Woodgett v. City of Midfield

• Decision Date: 01 May 2020
• Docket Number: 1180051
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: Robin WOODGETT and Jerome Ruffin v. CITY OF MIDFIELD and American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

319 So.3d 1231

Robin WOODGETT and Jerome Ruffin

v.CITY OF MIDFIELD and American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

1180051

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 1, 2020

Rehearing Denied August 28, 2020

J. Doyle Fuller and Susan G. Copeland of Fuller & Copeland, Montgomery, for appellants.

David A. Sullivan, city atty., City of Midfield, Birmingham; and Warren Kinney of Porter, Porter & Hassinger, Birmingham, for appellee City of Midfield.

Joseph Jay Minus, Jr., of Phelps Dunbar LLP, Mobile, for appellee American Traffic Solutions, Inc.

BOLIN, Justice.

Robin Woodgett and Jerome Ruffin (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") appeal from the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of their declaratory-judgment action challenging the Midfield Red Light Safety Act and the implementing City of Midfield ordinance providing for the automated photographic enforcement of red lights within the corporate limits of the City of Midfield ("the City") on constitutional and statutory grounds. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

In 2011, the Alabama Legislature enacted Act No. 2011-569, Ala. Acts 2011, a local act known as the "Midfield Red Light Safety Act" ("the Act"), which authorized the automated photographic enforcement of traffic lights within the corporate limits of the City. The Act became effective June 9, 2011. The legislature found in § 2(1) of the Act that "vehicles running red lights have been and are dangerous problem in Midfield, Alabama." The legislature further found in § 2(2) of the Act that "automated traffic camera enforcement in a municipal area is a highly accurate method for detecting red light violations and is very effective in reducing the number of red light violations and decreasing the number of traffic accidents, deaths, and injuries." To that end, the legislature found that it "should adopt legislation that would implement a program for automated photographic enforcement of traffic signal violations." § 2(4) of the Act. The legislature created a "non-criminal category of state law called a civil violation created and existing for the sole purpose of carrying out the terms" of the Act and made the penalty for committing a civil violation the "payment of a civil fine." § 3(3).

On June 27, 2011, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2011-4 ("the ordinance"), which provided for the automated photographic enforcement of red lights within the corporate limits of the City and the imposition of a civil penalty for those motorists whose vehicles were photographed running a red light. Section 54-51 of the ordinance states that the Midfield City Council found that there was a "significant risk to the health and safety of the community from drivers of vehicles that run red lights within the city"; that the running of a red light is a "public nuisance"; and that "accident data establishes that vehicles running red lights ... are a dangerous problem in the city." Section 54-52 of the ordinance classifies a "traffic-signal violation" as a civil violation. Section 54-53 of the ordinance imposes a civil penalty of $100 for violations of the ordinance.

The plaintiffs alleged that, in 2011, American Traffic Solutions, Inc. ("ATS"), approached the City regarding the installation of traffic-light-enforcement cameras within the corporate limits of the City. According the plaintiffs, ATS offered to install, maintain, and monitor traffic-light-enforcement cameras at multiple intersections throughout the corporate limits of the City. The plaintiffs further asserted that ATS represented to the City that, when a vehicle is caught on camera going through a red light, ATS would electronically forward the resulting picture to a City official for review. Upon approval from the City, the plaintiffs alleged, ATS would then mail to the owner of the vehicle that ran the red light a ticket requesting payment of a fine. Finally, the plaintiffs asserted, ATS would remit a portion of the fine recovered to the City and would retain the remainder for itself.

The plaintiffs alleged that the first automated traffic-light-enforcement cameras went into operation within the corporate limits of the City in February 2012 and that the first notices of violations of the Act and the ordinance were issued in March 2012. The plaintiffs each alleged that they received a notice of violation in 2013 after the automated traffic-light-enforcement cameras captured their vehicles running red lights at certain unspecified intersections within the corporate limits of the City. The plaintiffs paid their respective fines.

On February 6, 2018, the plaintiffs, on behalf of a putative class of individuals who had received notice of violation pursuant to the Act, sued the City and ATS (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the defendants"), seeking, among other things, a judgment declaring that the Act and the ordinance were unconstitutional and violative of Alabama law; an order enjoining the defendants from further ticketing individuals using automated photographic equipment; and a refund of all fines and fees collected from those persons ticketed based on the use of the automated traffic-light-enforcement cameras. The plaintiffs sought in count I of the complaint a determination by the trial court that the Act violates § 105 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which prohibits the enactment of a local law "in any case which is provided for by a general law." The plaintiffs also sought in count I a determination that the Act violates § 89 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which prohibits the legislature from authorizing any "municipal corporation to pass any laws inconsistent with the general laws of this state." The plaintiffs sought in count II of the complaint a determination that the ordinance violates § 11-45-1, Ala. Code 1975, which prohibits municipal corporations from adopting ordinances inconsistent with the laws of this State. The plaintiffs also sought in count II of the complaint a determination that the ordinance violated § 32-5-1, Ala. Code 1975, which prohibits "local authorities" from adopting any ordinance "regulating motor vehicles ... contrary to the provisions" of Chapter 5 of Title 32. The plaintiffs sought in count III of the complaint a determination that the Act violates § 104 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, which prohibits the legislature from passing a local law that fixes the "punishment of crime" or "creat[es], extend[s], or impair[s] any lien." Finally, the plaintiffs sought in count IV of the complaint a determination that the City had improperly delegated its police power to ATS.

On April 11, 2018, the defendants moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., to dismiss the declaratory-judgment complaint against them, arguing that it appeared from the face of the complaint that the plaintiffs could prove no set of facts entitling them to relief. Specifically, the defendants argued, among other things, that the Act and the ordinance both provide for an adjudicative hearing in municipal court and a de novo appeal to the circuit court as a means of challenging a noticed violation and that there are no allegations contained in the plaintiffs' complaint that indicate that the plaintiffs sought that relief. The defendants contend that, because the plaintiffs failed to challenge the violations pursuant to the procedures provided for in the Act and the ordinance, they cannot now present this issue in a collateral declaratory-judgment action.

On August 23, 2018, the trial court entered an order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding, among other things, that the plaintiffs cannot now revive their claims in a collateral proceeding when they failed to assert those claims pursuant to the procedures provided for by the Act and the ordinance. This appeal followed.

Standard of Review

This Court has stated the appropriate standard of review for an appeal from an order of dismissal pursuant to 12(b)(6) as follows:

" ‘On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.... The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6) [, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [the pleader] to relief. ... In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [the plaintiff] may possibly prevail.... We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.’ "

Carr v. International Refining & Mfg. Co., 13 So. 3d 947, 952 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) ). Further,

" ‘[f]or a declaratory-judgment action to withstand a motion to dismiss there must be a bona fide justiciable controversy that should be settled. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d 640, 641 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) ; Smith v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 293 Ala. 644, 309 So. 2d 424, 427 (1975). The test for the sufficiency of a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment is whether the pleader is entitled to a declaration of rights at all, not whether the pleader will prevail in the declaratory-judgment action. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641.

" ‘The lack of a justiciable controversy may be raised by either a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment. Smith, 309 So. 2d at 427. See also Rule 12, Ala. R. Civ. P.; Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. However, a motion to dismiss is rarely appropriate in a declaratory-judgment action. Wallace v. Burleson, 361 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1978). If there is a justiciable controversy at the commencement of the declaratory-judgment action, the motion to dismiss should be overruled and a declaration of rights made only after an answer has been submitted and evidence has been presented. Anonymous, 472 So. 2d at 641.

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