Wilson v. Edward Hosp.

• Decision Date: 13 December 2012
• Docket Number: No. 112898.,112898.
• Citation: 981 N.E.2d 971,2012 IL 112898,367 Ill.Dec. 243
• Parties: Brandon WILSON et al., Appellants, v. EDWARD HOSPITAL et al. (Edward Hospital, Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2012 IL 112898

981 N.E.2d 971

367 Ill.Dec. 243

Brandon WILSON et al., Appellants,

v.EDWARD HOSPITAL et al. (Edward Hospital, Appellee).

No. 112898.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 13, 2012.

Michael W. Rathsack, Michael P. Cogan, Chicago, IL, for appellants.

Mary N. Nielsen and Hugh C. Griffin, Hall, Prangle & Schoonveld, LLC, Chicago, IL, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice GARMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[367 Ill.Dec. 245]¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Brandon Wilson and Daphne Wilson, brought an action for medical malpractice in the circuit court of Du Page County against defendant Edward Hospital, two doctors and their practice groups, and a nurse for injuries allegedly caused to Brandon during surgery to repair a broken leg. Pertinent to this appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the two doctors were agents of the hospital. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the hospital on the ground that the two doctors were not the hospital's actual agents. The court found a question of fact to exist as to whether the doctors were the hospital's apparent agents. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint. Subsequently, they refiled their complaint, alleging that the doctors were the hospital's apparent agents. The hospital moved to dismiss on the grounds that the trial court's earlier finding that the doctors were not the hospital's actual agents was a final judgment on the merits and that res judicata therefore barred the refiled action. The trial court denied the motion, but certified a question to the appellate court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) on the issue of whether actual agency and apparent agency are separate claims for purposes of res judicata and the prohibition against claim-splitting, thereby barring the refiling of the complaint based on apparent agency. The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative. 2011 IL App (2d) 110085–U. This court granted plaintiffs leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In 2003, plaintiff Brandon Wilson, who was then a minor, broke his right femur in an automobile accident. He was taken to defendant Edward Hospital, where surgery was performed to repair the fractured bone. During surgery, Brandon aspirated vomit into his lungs, causing cardiac arrest which resulted in an anoxic brain injury.

¶ 4 In 2004, Brandon and his mother, Daphne, filed a complaint for medical malpractice. Their complaint alleged that the surgery was not of an emergency nature and that the doctors were negligent in failing to provide for a sufficient period of fasting prior to performing surgery on Brandon. Plaintiffs alleged that all persons working at the hospital were employees and/or agents of the hospital. In a single count of their second amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that each of the defendant doctors was an “agent in law or in fact” of the hospital and that the hospital was liable for the wrongful acts and omissions of the doctors. The hospital filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the doctors were neither its actual nor its apparent agents. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the ground that the doctors were not actual agents of the hospital. The court found that a question of fact existed as to whether the doctors were the apparent agents of the hospital. In 2009, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint pursuant to section 2–1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–1009 (West 2008)). One year later, plaintiffs refiled their action. In their third amended complaint, they alleged, as to the hospital, that both doctors acted as apparent agents of the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, citing this court's decision in Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill.2d 462, 321 Ill.Dec. 306, 889 N.E.2d 210 (2008). The hospital argued that plaintiffs' refiled action was barred by res judicata because (1) a final judgment on the merits was rendered on plaintiffs' actual agency claim; (2) the causes of action against the hospital pleaded in the original and refiled actions are identical; and (3) there is an identity of parties. Thus, according to the hospital, since res judicata bars every matter that might have been raised or determined in the first action, plaintiffs' apparent agency claims were barred.

¶ 5 The trial court denied the hospital's motion to dismiss but granted its motion for an order certifying the following question of law under Rule 308:

“Are actual agency and apparent agency separate claims for purposes of the res judicata doctrine and the prohibition against claim-splitting set forth by the Supreme Court in Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill.2d 462 [321 Ill.Dec. 306, 889 N.E.2d 210] (2008) and Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill.2d 325 [216 Ill.Dec. 642, 665 N.E.2d 1199] (1996), so that a summary judgment entered on the actual agency claims in plaintiff's initial suit bars plaintiff's apparent agency claims in this refiled suit, even in the face of a ruling that there is a question of fact as to the apparent agency claims?”

