, 10 S.W.3d 508, 511 (Mo. banc 2000). "Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Moss, 10 S.W.3d at 511.

For ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show (1) his attorney's conduct was not reasonable, and (2) prejudice: "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Courts should defer to trial counsel, and not second-guess with the benefit of hindsight. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Reasonable trial strategy cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel. Clayton v. State, 63 S.W.3d 201, 206 (Mo. banc 2001).

III. Guilt Phase
A. Undisclosed Deals

Defendant claims that the prosecution did not disclose deals made for the testimony of John Thomas and Danny Spurling. "Prosecutors must disclose, even without a request, exculpatory evidence, including evidence that may be used to impeach a government witness." State v. Robinson, 835 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1992). See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Rule 25.03. "Deals" — including plea agreements negotiated with witnesses — must be disclosed. Hutchison v. State, 59 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Mo. banc 2001).

1. John Thomas

On June 8, 1995, Thomas was charged with selling drugs, a class B felony. On February 27, 1998, the associate circuit judge wrote this docket entry:

Δ appears with counsel, Mr. Gary Allen, and waives preliminary hearing in open court. State appears by Ms. Chris Stallings, and state advises delay in prosecution due to Δ's participation as witness in companion proceedings.

Δ band [sic] over to Div. I and to appear at 9 a.m., March 17, 1998, and file to be certified to said division.

On March 17, Thomas waived arraignment and pled not guilty, with the case continued to April 21. On March 31, he testified in the trial of this case. On April 21, Thomas pled guilty to attempting to sell drugs, a class C felony. On September 10, 1998, the court suspended imposition of sentence, placing him on five years of supervised probation.

Defendant's trial counsel knew of Thomas's pending charge, questioning him about it at trial (as recorded on six transcript pages). Thomas denied making a deal, and blamed the local prosecutor for the delay.2

Defendant contends that the circumstantial evidence shows that Thomas had an undisclosed deal to testify against him. In Commonwealth v. Strong, an exchange of letters showed pre-trial plea negotiations. 563 Pa. 455, 761 A.2d 1167, 1170, 1174 (2000). The witness offered to plead guilty for a 36-month sentence. Id. at 1174. The state and the witness never reached an "ironclad" agreement. Id. But, after testifying, the witness received a 40-month sentence for murder and kidnapping. Id. Based on all the facts, the court found an "understanding," which should have been disclosed. Id. at 1174-75.

Here, defendant did not prove any understanding between any prosecutor and Thomas. The motion court did not clearly err.

2. Danny Spurling

When defendant was charged with the two murders, Spurling had eight pending criminal charges in Missouri. Two of the charges were dismissed in 1996, nineteen months before Spurling testified in defendant's trial. Fourteen months before testifying, he negotiated a plea agreement, pleading guilty to two charges. Twelve months before testifying, the other four charges were dismissed. No charges were pending when Spurling testified against defendant.

Defendant argues, in effect, that the pleas and dismissals can be explained only as an undisclosed deal. Defendant must, however, do more than speculate. He must show that the plea was more than the common method to resolve charges. He must demonstrate why the other charges were dismissed. Moreover, Spurling testified that he did not have a deal. Given the paucity of supporting evidence, the motion court did not clearly err in concluding there was no deal.

Alternatively, defendant claims that the dismissals should have been disclosed. This claim also fails. The dismissals resolved the charges, removing Spurling's incentive to lie in order to obtain favorable treatment. State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 180 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 953, 118 S.Ct. 376, 139 L.Ed.2d 293 (1997). Absent evidence of an understanding, the prosecutor was not required to disclose the dismissals.

B. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel
1. Required Mental State for First-Degree Murder

Defendant claims his attorneys were ineffective for not arguing that he lacked the mental state required for first-degree murder.

During guilt phase, defendant called no witnesses, instead attacking the credibility of the State's witnesses. In closing, his attorney emphasized that the State did not prove the murders beyond a reasonable doubt.

During penalty phase, Dr. Lipman — a neuropharmacologist — testified that defendant's chronic methamphetamine abuse caused symptoms (delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia) functionally identical to paranoid schizophrenia. In penalty closing, defendant's attorney argued that he should not get the death penalty, invoking (1) the excessiveness of imposing additional death sentences, when he already had one (for the Pinegar murder), (2) mercy, (3) the weak evidence against him, and (4) the corrosive effect of drug use on his thought processes.

Defendant now argues that counsel was ineffective for presenting inconsistent guilt and penalty theories. He contends counsel should have asserted that he lacked the...

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