Woodard v. State

• Decision Date: 27 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. S14A1532.,S14A1532.
• Citation: 771 S.E.2d 362,296 Ga. 803
• Parties: WOODARD v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

296 Ga. 803

771 S.E.2d 362

WOODARD

v.The STATE.

No. S14A1532.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 27, 2015.

Jimmonique R.S. Rodgers, Long Dai Vo, Christopher R. Geel, Mount Pleasant, for appellant.

Meghan Hobbs Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Anna Green Cross, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert D. James, Jr., Dist. Atty., for appellee.

Opinion

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Appellant William Woodard was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of two DeKalb County police officers, Eric C. Barker and Ricky L. Bryant, Jr. Although the State sought the death penalty, the jury recommended sentences of life without parole. Appellant now contends that several jury instructions improperly undermined his defense of justification by lessening the State's burden of proof, and he asserts that his trial counsel were ineffective in failing to object to the trial court's instruction, tracking the language of OCGA § 16–3–21(b)(2), that a person is not justified in using force in self-defense if he is committing a felony. We affirm.¹

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence at trial showed the following. At about 9:00 p.m. on January 15, 2008, Appellant and his friend Mario Westbrook went to a sparsely occupied apartment complex in south DeKalb County to visit Yanita Payne, the mother of one of Appellant's friends. While Appellant was talking on Payne's telephone, he took out a handgun and put it on her table. When she asked why he had the gun, Appellant explained that he knew that off-duty police officers worked security at the complex and patrolled the parking lot and said, “They tote theirs, I tote mine. They draw theirs, I draw mine.” Appellant, who had several prior felony convictions, had also told his girlfriend on numerous occasions that he carried his gun “everywhere he go[es],” and whenever they were together and Appellant's girlfriend mentioned that she saw a police officer, he would tell her “that he was under [the] recidivist act and that he wasn't going back to jail, he would have court in the street.”

After visiting Payne, Appellant and Westbrook left the apartment complex, but they returned around midnight in a car driven by Herbie Durham to buy beer at an illegal “shot house” run by Major Fields from his apartment across the hallway from Payne's unit. Durham parked the car, which had dark-tinted windows, in front of the building, and Appellant got out and walked up the stairs to the shot house. Appellant went inside and bought beer, cigarettes, and cigars from Fields using a counterfeit $50 bill. After receiving his change in genuine currency, Appellant left the apartment, but Fields, who by then had realized that the bill was counterfeit, caught up with Appellant before he descended the stairs back to the parking lot.

Appellant told Fields that the police were outside, so Fields went back into his apartment.

Officer Barker and Officer Bryant were working off-duty security, in uniform, at the complex. When Appellant walked down the stairs, he encountered Officer Barker in front of Durham's car. The officer said something to Appellant, but Appellant ignored him and got into the front passenger seat. Officer Barker then approached the driver's side of the car. Durham rolled down his window, and the officer told him to turn off the car and present his driver's license; Durham complied. Officer Barker said that he smelled marijuana and asked if there was any marijuana in the car, which Durham denied. The officer then requested identification from Appellant, who reached in his pocket but did not produce any identification.

At this point, Officer Bryant arrived to assist Officer Barker and approached the passenger side of the car. Officer Bryant opened the front door and asked Appellant to get out, but Appellant did not comply. The officer then pulled Appellant out of the car and placed him with his hands on the vehicle. Standing behind Appellant, Officer Bryant started to frisk him, but he began to scuffle, trying to avoid the pat-down. Officer Barker ran around the car to assist Officer Bryant, but as Officer Barker reached the passenger side, Appellant managed to break free from Officer Bryant and draw his gun. Appellant then fired repeatedly at the officers, striking each of them three times before fleeing into the night. Officer Bryant died at the scene, and Officer Barker was pronounced dead at the hospital. Appellant testified at trial, admitting that he shot the officers but claiming that they were beating him when he did so, causing him to fear for his life.

Appellant does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Nevertheless, in accordance with this Court's practice in murder cases, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33, 673 S.E.2d 223 (2009) (“ ‘It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ ” (citation omitted)).

2. Appellant contends first that several of the trial court's jury instructions improperly undermined his sole defense of justification by lessening the State's burden of disproving his self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, Appellant challenges the instructions that a police officer has a general duty to enforce the law 24 hours a day, that he lawfully discharges that duty when he arrests an individual who has committed a crime in his presence, and that probable cause for an arrest does not require the quantum of proof necessary for proof of guilt in a trial. Appellant also challenges the instructions regarding police-citizen encounters and the legal requirements for a valid detention or arrest, and he contends that the court erred in instructing the jury that the mere odor of marijuana establishes probable cause for an arrest. We note that Appellant's defense was clearly not, in fact, limited to a customary self-defense claim, but rather focused on his right under Georgia law to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest or an arrest made using excessive force. See Ramirez v. State, 279 Ga. 569, 577, 619 S.E.2d 668 (2005) ; Mullis v. State, 196 Ga. 569, 577–579, 27 S.E.2d 91 (1943).

Because Appellant did not object to these jury charges on the grounds he now raises before the jury retired to deliberate, appellate review of his claims is precluded unless the particular jury instruction in question was “plain error which affects [his] substantial rights.” OCGA § 17–8–58(b) ; State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 33, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011).²

An appellate court may ... reverse a trial court for plain error if the instructional error was not affirmatively waived by the defendant, was obvious beyond reasonable dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Wells v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 167 n. 4, 758 S.E.2d 598 (2014). See also Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33, 718 S.E.2d 232. In evaluating claims of instructional error, we examine the jury charge as a whole. See Laster v. State, 276 Ga. 645, 650, 581 S.E.2d 522 (2003).

Appellant has failed to demonstrate error, much less plain error, in the jury instructions he now disputes. Law enforcement officers have a general duty to enforce the law and maintain the peace, and this duty exists 24 hours a day, including when an officer is working a private security job. See Duncan v. State, 163 Ga.App. 148, 148–149, 294 S.E.2d 365 (1982). “An arrest for a crime may be made by a law enforcement officer ... [w]ithout a warrant if ... [t]he offense is committed in such officer's presence or within such officer's immediate knowledge....” OCGA § 17–4–20(2)(A). See Mullis, 196 Ga. at 576, 27 S.E.2d 91. And there is “a great difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest.” Banks v. State of Ga., 277 Ga. 543, 544, 592 S.E.2d 668 (2004) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). The trial court's instructions incorporating these principles of law were not erroneous. Likewise, in Ramirez, another case where a defendant shot and killed a police officer and claimed self-defense, this Court approved jury instructions on police-citizen encounters and the standards for legal detention and arrest nearly identical to the ones given in this case. See Ramirez, 279 Ga. at 577, 619 S.E.2d 668.

Finally, Appellant's claim that the trial court instructed the jury that the mere odor of marijuana establishes probable cause for arrest is not supported by the record. What the court actually said was:

Probable cause for an arrest without a warrant exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime has been committed.... To justify an arrest without a warrant an officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime take place if by any of the officer's senses the officer has personal knowledge of its commission. Odor, as well as sight, hearing, taste, or touch can be used to establish probable cause for arrest.

The last sentence was essentially a direct quote from O'Keefe v. State, 189 Ga.App. 519, 526, 376 S.E.2d 406 (1988). The instruction did not refer explicitly to the odor of marijuana, nor did it say that odor alone establishes probable cause. Instead, the court correctly advised the jury that the information that a police officer obtains through...