Willson v. Northern P. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1893
• Citation: 32 P. 468,5 Wash. 621
• Parties: WILLSON v. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

32 P. 468

5 Wash. 621

WILLSON v. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 31, 1893

Appeal from superior court, King county; T. J. Humes, Judge.

Action by Bessie M. Willson against the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to recover damages for a wrongful ejection from defendant's train. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

For dissenting opinion, see 34 P. 146.

Mitchell Ashton & Chapman and Andrew F. Burleigh, for appellant.

Thompson Edsen & Humphries, for respondent.

SCOTT J.

On June 29, 1891, the respondent purchased a ticket from Vincennes Ind., to Seattle, Wash., via St. Paul, Minn over appellant's road. On July 2d, soon after leaving St. Paul, the ticket exchanger passed through the train, and took up the tickets of the passengers, giving them exchange tickets in return. By mistake the respondent was given an exchange ticket to Missoula, Mont., instead of to Seattle. The mistake was unnoticed at the time, and respondent traveled upon this ticket, over the various divisions of appellant's road, from St. Paul to Missoula, arriving there on the 4th day of July. Just before reaching this point, the conductor of the train took up the respondent's ticket, whereupon he was informed by her that her destination was Seattle; that her original ticket, which had been taken up, was purchased to that point. After some conversation the conductor said to respondent that he would telegraph back, and undertake to ascertain the facts, and get the mistake rectified. He did telegraph, accordingly, and received an answer stating that "Mrs. Walker's ticket was to Missoula, Montana." It seems that a mistake was made in the name, in sending this answer. The conductor claims that he only sent one telegram, and that this was an answer to it, and that the name of Mrs. Walker was evidently meant for Miss Willson. He then informed respondent that she would have to purchase a ticket to Seattle, or he could not carry her any further than Missoula. The price of a ticket from Missoula to Seattle was $30.30, and respondent did not have sufficient money with her to pay for one, of which fact she informed the conductor. Some of the other passengers had become interested in respondent's behalf, and protested against her being compelled to leave the train. But the conductor insisted there was no other alternative, if she did not pay her fare for the remainder of the distance. One of the passengers said to the respondent that, if she was required to leave the train, to do so, and that he would then purchase a ticket for her from Missoula to Seattle, and that she could re-enter the car, and continue her journey. At Missoula the conductor again said to the respondent that she must pay her fare for the remainder of the distance, or leave the train. Whereupon respondent got up from her seat, but without taking any of her wraps or baggage, and walked out upon the platform, followed by the conductor and by the passenger aforesaid. The conductor held the train a few moments at this place, while this passenger purchased a ticket for the respondent to Seattle, whereupon she re-entered the car, and resumed her seat, arriving at Seattle without any material delay. Soon after her arrival at Seattle, the appellant's agents, having further investigated the matter, and having found there had been a mistake made in exchanging tickets with respondent, tendered her the sum of $30.30, which had been paid for the ticket from Missoula to Seattle. She declined to receive this, and brought an action for damages. A jury trial was had, which resulted in a verdict in her favor for $1,900. Upon a motion for a new trial the superior court required her to remit $1,400 of this sum, which she did, and the judgment was allowed to stand for $500. Whereupon the railroad company appealed.

Appellant contends that the respondent should be limited in her recovery for damages to her actual money outlay; that she should not be allowed to recover anything for humiliation or mental suffering; that there was nothing in the treatment which respondent received which should cause any feeling of humiliation or mental suffering; that there must first be a physical injury, as a foundation for such a recovery; that a recovery for more than the extra fare paid in this case would be, in effect, a recovery for punitive or exemplary damages, which are never allowed except in cases attended with insult, indignities, or oppression, and are not recoverable in this state in any event. Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072. The respondent does not claim to have received any physical injury, and was not subjected to any abusive treatment. She admits that the conductor treated her in a gentlemanly manner, and it appears she understood he was simply obeying the regulations of the railroad company in dealing with her as he did. The principal damages which respondent claims to have suffered were in the publicity given to the matter, in having the attention of the other passengers attracted thereto, and in being put under obligations to the gentleman who purchased her ticket, in so being compelled to accept financial assistance from him, and in the sense of wrong which she suffered. By reason of these matters she claims to have been very much annoyed, humiliated, and disturbed in her peace of mind. The respondent had no acquaintances aboard the train upon this occasion, except such as she had made upon the trip. She was 21 years of age, and had traveled some upon railroad trains before this time, but not extensively. Owing to her inexperience in this direction, it seems she was an object of some solicitude upon the part of her relatives, in starting her upon this journey. An uncle purchased a through ticket for her, and accompanied her from Vincennes to Chicago, there putting her aboard the regular sleeping car for Seattle, so that she might travel through without a change of cars.

From an examination of many cases bearing upon these questions we are led to the following conclusions: That there is no distinction to be drawn between a case like this, where the passenger vacates the car upon being told to do so by the conductor, and one where resistance is offered, and no more force is used by the agents of the company than is necessary to eject, as the passenger has no right to resist, but must rely upon an action for damages. It is as much a wrongful expulsion in one case as in the other. Railroad Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Railroad Co. v. Connell, 112 Ill. 295; Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 F. Rep. 57; Townsend v. Railroad Co., 56 N.Y. 295. Such actions are not necessarily founded upon a breach of the contract to carry, but properly lie in tort upon the theory that, when the relation of passenger and carrier is established, a wrongful violation of the contract upon the part of the carrier is a breach of a public duty. An action of case would lie therefor at the common law. Pouilin v. Railway Co., 47 F. Rep. 858; Yorton v. Railway Co., (Wis.) 21 N.W. 516; Walsh v. Railway Co., 42 Wis. 23; Head v. Railway Co., 79 Ga. 358, 7 S.E. Rep. 217. In this last case it will be observed that the syllabus, with regard to the force used, is somewhat at variance with the facts, as stated in the opinion. It is apparent that there was no question of undue force or violence involved. Of course, no question as to the...