Williamson v. Dallas County, 5391

• Decision Date: 06 February 1975
• Docket Number: No. 5391,5391
• Citation: 519 S.W.2d 495
• Parties: Howard WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DALLAS, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 495

519 S.W.2d 495

Howard WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF DALLAS, Appellee.

No. 5391.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas,

Waco.

Feb. 6, 1975.

Rehearing Denied March 6, 1975.

Charles J. Winikates, Paul E. Daugherty, Jr., Dallas, for appellant.

Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Edward R. Blackstone, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, for appellee.

OPINION

JAMES, Justice.

This is a condemnation case. The County of Dallas, Plaintiff-Appellee, will be referred to herein as 'County'; and Howard Williamson, Defendant-Appellant, is hereinafter referred to as 'Landowner'. County filed this suit in eminent domain on March 7, 1973, in the trial court to take .303 acre of land belonging to Landowner for the purpose of building a public road. The land condemned is a strip near the center of Landowner's tract and divides his tract into two separate tracts. On March 7, 1973, the same day suit was filed, the special commissioners after a hearing made an award of $3670.00, which amount the County on May 11, 1973, put up as a deposit into the registry of the court under the provisions of Article 3268, Vernon's Annotated Texas Civil Statutes. Landowner filed his objections to the award on March 14, 1973, and withdrew the award money on June 1, 1973. Thereafter the County entered Landowner's land, took possession of the condemned strip and cleared it and let a contract for construction of a public road known as the 'Elam Road' project. This project was located on right of way of which Landowner's strip was a part. The contract for the Elam Road Project was awarded for approximately $1,400,000.00. Although the contract had been awarded at the time of the temporary injunction hearing hereinafter referred to, construction of the road had not been commenced at the time of such hearing.

On May 15, 1974 (about eleven and a half months after Landowner withdrew the award money) Landowner filed an application for injunction against the County. Landowner alleged in effect that he was in the business of moving houses and buildings and used the real property in question for the purpose of building, storing and repairing equipment; that the north end of his tract has a residence in which Landowner resides, whereas the south end has a building in which he stores tools and parts. The right of way strip goes through the center of Landowner's tract and cuts his land in two, and said strip was in the area where he kept most of his moving equipment and made his repairs to same. He alleged that since the County has taken possession of the subject strip of land, his tools and equipment are crammed and stored on the remainder of his property, and that this works a great inconvenience upon his business operations, has materially damaged his income, and, 'for all practical purposes, he has been displaced.'

As a result thereof, Landowner claims that he is entitled to be furnished 'Relocation Assistance' by the County under the provisions of Article 3266b, ¹ V.A.T.C.S. He alleges the County has no 'Relocation Assistance' program, and that this is in violation of Article 3266b, and prays for a temporary injunction against the County, enjoining said County from 'going forward with the above styled and numbered condemnation suit and with proceeding with construction upon the aforementioned real property, and with interfering with Defendant Landowner's use of the land until such time as the Plaintiff (County) complies with the provisions of the Relocation Assistance Program . . ..'

The trial court after a hearing denied the temporary injunction prayed for by Landowner, from which order Landowner appeals to this court. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

By his first two points of error, Landowner-Appellant asserts error of the trial court in denying the temporary injunction, 'because the County has been ignoring its obligation under Article 3266b, V.A.T.C.S., to formulate rules and regulations to offer relocation assistance to Landowner, and to offer such relocation assistance to Landowner'; and moreover, since the County was not enjoined, Landowner will 'never receive the relocation assistance that the Legislature intends for him to have.' He further asserts error on the part of the trial court for finding that injunction is too harsh a remedy, and for the trial court's finding that Landowner had waived his rights to relocation assistance when he withdrew the award money.

We overrule Appellant's points of error, and are obliged to affirm the trial court's judgment for the following reasons:

The law is well settled in this state that the purpose of the issuance of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo in regard to the matter in controversy, and not to determine the respective rights of the parties under the cause of action asserted or defenses urged. James v. E. Weinstein & Sons (Tex.Com.App.1929) 12 S.W.2d 959, opinion approved by the Supreme Court; Story v. Story (1944) 142 Tex. 212, 176 S.W.2d 925; Transport Co. of Texas v. Robertson Transports (1953) 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549.

If the effect of the granting of a temporary injunction does more than preserve the status of the property as it had theretofore existed, and accomplishes the whole object of the suit, it would be improper for the court to grant same, as the legitimate purpose of the temporary injunction is merely to preserve the existing condition until a final hearing can be had on the merits. The court is without authority to divest a party...