Willis v. Fugro Chance, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:07-CV-353. |
| Parties | Stephen L. WILLIS and Corinna J. Willis, Plaintiffs, v. FUGRO CHANCE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
William B. Coffey, Jr. of Coffey & Browne, Bryan Adam Terrell, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiffs.
James M. Tompkins, Lynne Jurek Shannon, and Ron Thomas Capehart of Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith, Houston, TX, for Defendant.
Pending before the court is Defendant Fugro Chance, Inc.'s ("Fugro Chance") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 14). Fugro Chance seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs Stephen L. Willis ("Willis") and Corinna J. Willis's ("Mrs. Willis") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") claims for negligence pursuant to the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30104-30105 (formerly 46 App. U.S.C. § 688) (the "Jones Act"). Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment is warranted.
Fugro Chance, a Louisiana corporation, provides a range of survey services to the energy industry, including positioning offshore drilling rigs, production platforms, and pipeline lay barges. In order to render these services, Fugro Chance maintains a Gulf of Mexico database containing information concerning the positions of wells, pipelines, and hazards in the Gulf of Mexico as well as the locations of shipwrecks, block boundary polygons, shipping fairways, and underwater hazards on the Outer Continental Shelf. Fugro Chance employees utilize this database to assist clients in planning projects and to provide information to field crews in order to avoid delays and assure safe operations.
Willis was employed by Fugro Chance as a survey party chief from December 1994 to August 2002 and from November 2004 to June 2007. In this role, Willis assisted in moving vessels and other devices, such as semi-submersible drilling rigs, jack-up drilling rigs, submersible drilling rigs, pipe laying barges, derrick barges, and coring vessels, from dry-docks, harbors, and similar places to drill site locations. Equipped with a global star satellite telephone and other electronic equipment, Willis was responsible for consulting global positioning satellites, maps, and Fugro Chance's database and notifying the rig mover of potential underwater obstructions and hazards. Relying on information from Willis as well as his own observations of the monitors, the rig mover would then order tug boat captains to make the proper navigational adjustments.
Plaintiffs allege that, on January 12, 2007, Willis was exposed to mercury and other toxic chemicals while aboard the LESTER PETTUS, a submersible offshore drilling rig leased by operator Century Exploration New Orleans, Inc. ("Century Exploration") but owned and "crewed" by Noble Drilling Services, Inc. ("Noble Drilling"). At the time of the incident, Fugro Chance had been retained by Century Exploration to provide navigational information to the rig mover of the LESTER PETTUS, a Noble Drilling employee, in order to assist him in moving the rig from a shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi, to an offshore location. This information was to be provided by Willis and his two Fugro Chance assistants while aboard the LESTER PETTUS.
When Willis arrived at the rig on the night in question, he reported to the toolpusher and was told where to set up his equipment. Willis asserts that, prior to departure from the shipyard, the ballast operator informed him that the rig was not ready to leave. Despite this purported statement, the rig proceeded to depart. While en route, valves in the area where Willis was working malfunctioned, and Willis and his equipment were allegedly showered with mercury and other toxic chemicals. According to Plaintiffs, as a result of this exposure, Willis sustained severe bodily injury, including damage to his brain and central nervous system.
On May 3, 2007, Willis and his wife, both Texas residents, filed suit against Fugro Chance in the 356th Judicial District of Hardin County, Texas, asserting claims of negligence pursuant to the Jones Act.1 As a result of his injuries, Willis purports to have suffered physical pain, mental anguish, and loss of earning capacity; incurred reasonable and necessary medical expenses; and sustained physical impairment, disfigurement, and loss of household services. Mrs. Willis additionally claims loss of consortium and interference with marital and family relations. Consequently, Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages under the Jones Act.
On June 8, 2007, Fugro Chance removed this case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 on the basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as well as the court's admiralty jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h). Plaintiffs filed a motion for remand on July 3, 2007, arguing that Fugro Chance is barred from removing a Jones Act case. On September 4, 2007, Fugro Chance filed the instant motion for summary judgment. In its motion, Fugro Chance contends that because Willis is not a seaman, Plaintiffs cannot seek seaman's remedies pursuant to the Jones Act. Specifically, Fugro Chance argues that Willis does not have seaman status because he was not connected to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir.2003); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002).
Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving parties may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir.2006); Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004); Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir.2003); Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1160, 120 S.Ct. 1171, 145 L.Ed.2d 1080 (2000). "[T]he court must review the record `taken as a whole.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348); see Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.2005). All the evidence must be construed "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or resolving any factual disputes." Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1996); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097; Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 401 F.3d at 350; Smith, 391 F.3d at 624; Malacara, 353 F.3d at 398; Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.2003); Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 471 (5th Cir.2001); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 951, 122 S.Ct. 347, 151 L.Ed.2d 262 (2001). The evidence of the nonmovants is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in their favor. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 401, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505); Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir.2004); Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003); Martinez, 338 F.3d at 411; Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 815, 124 S.Ct. 66, 157 L:Ed.2d 30 (2003); Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.2002).
Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovants fail to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to their case on which they bear the burden of proof at trial. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S.Ct. 1689, 123 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2005); Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir.2004). "In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Plaintiffs claim that Willis was injured while aboard the LESTER PETUS due to...
To continue reading
Request your trial