Williams v. The State
| Decision Date | 04 October 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. S10G0310.,S10G0310. |
| Parties | WILLIAMS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
288 Ga. 7
700 S.E.2d 564
WILLIAMS
v.
The STATE.
No. S10G0310.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Oct. 4, 2010.
Danielle P. Roberts, Tony L. Axam, Atlanta, for appellant.
Richard A. Mallard, Dist. Atty., Michael T. Muldrew, Keith A. McIntyre, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.
THOMPSON, Justice.
After a jury trial, appellant Tosha Williams was acquitted of malice murder but found guilty of felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault. She was convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment on the voluntary manslaughter charge. The jury's verdict on the felony murder charge was vacated pursuant to Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992), and the aggravated assault conviction was merged into the conviction for voluntary manslaughter. See OCGA § 16-1-7. The trial court subsequently granted Williams' motion for new trial, finding, in relevant part, that the jury had been selected in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). After the grant of her motion for new trial, Williams filed a plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds seeking to preclude a second prosecution on the charges of felony murder and aggravated assault. The trial court denied the plea, and the parties initiated jury selection. Before trial began, Williams pled guilty to aggravated assault and appealed the judgment and sentence, as well as the denial of her plea of double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See Williams v. State, 300 Ga.App. 305, 684 S.E.2d 430 (2009). We granted Williams' petition for certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the denial of the plea in bar. We now reverse.
1. The Court of Appeals first rejected Williams' double jeopardy defense on its “merits,” holding she was precluded from asserting a constitutional defense of double jeopardy to a second prosecution on the greater offense of felony murder because a defendant waives the right to plead former jeopardy when she secures a new trial through her own efforts. Williams, supra, 300 Ga.App. at 305-306, 684 S.E.2d 430. As a general rule, re-prosecution for the same crime based upon the same facts is not barred if subsequent proceedings resulted in the setting aside, reversal, or vacating of the conviction, unless the accused was adjudged not guilty or there was a finding that the evidence did not authorize the verdict. Keener v. State, 238 Ga. 7, 8-9, 230 S.E.2d 846 (1976); Daniels v. State, 165 Ga.App. 397(1), 299 S.E.2d 746 (1983). See also OCGA § 16-1-8(d)(2). This rule, however, has no application to the present case where Williams successfully appealed her conviction for voluntary manslaughter and faced retrial not only for the voluntary manslaughter charge but also for the greater offense of felony murder. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 193-194, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), “[c]onditioning an appeal of one offense on a coerced surrender of a valid plea of former jeopardy on another offense exacts
a forfeiture in plain conflict with the constitutional bar against double jeopardy.” Accordingly, we find no waiver of Williams' right to plead double jeopardy. 1
2. Williams contends her double jeopardy rights were violated when the State sought to retry her on charges of felony murder and aggravated assault because she was implicitly acquitted of these charges at the first trial. See Edge, supra. In the first trial, Williams was found guilty of felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and aggravated assault. Applying the modified merger rule of Edge, the trial court vacated the jury's verdicts as to felony murder and aggravated assault and entered a judgment of conviction against Williams on the charge of voluntary manslaughter.
[4] [5] The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, states that no person shall “ ‘be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’ ” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). See 1983 Ga. Const. Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVIII (“No person shall be put in jeopardy of life or liberty more than once for the same offense except when a new trial has been granted after conviction or in case of mistrial.”). It protects criminal defendants from three governmental abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense. See Brown, supra, 432 U.S. 161, 165-166, 97 S.Ct. 2221. “The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.” Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970) quoting United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Thus, a conviction or verdict of acquittal is an absolute bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Green, supra, 355 U.S. at 188, 78 S.Ct. 221. The issue in this case is whether application of Edge to a verdict of guilty for felony murder bars subsequent prosecution on the same felony murder charge.
In Price, the United States Supreme Court considered the somewhat related issue of whether double jeopardy precluded the State from retrying an accused for murder after an earlier guilty
verdict on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter had been set aside because of trial error. The jury's verdict in that case made no reference to the greater charge of murder. Applying fundamental principles of double jeopardy, the Court held that retrial was limited to the lesser included offense. Id. at 329, 90 S.Ct. 1757. Its conclusion stemmed from its decision in Green, supra, in which the accused was tried and convicted of first-degree murder after an earlier guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder had been set aside on appeal. The Court determined in Green that the accused's jeopardy for first-degree murder came to an end when the jury was discharged at the end of his first trial. This conclusion was based on two premises: (1) the first jury's verdict of guilty on the second-degree murder charge was an implicit acquittal on the charge of first-degree murder, and (2) the accused's jeopardy on the...
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