Wood v. Wood

• Decision Date: 28 January 1959
• Docket Number: No. A-7041,A-7041
• Citation: 159 Tex. 350,320 S.W.2d 807
• Parties: Ruby L. WOOD, Petitioner, v. Cleveland E. WOOD, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 807

320 S.W.2d 807

159 Tex. 350

Ruby L. WOOD, Petitioner, v. Cleveland E. WOOD, Respondent.

No. A-7041.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Jan. 28, 1959.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1959.

Roger W. Crampton, Wichita Falls, for petitioner.

Mitchell & Baxter, Wichita Falls, amicus curiae, Donald E. Short, County Atty., Frank Gibson, Asst. County Atty., Wichita Falls, for respondent.

CULVER, Justice.

The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals has certified to us for consideration two questions growing out of a judgment of divorce rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Cleveland E. Wood, on an appeal taken by the defendant wife, Ruby L. Wood.

The first is:

'Does the amendment to Art. 4631, R.C.S. enacted in 1957 by the 55th Legislature, Regular Session (Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 4631), effected May 6, 1957, contravene Art. 3, Sec. 56 of the Constitution of Texas and/or the 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States?'

The amendment reads as follows:

'Any person serving in a military branch of the United States who was not previously a citizen of the State of Texas and who at the time of filing a petition for divorce has been stationed in a military installation or installations in the State of Texas for a continuous period of twelve (12) months next and in the county where the suit is filed for a continuous period of six (6) months next preceding the filing of same, shall for the purposes hereof be deemed to be an actual bona fide inhabitant and resident respectively of the State of Texas and of the county where such military installation is located.

'Sec. 2. The fact that many persons serving in the military service in Texas are presently unable to acquire residence for purposes of divorce creates an emergency and an imperative public necessity that the Constitutional Rule requiring bills to be read on three several days in each House be suspended, and this Rule is hereby suspended, and that this Act take effect and be in force from and after its passage, and it is so enacted.' Approved and effective May 6, 1957.

We answer the foregoing question in the negative and approve what is said in respect thereto in the submitted tentative opinion.

Appellant contends that the amendment constitutes a local or special law in violation of the constitutional inhibition.

Article 3, Section 56 of our State Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. reads: 'The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law, authorizing' among other actions, 'granting divorces.' This amendment cannot be regarded as a local law because it has universal application throughout the State of Texas, including, as it does, all who can qualify as members of the prescribed class. It is not a special act within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition for the Legislature possesses broad power to make classifications for legislative purposes and to pass laws in application thereto. So long as there is a substantial basis for the classification and it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, the Legislature acts within the legitimate scope of its authority. Mumme v. Marrs, 120 Tex. 383, 40 S.W.2d 31; Miller v. El Paso County, 136 Tex. 370, 150 S.W.2d 1000; Fort Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Welch, Tex.Civ.App., 183 S.W.2d 730, er. ref.

The classification authorized by this amendment is by no means arbitrary or unreasonable. In this enactment the Legislature lature has merely faced up to the realities of the times, conditions and circumstances. As pointed out by the Court of Civil Appeals, members of the national armed forces are stationed at many military installations throughout the state for indefinite periods of time. Their movements are restricted and they come and go at the will of the military command. A great many of these serve in the professional military establishment and can hardly be said to have a domicil anywhere, in the technical sense of the word, other than the one of origin. The Legislature has frankly recognized their plight under the hard and fast timeaccepted domicil rule. The solution of their marital problems is one of general interest. While not citizens of Texas in a legal sense nevertheless they are an important segment of the residential population. Other states have heretofore dealt with this situation by the adoption of similar legislation, notably Kansas, New Mexico, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Georgia and possibly others. These statutes have been construed and upheld against similar constitutional attack. Craig v. Craig, 1936, 143 Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464; Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 1954, 175 Kan. 629, 266 P.2d 282; Crownover v. Crownover, 1954, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127; Wallace v. Wallace, 1958, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020; Wilson v. Wilson, 58 N.M. 411, 272 P.2d 319. Search has not revealed any contrary result reached except in Georgia where the act was held invalid on a narrow constitutional ground not to be found in our state constitution. Darbie v. Darbie, 195 Ga. 769, 25 S.E.2d 685.