¶ 6 The appellate court answered the certified question in the affirmative, holding that actual agency and apparent agency are separate claims subject to the bar of res judicata and the prohibition against claim-splitting. In doing so, the appellate court followed Rein and Hudson and an appellate decision, Williams v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 408 Ill.App.3d 360, 348 Ill.Dec. 468, 944 N.E.2d 421 (2011). The appellate court here rejected plaintiffs' argument that they had only a single claim for negligence based upon vicarious liability that was supported in different ways by allegations of actual agency and apparent agency. It also rejected their argument that the trial court's determination that as a matter of law, the doctors were not the actual agents of the hospital, did not affect the unitary nature of the negligence claim. 2011 IL App (2d) 110085–U.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 A certified question under Rule 308 presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass'n., 236 Ill.2d 433, 439, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113 (2010).

¶ 9 The issue before us is whether res judicata and the prohibition against claim-splitting bar plaintiffs' refiled action due to the trial court's order granting partial summary judgment in the first action on plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant doctors were actual agents of the hospital. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction acts as an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The bar extends not only to all matters that were actually decided but also to those matters that could have been decided in the prior action. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill.2d 381, 389, 258 Ill.Dec. 782, 757 N.E.2d 471 (2001); River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 302, 234 Ill.Dec. 783, 703 N.E.2d 883 (1998). Three requirements must be met for res judicata to apply: (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of cause of action; and (3) identity of parties or their privies. DeLuna v. Treister, 185 Ill.2d 565, 572, 236 Ill.Dec. 754, 708 N.E.2d 340 (1999).

¶ 10 A cause of action is defined by the facts that give rise to a right to relief. Though one group of facts may give rise to a number of different theories of recovery, there remains a single cause of action. People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill.2d 285, 295, 176 Ill.Dec. 874, 602 N.E.2d 820 (1992).

“ ‘If the same facts are essential to the maintenance of both proceedings or the same evidence is needed to sustain both, then there is identity between the allegedly different causes of action asserted and res judicata bars the latter action.’ ” Id. (quoting Morris v. Union Oil Co. of California, 96 Ill.App.3d 148, 157, 51 Ill.Dec. 770, 421 N.E.2d 278 (1981)).

¶ 11 In holding that res judicata barred plaintiffs' refiled suit, the appellate court relied on two decisions of this court, Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill.2d 325, 216 Ill.Dec. 642, 665 N.E.2d 1199 (1996), and Hudson v. City of Chicago, 228 Ill.2d 462, 321 Ill.Dec. 306, 889 N.E.2d 210 (2008). In Rein, the plaintiffs' complaint alleged fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the nature of certain securities sold to the plaintiffs. Their complaint sought recovery under a variety of theories, including common law fraud and rescission. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the rescission counts of the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their complaint to allege equitable estoppel and declined to make a finding under Supreme Rule 304(a) to allow plaintiffs to appeal. The plaintiffs thereafter voluntarily dismissed the remaining counts of their complaint and appealed the dismissal of the rescission counts. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Rein, 172 Ill.2d at 329–30, 216 Ill.Dec. 642, 665 N.E.2d 1199. The plaintiffs subsequently refiled their action against the defendants. The complaint in the refiled action was virtually identical to the prior complaint, the only material difference being that the rescission counts alleged that the defendants were equitably estopped from raisingdefenses based on the statutes of limitation and repose. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on res judicata grounds. The trial court granted the motion. Id. at 331–32, 216 Ill.Dec. 642, 665 N.E.2d 1199. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the dismissal of the rescission counts of the first complaint was a final judgment on the merits and that the plaintiffs had a single cause of action because the same set of facts gave rise to both the rescission and...