Wood v. Marfa Independent School Dist., 3753.

• Decision Date: 23 November 1938
• Docket Number: No. 3753.,3753.
• Citation: 123 S.W.2d 429
• Parties: WOOD et al. v. MARFA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

123 S.W.2d 429

WOOD et al. v. MARFA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST.

No. 3753.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

November 23, 1938.

Rehearing Denied January 5, 1939.

Appeal from District Court, Presidio County; C. R. Sutton, Judge.

Suit by the Marfa Independent School District against S. T. Wood and another seeking judgment for taxes and to foreclose alleged statutory and constitutional tax liens, wherein defendants filed a cross-action. From an adverse judgment, defendants appeal.

Judgment reversed and judgment rendered for defendants.

C. W. Croom, of El Paso, and E. B. O'Quinn, of Marfa, for appellants.

S. J. Isaacks, of El Paso, amicus curiæ.

Mead & Metcalfe, of Marfa, for appellee.

NEALON, Chief Justice.

The Marfa Independent School District, which, as its name implies, is a municipal corporation, brought suit against the defendants, S. T. Wood and Doran Wood, seeking judgment for taxes alleged to be due for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, together with a foreclosure of plaintiff's alleged statutory and constitutional tax liens. The petition alleged that the property upon which the lien was sought was situated within the confines of said Independent School District and of Presidio County; that the tax was levied by proper ordinance under proper authority in compliance with statutory and constitutional provisions; and that the limits and boundaries of the school district were in accordance with an order theretofore entered by the County Board of Trustees of Presidio County, Texas, on December 12, 1933.

Defendants pleaded and now contend that their property against which taxes were sought to be foreclosed was not and is not situated within said district; that on December 12, 1933 plaintiff attempted to attach and annex certain territory which included said lands, but that the action of the County Board in this respect was null and void because the statutory requirements were not complied with, in that no notice was given as required by law and no petition of the voters of said district or the property owners in the territory sought to be annexed was had, and because no map and plan showing the boundaries of the district affected and of the proposed new district were made or caused to be made prior to the attempted annexation, and because all parties interested, including the defendants, were not given a full opportunity to be heard; and that the action of said board as of December 12, 1933 in so attempting to annex said territory was rescinded by the County Board of Trustees on January 27, 1934, prior to any attempted levy of taxes involved in the suit. By way of cross-action defendants pleaded the alleged illegality of the taxes sought to be recovered and the alleged illegality of the attempted formation of the plaintiff district and prayed that the alleged taxes be cancelled, and that "the formation or attempted formation by said plaintiff district be by the court declared null and void, and that plaintiff be adjudged not to be entitled to taxes, past or future, from defendants by virtue of the alleged attempted formation of said district."

The cause was tried before the court without the intervention of a jury and judgment entered in favor of defendants (appellants here) as to the claim for taxes sought to be collected for the years 1934 and 1935, upon the ground that no valid levy had been made. Judgment was entered against appellants for the taxes for the year 1936 and a foreclosure of the tax lien decreed. From the action of the court in rendering judgment against them for 1936 taxes this appeal is prosecuted.

At the request of appellants the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found, among other facts, that beginning December 12, 1933, and thereafter at all times, plaintiff exercised corporate control over the territory here involved; that on December 12, 1933 the County Board of Trustees of Presidio County undertook to rearrange the lines of the Marfa Independent School District and in such proceedings complied with all the provisions of law applicable thereto except that it did not show boundaries of common school districts affected; that beginning with December 12, 1933, plaintiff assumed control over said territory, assessing and collecting taxes therein; providing schools and paying teachers therefor from the State per capita tax and from maintenance tax on the entire district, including said added territory; that no litigation bringing any of said acts into question was had prior to January 25, 1937; that taxes for 1934 and 1935 had been levied by motion and order and not by ordinance; that taxes for 1936 had been duly levied by ordinance based upon election theretofore held authorizing the levy of a maintenance tax not exceeding $1 on the hundred dollar valuation; that there was $264.13 taxes due and unpaid on the lands described which had been duly levied upon proper assessment; that on January 27, 1934, the County Board of Trustees sought to rescind the order of December 12, 1933, but none of the requirements for rearranging the district were had by such trustees; that after the order of December 12, 1933, the district, as enlarged, had been continuously recognized by State and County authorities as a school district and that prior to January 25, 1937, neither the formation of the district, nor its tax levy or assessment had been involved in any litigation or contest.

