Wilz v. Sanders, No. 10-04-00007-CV (TX 2/23/2005)
| Decision Date | 23 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-04-00007-CV.,10-04-00007-CV. |
| Parties | PATRICIA WILZ, GUARDIAN OF JON PATRICK FLOURNOY, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, Appellants v. JACK M. SANDERS, JR., Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Appeal from the 77th District Court, Limestone County, Texas, Trial Court # 26,300-A-1.
Affirmed.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA (Chief Justice GRAY concurring).
This is a professional negligence case involving a guardian ad litem in federal court. Patricia Wilz appeals from the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Jack Sanders. Wilz appeals in three issues:1 (1) error in shielding Sanders (guardian ad litem) with judicial immunity; (2) error in granting no-evidence summary judgment; and (3) error in finding that the Ward's father's misappropriation was a superseding cause to Sander's alleged breaches of duty as guardian ad litem. We will affirm the summary judgment.
Jon Flournoy (the "Ward") became permanently disabled in a car accident. The Ward's father, Kenneth Flournoy ("Flournoy"), as next friend of the Ward and in his own capacity, sued Ford Motor Company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division ("federal court"). A settlement was reached and the federal court appointed Jack Sanders as guardian ad litem for the Ward. While the settlement in the federal court was pending, a guardianship proceeding was filed in the County Court at Law of Harrison County. Joe Hughey, a probate lawyer, was appointed attorney ad litem for the Ward, and Flournoy was appointed guardian of the Ward.
In a fairness hearing, Sanders told the federal court that the settlement was in the best interest of the Ward. The federal court approved the settlement in a judgment dated April 1, 1991, which became final when the probate court of Harrison County approved (1) the actions of Flournoy, as guardian of the person and estate of the Ward, in settling the suit and (2) the federal court's apportionment of the settlement funds. The Ward's proceeds were then transferred into a guardianship account.
For the next eight years, Flournoy and his wife misappropriated the Ward's funds (approximately $380,000), which depleted all of the Ward's settlement proceeds. Flournoy and his wife institutionalized the Ward. Wilz, who is the Ward's mother, then applied for a guardianship of the Ward, which was granted in Limestone County. Wilz sued Fluornoy and his wife, their surety, and the attorneys (including Sanders). Sanders filed a traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motion.2 The trial court granted the motion without specifying the grounds and severed the cause from the remaining defendants.
When a trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or grounds relied on for the ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of the theories advanced are meritorious. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex. 1993).
We review the decision to grant or deny a summary-judgment motion de novo. See Rucker v. Bank One Texas, N.A., 36 S.W.3d 649, 653 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, pet. denied). The standards for reviewing a traditional motion for summary judgment are well established. Nixon v. Mr. Property Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to the summary judgment as a matter of law. American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997); Ash v. Hack Branch Distributing Co., 54 S.W.3d 401, 413 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied). The reviewing court must accept all evidence favorable to the non-movant as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and all doubts resolved in her favor. American Tobacco, 951 S.W.2d at 425; Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. If the movant for summary judgment is a defendant, then the movant must negate at least one of the elements of the non-movant's cause of action, or alternatively, the movant must conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Clifton v. Hopkins, 107 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, pet. denied). The non-movant need not respond to the motion for summary judgment unless the movant meets his burden of proof. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 222-23 (Tex. 1999). But if the movant meets his burden of proof, the non-movant must present summary-judgment evidence to raise a fact issue. Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
We apply the same standard in reviewing the grant or denial of a no-evidence summary-judgment motion as we would in reviewing a directed verdict. Ash, 54 S.W.3d at 413. We review the summary-judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. A no-evidence motion will be defeated if more than a scintilla of probative evidence exists to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element challenged by the movant. Id. More than a scintilla of evidence exists if it would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003) (business disparagement case). Evidence attached to a no-evidence motion should not be considered unless it creates a fact issue. See Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 651 (Tex. 2004).
Judges are absolutely immune from liability for judicial acts performed in the course of judicial proceedings over which they have jurisdiction. Turner v. Pruitt, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1961); Houston v. West Capital Fin. Servs., 961 S.W.2d 687, 689 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, writ dism'd w.o.j.). When judges delegate their authority or appoint others to perform services for the court, the judge's judicial immunity may follow the delegation or appointment, which is called derived judicial immunity. Clements v. Barnes, 834 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Tex. 1992).
Because Sanders was appointed guardian ad litem in a federal court, we will apply federal law to determine whether Sanders is entitled to derived judicial immunity.
The United States Supreme Court adopted a functional approach to determine whether a party is entitled to immunity. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 994-96, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). In Imbler, the Court stated:
[The prosecutor's] activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 563, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (). The United States Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity to various persons whose involvement with the judicial process has been thought to warrant protection from interference with their ability to engage in impartial decision-making. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1116, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913-15, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 364, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107-09, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (state trial judge).
A number of courts have held various participants in judicial proceedings absolutely immune from liability for their actions taken in performance of their roles as "integral parts of the judicial process." See, e.g., Babcock v. Tyler, 884 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1989) (social worker), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072, 110 S.Ct. 1118, 107 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1990); Meyers v. Contra Costa County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829, 108 S.Ct. 98, 98 L.Ed.2d 59 (1987); Moses v. Parwatikar, 813 F.2d 891 (8th Cir.) (court-appointed psychiatrist), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S.Ct. 108, 98 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1985) (probation officer); Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1983) (pathologist assisting coroner); Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1981) (), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840, 103 S.Ct. 90, 74 L.Ed.2d 83 (1982); Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy trustee); T & W Inv. Co. v. Kurtz, 588 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1978) (court-appointed receiver); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976) (same); Burkes v. Callion, 433 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1970) (), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 2217, 29 L.Ed.2d 685 (1971); Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1980) (partition commissioner); Wagner v. Genesee County Bd. of Comm'rs, 607 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Mich. 1985) ().
The Fifth Circuit adopted the functional approach in decisions denying absolute immunity to social workers. See Hodorowski v. Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1213-15 (5th Cir. 1988) (...
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