Wilson v. Town of Mooresville
| Decision Date | 25 November 1942 |
| Docket Number | 523. |
| Parties | WILSON v. TOWN OF MOORESVILLE et al. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Proceeding under North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act to determine liability of defendants to claimant.
The commissioner before whom the case was heard, after stating that the sole question in controversy in connection therewith is whether the injury by accident which claimant sustained on July 20, 1941, arose out of and in the course of his employment with defendant employer, made findings of fact substantially these:
That claimant, a regular policeman of the town of Mooresville situated in Iredell County, North Carolina, "while dressed in his policeman's uniform and wearing his badge", and "patrolling a street" in said town "in an automobile furnished by the defendant employer for police work, saw an automobile which was speeding and thereby violating the motor vehicle laws of the State of North Carolina, and the speed laws of the town of Mooresville, N. C., and immediately thereafter turned on the siren in the police car and started in pursuit of the speeding automobile with the purpose of apprehending the driver" thereof; that in pursuing the speeding automobile, it was at all times in plain view of him; that the pursuit had continued for about six miles beyond the city limits of the town of Mooresville and about one half mile beyond the Iredell County line into Mecklenburg County and through a part of the Town of Davidson, in Mecklenburg County, when the car in which he was riding was wrecked causing injury to claimant; that that part of the pursuit which was in Iredell County was through Coddle Creek and Davidson Townships; that the chief of police of the town of Mooresville, "plaintiff's superior or commanding officer", "had previously instructed claimant and his fellow police officers that they had the right to pursue a party who had violated a State of North Carolina law" in said town, "into adjoining counties to apprehend said law violators, provided *** the policeman involved was at all times in view of the law violator or was in 'hot pursuit' of him"; and that it has been the long and well-established custom for the police officers of said town to so pursue persons, who were seen violating a law in said town, "into adjoining counties if it was necessary to apprehend them, when said police officer was at all times in view of or in 'hot pursuit' of said law violator".
"Upon the detailed circumstances and facts hereinbefore found", the commissioner, after making findings with regard to statutory authority of policemen of the town of Mooresville to make arrests in Coddle Creek and Davidson Townships in Iredell County, further finds as a fact that the injury by accident which claimant sustained "arose both out of and in the course of his employment" by the defendant Town of Mooresville.
Upon such findings of fact the commissioner concludes as matter of law that claimant sustained injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and compensation was awarded.
Upon appeal thereto by defendants, the full commission ratified and affirmed and adopted the findings of fact, conclusions of law and award of the hearing commissioner, all of which on appeal thereto by defendants was affirmed by Superior Court.
Defendants appeal to Supreme Court and assign error.
Starr & Starr, of Mooresville, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. Laurence Jones, of Charlotte, for defendants-appellants.
These are the questions for decision:
1. Where policeman, in effort to apprehend and arrest without warrant a person who has within the town and in his presence committed a breach of peace, or an offense less than a felony for which arrest may be so made, pursues such person to and beyond the boundaries of the town or district within which by statute he is authorized to act, and while pursuing such person outside such boundaries suffers injury by accident, does such injury arise out of and in the course of his employment as policeman of such town within the meaning of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act?
2. If not, does the fact that the chief of police and superior officer instructed the policeman that he had a right to so pursue such person when in sight of and in "hot pursuit" of him, or the fact that it was customary for police officers of the town in an effort to effect arrest, without warrant, to so pursue such person under such circumstances, alter the situation?
Though conceding that a policeman, while within the town, by virtue of office, has authority, without warrant, to arrest a person for breach of the peace or an offense less than a felony for which arrest may be so made, committed in his presence,--each of these questions is properly answered "No".
Under the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, Public Laws 1929, Chapter 120, as amended, Code 1939, § 8081(h) et seq., the condition antecedent to compensation is the occurrence of an injury (1) by accident (2) arising out of and (3) in the course of employment. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266; Whitley v. North Carolina State Highway Comm. 201 N.C. 539, 160 S.E. 827; Beavers v. Lily Mill & Power Co., 205 N.C. 34, 169 S.E. 825; Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370; Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N.C. 356, 196 S.E. 342.
The words "out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and the words "in the course" to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., supra; Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728; Hunt v. State, 201 N.C. 707, 161 S.E. 203; Ridout v. Rose's 5-10-25¢ Stores, Inc., 205 N.C. 423, 171 S.E. 642; Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., supra; Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., supra.
It has been said that the term "arising out of employment" is broad and comprehensive and perhaps not capable of precise definition. It must be interpreted in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case, and there must be some causal connection between the injury and the employment. Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N.C. 28, 153 S.E. 594; Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., supra; Carter v. Surry County Board of Education, 201 N.C. 836, 160 S.E. 924; Walker v. J. D. Wilkins, Inc., 212 N.C. 627, 194 S.E. 89; Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., supra.
"Arising out of", as said by Adams, J., in Hunt v. State, supra [201 N.C. 707, 161 S.E. 205], Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., supra; Chambers v. Union Oil Co., supra; Beavers v. Lily Mill & Power Co., supra; Bain v. Travora Mfg. Co., 203 N.C. 466; 166 S.E. 301; Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., supra.
In the light of these principles, what services was claimant to perform, and what work was he to do under his appointment as policeman of the town of Mooresville? The statutory law affords the answer. A police officer, unknown to the common law, is a creature of statute, and as such has and can only exercise such powers as are given by the legislature, expressly or derivatively. State v. Freeman, 86 N.C. 683; Martin v. Houck, 141 N.C. 317, 54 S.E. 291, 7 L.R.A.,N.S., 576.
In this State statutory power, applicable to all incorporated cities and towns, where same shall not be inconsistent with special acts of incorporation or special laws in reference thereto, C.S. § 2625, is given to the boards of commissioners or aldermen or other governing municipal authority, to appoint town watch or police, C.S. § 2641, and "a town constable". C.S. § 2630. See Riddle v. Ledbetter, 216 N.C. 491, 5 S.E.2d 542. And the powers and duties of policemen and the territorial limits within which such powers and duties may be exercised are prescribed by statute. Thus, when the board of commissioners or aldermen of the town of Mooresville appointed claimant to office of policeman, and when he accepted the appointment, the existing laws pertaining to the position entered into and became a part of the relationship thus established, see Bryson City Bank v. Town of Bryson City, 213 N.C. 165, 195 S.E. 398, and cases cited; also Wilkinson v. Boomer, 217 N.C. 217, 7 S.E. 2d 491; McGuinn v. City of High Point, Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N.C. 15, 9 S.E. 2d 511; Com'rs v. Gaines, 221 N.C. 324, 20 S.E.2d 377, and fixed the scope of employment.
What then are the statutory powers, and territorial limits upon the power of a policeman of the town of Mooresville, North Carolina, to make an arrest without warrant? It is provided by special statutes (1) "that arrests may be made by the town constable or any policeman of the town in the following cases: first, when he shall have in his hands a warrant duly issued by the mayor of the town or a justice of the peace of Iredell county; or second, when an offence has been committed in his presence and when an offence has been committed and the party is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained"; and that "he shall execute the precepts of the mayor anywhere in the county of Iredell ***" Private Laws 1885, Chapter 68, Section 7, amending the charter of the town of Mooresville; and (2) that "the policemen of Mooresville shall have the same authority to make arrests and to execute criminal process within the territory in which the Recorder's Court of Mooresville has jurisdiction as is vested by law in a sheriff". Public Local Laws 1937, Chapter 89. And the recorder's court of Mooresville is vested with jurisdiction only over certain criminal offenses committed within the town of Mooresville and within Coddle Creek and Davidson...
To continue reading
Request your trial