Opinion.

In attempting to annex appellants' land to Marfa Independent School District, the County Board of Trustees acted under powers which it assumed had been granted it by the Acts of the 43d Legislature, 1st Called Sess., Chap. 108, p. 293, which appears in Vernon's Annotated Statutes as Art. 2742c. No question is made as to this being the authority that the Board invoked. That act provides that "It shall be the duty of the County Board of Trustees of the public schools in every county in this State, having an area of not more than three thousand eight hundred (3,800) square miles and not less than three thousand six hundred (3,600) square miles and a population of not less than nine thousand and not more than twelve thousand, according to the last preceding Federal Census, as soon as may be after this Act shall take effect, to rearrange and resubdivide all the territory of their respective counties into such number of convenient school districts as it shall deem advisable and designate them by number." Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 2742c, § 1. The trial court made a finding of fact to the effect that on December 12, 1933, Presidio County had an area of 3787 square miles and a population of 10,154, according to the Federal Census of 1930, "being the last Federal Census immediately preceding December, 1933." Upon oral argument on appeal amicus curiæ urged that the action of the County Board of Trustees was ineffective, in that it was taken under a legislative act that could apply to but one county in the State, and which, therefore, was a special law. Sec. 3 of Art. 7 of the State Constitution as amended in 1926, Vernon's Ann. Civ.St., provides that "the Legislature may also provide for the formation of school districts by general laws." Prior to the amendment of the Constitution in this particular the legislature might have provided for the formation of school districts by special laws. This amendment destroyed the exception to the limitation which Article 3, Sec. 56 of the State Constitution, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., placed upon the power of the legislature forbidding the passage of local or special laws regulating the affairs of school districts. It is urged, therefore, that the act in question was unconstitutional (Constitution, Art. 3, Sec 56), and that as the legislature had no power to enact this legislation originally, it could not validate the action of the Board had in pursuance of the attempted grant of authority. This last stated proposition was urged in view of the contention of appellee that if the act of the County Board was originally irregular in any respect, it was validated by that portion of Chap. 380 of the Acts of the 44th Legislature, 1st Called Sess. p. 1555, which appears in Vernon's Annotated Statutes as Art. 2815g—8, which validates the school districts created by general or special law in this State under certain circumstances, and validates acts of the boards in rearranging, changing or subdividing, districts or increasing or decreasing their area.

After submission, in view of the fact that the constitutionality of the act was not challenged either in the district court or in the briefs filed in this Court by the parties to the cause, this Court requested counsel for the various parties, as well as amicus curiæ, to submit further briefs and written argument treating of the questions thus raised, as well as of the Court's duty in the premises in respect to giving consideration to the question when raised for the first time upon appeal. We have had the advantage of excellent briefs from all parties.

We have come to the conclusion that the legislation under which the County Board of Trustees assumed to act was unconstitutional, and that it is our duty to consider the question. We think our duty is the same that would devolve upon the Supreme Court in a like situation. That Court, in Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 114 Tex. 548, 273 S.W. 808, in passing upon the constitutionality of legislation that sought to attach the character of separate property to rents derived from separate property, said [page 812],

"We are not precluded from declaring the true status of the rents by reason of the fact that defendants in error in the courts below may not have attacked the validity of the provision of the statutes which purports to make rents of the wife's separate lands a part of her separate estate. The court could not perform its duty to enforce the paramount law did it not refuse to give effect to a statute in conflict with the Constitution. So the court will...