What is contemplated actually by the constitutional inhibition against any special law anent the granting of divorces, we think, is a ban on legislative authority to grant that relief to individuals by a special act. The power of the Legislature to grant divorces absent constitutional restriction, has been recognized generally and formerly in some of the states was not uncommonly exercised. 27 C.J.S. Divorce § 5.

Appellant asserts that domicil within the state, as distinguished from residence, is a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action for divorce. She points to no such constitutional mandate, but quotes Restatement Conflicts of Laws, Sec. 111, as follows: 'A state cannot exercise through its courts jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage when neither spouse is domiciled within the state.' While this statement is supported by ample authority and reflects the traditional approach to this problem, it by no means can be taken literally especially so far as the validity of the divorce is concerned within the state where jurisdiction is asserted. For example, in New York the right of non-residents to prosecute suits for divorce where the parties were married in that state has been upheld. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 838, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649.

In Arkansas the statute only requires proof of 'actual residence' for a period of three months before final judgment, Ark. Stats. § 34-1208. The validity of the statute has been upheld by the courts of that state and construed to authorize the granting of a divorce even though the plaintiff has no intention of making Arkansas his permanent residence and establishing a domicil in that state. Actually only physical presence for the period of time is necessary. Squire v. Squire, 186 Ark. 511, 54 S.W.2d 281; Carlson v. Carlson, 198 Ark. 231, 128 S.W.2d 242; Brickey v. Brickey, 205 Ark. 373, 168 S.W.2d 845.

Really the point does not extend to or affect the internal validity of the divorce, but goes rather to the question of full'faith and credit' to be given by other jurisdictions.

'The right to apply for or obtain a divorce is not a natural one, but is accorded only by reason of statute, and the state has the right to determine who are entitled to use its courts for that purpose and upon what conditions they may do so.' 17 Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, Sec. 8.

The Constitution of the United States confers no power at all upon the United States government to regulate marriage or its dissolution within the several states. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 S.Ct. 237, 47 L.Ed. 366.

The United States Supreme Court has never held that a divorce decree has no internal validity unless it is entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere. Wallace v Wallace, supra. Moreover, so far as the rights of this appellant are concerned having answered and contested the issue of jurisdiction she would be barred from attacking the decree collaterally in any other forum. Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 72 S.Ct. 157, 96 L.Ed. 146.

The true basis of the result reached by the United States Supreme Court in the two cases of Williams v. State of North Carolina, ¹ seems to be that by the terms of the divorce statute of that state the Nevada courts acquire jurisdiction only of its domiciliaries and, in the absence of the fact of a bona fide domicil, the divorce decree is not valid in Nevada, much less is it entitled to recognition elsewhere. This decision is in full accord with the construction given to the statute by the courts of that state. Latterner v. Latterner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 P. 194; Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 872.

The second Williams case does say that 'under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil.' This, for the reason, observes the court, that 'domicil implies a nexus between person and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance. The domicil of one spouse within a State gives power to that State, we have held, to dissolve a marriage wheresoever contracted.' North Carolina was thus permitted to inquire in a collateral proceeding as to the fact issue necessary to give jurisdiction to the Nevada courts, to determine whether the litigant was acting in good faith or whether the domiciliary claim was a pretense and a sham. But granting that no state can assert a legitimate jurisdictional concern over the marital problems of one spouse airplaining to that state on a roundtrip ticket for the purpose of obtaining a divorce with no intent other than to return to his home as soon as the mission is accomplished, yet that falls short of saying domicil in a strict sense of the term is the 'sine qua non' of jurisdiction.

The State of Texas is hardly less concerned with the domestic relations of persons required to live in this state indefinitely under military orders, oftentimes for a period of years, with the...