Wood v. Wood
| Decision Date | 05 July 1983 |
| Citation | 119 Misc.2d 1076,465 N.Y.S.2d 475 |
| Parties | Sharon WOOD, Plaintiff, v. Rodney WOOD, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
This is an application for an order and/or judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting defendant partial summary judgment and it raises the issue of whether a spouse's contributions as a parent and homemaker may be considered by the court in awarding said spouse a share in the appreciation in value of the other spouse's separate property which appreciation has occurred since the inception of the marriage to the date of the commencement of the divorce action. The court answers the question in the affirmative.
It appears that the parties were divorced by judgment of this court dated March 2, 1982 (McInerney, J.) which judgment directed that all other issues, including equitable distribution of the parties marital property, be referred for a subsequent trial. Defendant in this four year marriage is seeking an order directing that his medical practice is separate property and that any increase in the value of the claimed separate property subsequent to the date of his marriage to plaintiff herein is also separate property, and, as such, is not property subject to equitable distribution. Defendant claims that plaintiff never worked at defendant's medical office and has done nothing to increase the value of his professional practice.
DRL § 236(B)(5)(a) provides that "the court, in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce ... shall determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate or marital property, and shall provide for the disposition thereof in the final judgment." DRL § 236(B)(1)(c) defines "marital property" as "all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part..." Among the items defined in the term "separate property" is the increase in value of separate property, "except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse" (DRL § 236(B)(1)(d)(3); emphasis supplied). DRL § 236(B)(5) goes on to list ten factors that the court is mandated to consider in making an equitable distribution of the parties marital property (Nielsen v. Nielsen, 91 A.D.2d 1016, 457 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2nd Dep't 1983); see also, Duffy v. Duffy, 94 A.D.2d 711, 462 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2nd Dep't)) and one of such factors is the direct and indirect (emphasis supplied) contributions made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title, including contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party (DRL § 236(B)(5)(d)(6)).
Accordingly, based on a liberal reading of the above sections of DRL § 236(B), the court holds that appreciation in separate assets from the inception of the marriage to the date of the commencement of a divorce action constitutes marital property to the extent that such appreciation is due to the contributions or efforts of the non-titled spouse and the contributions to the accumulation of such appreciation may be direct or indirect (DRL § 236(B)(5)(d)(6); but see, Jolis v. Jolis, 111 Misc.2d 965, 446 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Sup.Ct., N.Y.Co., 1981)).
The meaning of "indirect contribution", however, is yet subject to definition. There are situations where the non-titl spouse surely makes a contribution to the increase in value, as where he or she helps build up a business owned by the titled spouse, or manages the finances, trades securities or real estate or has made other significant direct contributions to enhance the value of the other's separate property. But will the fact that one of the parties was a homemaker, parent and companion qualify as an "indirect" contribution as opposed to the more normally thought of "indirect" contributions such as preparing social events for the business, appearing with the titled spouse at business related social functions, etc. (See, generally, Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L.S.L.Rev. 1, 9 (1981); DiLeo & Model, A Survey of the Law of Property Disposition upon Divorce in the Tristate Area, 56 St. John's L.Rev. 219, 229, n. 26 (1982)).
A recent development in Canada, where this issue has seen much play (Bregman v. Bregman, 23 O.R.2d 722, 7 R.F.L.2d 201, 91 D.L.R.3d 470, affirmed without written reasons, 25...
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