Wiseman v. State, No. 2-06-021-CR (Tex. App. 11/16/2006)
| Decision Date | 16 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-06-021-CR.,2-06-021-CR. |
| Parties | KATHERINE WISEMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, State. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 3 of Denton County.
Panel F: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and HOLMAN, JJ.
Katherine Wiseman appeals the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress, after which she pled nolo contendere to driving while intoxicated ("DWI") pursuant to a plea bargain, for which she received twenty months' community supervision and a $500 fine. Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress, based on her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. We affirm.
Just after midnight on April 11, 2005, a Carrollton police officer, Brian Box, noticed Appellant's Ford Explorer ("SUV") as he drove past an apartment complex during his patrol. The SUV had its hazard lights turned on and was parked against the curb in the main driveway of the apartment complex's parking lot, in which multiple vehicles were parked.2 Officer Box acknowledged that the complex was not in a high crime or high drug-traffic area. Appellant and two passengers were in the SUV.
As he drove by, Officer Box looked into the parking lot and saw someone's legs partially protruding from the SUV's open right rear passenger door.3 Officer Box decided to turn around, to "see if they were stranded and needed any assistance." He indicated that he "[c]ouldn't tell exactly what they were doing, but the legs were out of the vehicle facing sideways."
When Officer Box completed a U-turn about a block south, entered the apartment complex, and turned on the lights on his patrol car4 so that approaching traffic could see his vehicle, the rear passenger was back in the SUV. Officer Box testified that at the point he pulled up behind the SUV, he "did not know anything about the vehicle other than the fact that it had its hazard lights on." After Officer Box pulled up behind it, the SUV moved twenty to thirty feet forward and turned left into a parking space. Officer Box testified that he continued pulling forward, into a position where he could make contact with Appellant, the driver.
Officer Box called in the SUV's license plate to dispatch;5 he testified that at this point, he was concerned about whether the SUV was operational and able to move. As he approached the SUV,6 he saw a puddle of vomit close to the rear passenger's location.7 He also noticed some vomit protruding from the rear passenger's window back to the rear tire, and down over the SUV's passenger side running board. However, he did not see anyone throw up, nor did he see any signs of distress to indicate anything worse than an upset stomach. After seeing the vomit, he expanded his purpose to include checking to see if anyone in the SUV needed medical attention.
Appellant was the first person Officer Box approached, and upon contact with her, he saw signs of intoxication and proceeded with a DWI investigation. This led to her arrest for DWI. At the trial court's suppression hearing on November 2, 2005, Appellant argued that Officer Box violated her Fourth Amendment rights by stopping and detaining her without a warrant,8 reasonable suspicion for a stop, or satisfying the community caretaking exception, which resulted in her subsequent arrest for DWI. Officer Box was the sole witness to testify at Appellant's suppression hearing.
The trial court limited the suppression hearing to a discussion of the community caretaking exception, stating, "This is not a reasonable suspicion, criminal activity abound or that type of stop." The trial court denied the motion to suppress, but upon Appellant's conviction, certified her right of appeal.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct.Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Id. Once the defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was reasonable. Id. It is undisputed that the interaction between Appellant and Officer Box was made without a warrant.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v. State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Best, 118 S.W.3d at 861-62. However, when the trial court's rulings do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review de novo a trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact. Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.
When the trial court does not make explicit findings of historical facts, as in the instant case, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact supporting its ruling, so long as those findings are supported in the record.9 Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28. In determining whether a trial court's decision is supported by the record, we generally consider only evidence adduced at the suppression hearing because the ruling was based on it rather than evidence introduced later. Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996).
The trial court limited the suppression hearing to the community caretaking exception, implicitly finding that this was a "stop," rather than an "encounter," for Fourth Amendment purposes. There appeared to be no dispute at the suppression hearing with regard to the pertinent facts. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress, indicating that because Appellant had turned on the SUV's hazard lights in the apartment complex driveway, at midnight, the officer would have been remiss if he had failed to stop and see whether something was wrong; therefore, under the community caretaking exception, the officer acted reasonably in making an investigative stop.
Because the trial court found Officer Box's testimony sufficient to establish that the community caretaking exception applied, its ruling was an application of law to fact that did not turn on the witness's credibility and demeanor. See Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; State v. Bryant, 161 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Therefore, we review de novo the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress, to determine whether, on these facts, the initial contact between Appellant and Officer Box was an "encounter," which would not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and if not, whether the community caretaking exception was properly applied under these circumstances.
Appellant argues that her initial contact with Officer Box was a Fourth Amendment "stop," and that without a valid warrant or warrant exception, her motion to suppress should have been granted. The State counters that Appellant's motion to suppress was properly denied, characterizing Officer Box's initial interaction with Appellant as an "encounter," which, as a matter of law, would fail to implicate the Fourth Amendment's protections.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three categories of interactions between police officers and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests. State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Unlike investigative detentions and arrests, which are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes, an encounter is a consensual interaction, which the citizen is free to terminate at any time. Bryant, 161 S.W.3d at 761;See Gurrola v. State, 877 S.W.2d 300, 302-03 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). The dispositive question is whether the totality of the circumstances shows that the police conduct at issue would have caused a reasonable person to believe that she was free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439-40, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389 (1991); State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627-28, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551-52 (1991); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). If so, or when the individual's freedom of movement is restricted by a factor independent of police conduct, the interaction is a police-citizen "encounter." United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 (2002); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436, 111 S. Ct. at 2387;Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); see also Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d at 679.10 A seizure occurs when a reasonable person would believe he or sh...
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