Willis v. State

Decision Date22 May 2002
Docket NumberNo. 01-74.,01-74.
Citation46 P.3d 890,2002 WY 79
PartiesFranklin S. WILLIS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Nadine McLeod, Casper, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.

Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Representing Appellee.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Franklin Willis was convicted of felony larceny by a bailee under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(b) (LexisNexis 2001) for selling three horses which were entrusted to his care. He appeals his judgment and sentence claiming insufficient evidence and certain evidentiary errors. Finding no error, we affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Mr. Willis presents the following issues for our review:

I.
Whether the evidence was insufficient to show a felonious taking as the appellant had an honest good faith belief that he had right and title to the property[.]
II.
Whether the Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial as [g]uaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the United States and the Wyoming Constitutions when the trial court erred by its refusal to allow the appellant to introduce evidence to show basis for appellant's belief that the horses had been given him by Sondeno.
III.
Whether the appellant was denied his right to a fair trial when the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony by the state to improperly impeach its own witness[.]
IV.
Whether the evidence [was] insufficient to find that the property sold on the date charged met the felony limit[.]
V.
Was the cumulative effect of the errors discussed above such that the appellant was denied his right to a fair trial[?]

The State of Wyoming phrases the issues as:

I. Was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Appellant's conviction?
II. Was Appellant denied a fair trial by the district court's evidentiary rulings?
FACTS

[¶ 3] Mr. Willis and Kelly Sondeno initially met in the 1980s when they were both raising and racing thoroughbred horses. In June 1995, Ms. Sondeno experienced difficulties feeding and maintaining the horses she owned. As a result, Mr. Willis agreed to lend her $6,500, to be repaid within a year. In lieu of interest on the executed promissory note, Ms. Sondeno gave Mr. Willis two geldings. Ms. Sondeno insists that, at the same time, they also entered into a lease agreement whereby Mr. Willis would care for several of her horses, breed them to his paint stallions, and keep the foals. Ms. Sondeno claims she sent several horses1 to Mr. Willis, including the three mares that are the subject of Mr. Willis' criminal prosecution: Wears Like Iron, Miss Pitty Pat, and Hockey Jeans. Although he admitted he did not receive a bill of sale, Mr. Willis argues Ms. Sondeno gave all the horses to him because she could not afford to appropriately care for them.

[¶ 4] Over time, Ms. Sondeno made several trips to Mr. Willis' property to check on the horses. In January 1997, Mr. Willis notified her that one of the three mares passed away. In the summer of 1997, Ms. Sondeno went to check on her horses and noticed the other two mares were gone. Mr. Willis told her a veterinarian had put them down due to poor health. In February 1999, Ms. Sondeno became suspicious and did an inventory of the horses. She was able to find only eight. When she confronted Mr. Willis, he maintained he owned the horses.

[¶ 5] In May 1999, a search warrant was executed, and the Wyoming Livestock Board seized the eight remaining horses. An ensuing investigation revealed the three mares did not die as Mr. Willis previously stated but were sold by him for slaughter at the Billings Livestock Commission auction (the auction) on August 24, 1996. The investigation also disclosed Mr. Willis had listed himself as the owner of the horses and he had received a check from the sale in the amount of $1,291.24.

[¶ 6] As a result of his sale of the three mares, Mr. Willis was charged with one count of felony larceny by a bailee under § 6-3-402(b), and he pleaded not guilty. A jury trial commenced on March 13, 2000, and he was convicted on March 14, 2000. The trial court sentenced him to five years' probation and ordered him to pay $9,500 in restitution and $100 to the crime victims' compensation account. He appeals from his judgment and sentence.

DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[¶ 7] Mr. Willis contends the state did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for felony larceny by a bailee. Specifically, he argues he had a good faith belief that Ms. Sondeno gave him ownership of the horses; therefore, he could not be guilty of the crime charged. He further asserts the state did not present sufficient evidence to establish the horses were worth $500 or more, an element necessary to support his conviction. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-402(c)(i) (LexisNexis 2001).

[¶ 8] When addressing a claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction for a crime, we apply the following standard:

This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did.

Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995) (citation omitted); see also Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo.2000),

cert. denied, 532 U.S. 980, 121 S.Ct. 1620, 149 L.Ed.2d 483 (2001). This inquiry does not require a court to determine whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo.1985). Rather, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This standard gives the trier of fact the responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Id. "`Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.'" Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)).

[¶ 9] The evidence must be evaluated in the context of the elements of felony larceny by a bailee, which are set forth in § 6-3-402(b):

(b) A bailee, a public servant as defined by W.S. 6-5-101(a)(vi) or any person entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or other property who, with intent to steal or to deprive the owner of the property, converts the property to his own or another's use is guilty of larceny.

To sustain Mr. Willis' conviction for felony larceny by a bailee, the state had to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

1. On or about the 24th day of August, 1996
2. In Big Horn County, Wyoming
3. The Defendant, Franklin S. Willis
4. While a bailee entrusted with the control, care or custody of any money or property
5. With intent to steal or deprive the owner of the property
6. Converted the money or property to his own use; and
7. The value of the money or property converted was $500.00 or more.

[¶ 10] Mr. Willis does not dispute he sold the mares and retained the proceeds of that sale. He does dispute, however, that he was a bailee and intended to steal or deprive Ms. Sondeno of her ownership interest in the horses. We conclude sufficient evidence was presented at trial to allow a reasonable and rational jury to find the essential elements of the crime of felony larceny by a bailee beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶ 11] The evidence favorable to the state consisted of testimony that in July 1995 Mr. Willis agreed to lend Ms. Sondeno $6,500 in exchange for two geldings as interest. She then agreed to lease him several mares to breed with his paint stallions, and, in turn, his care for the horses would ease her financial concerns. In 1996, Ms. Sondeno sent the three mares that are the subject of Mr. Willis' criminal conviction to him without a bill of sale. She claims she never transferred ownership of the horses to Mr. Willis. Rather, she maintains they made an oral agreement that Mr. Willis would lease the mares for a period of almost four years and she fully expected their return at the end of the lease term.

[¶ 12] Meanwhile, Mr. Willis told Ms. Sondeno that the three mares passed away. After her suspicions were raised, however, she confronted Mr. Willis and learned the three mares were sold at the auction. Mr. Willis later admitted he sold the mares because they were barren and unable to breed with his stallions. This testimony was corroborated by Duane Homewood who stated that, while employed with the Wyoming Livestock Board, he performed a brand inspection for three mares that Mr. Willis intended to sell at the auction. Moreover, a sales receipt for three mares totaling $1,291.24 was introduced.

[¶ 13] Two additional witnesses supported Ms. Sodeno's assertion that Mr. Willis was merely a bailee with no ownership interest in the horses. Both witnesses testified they had conversations with Mr. Willis, who told them he was going to use the horses for breeding purposes until Ms. Sondeno became financially secure. Mr. Willis' claim that he in good faith believed he owned the horses and therefore could not have committed the crime charged was fully presented to the jury and clearly rejected...

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