Woodham v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.
Decision Date | 10 October 2002 |
Docket Number | No. SC01-2160.,SC01-2160. |
Citation | 829 So.2d 891 |
Parties | Cordette WOODHAM, Petitioner, v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF FLORIDA, INC., Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Lisa Fletcher-Kemp, Hollywood, FL, and Gary L. Printy, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
Patrick D. Coleman and Melissa A. Dearing of Coffman, Colemand, Andrews & Grogan, P.A., Jacksonville, FL, for Respondent.
Richard E. Johnson, Tallahassee, FL; and Archibald J. Thomas, III, Jacksonville, FL, for National Employment Lawyers Association, Florida Chapter, Amicus Curiae.
Christine D. Hanley and David H. Spalter of Christine D. Hanley & Associates, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Human Resource Association of Palm Beach County, Amicus Curiae.
Andrew S. Hament and Aaron D. Lyons of Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A., Melbourne, FL, for The Academy of Florida Management Attorneys, Amicus Curiae.
Allan W. Weitzman and Arlene K. Kline of Proskauer Rose LLP, Boca Raton, FL, for the HR Florida State Council and the Human Resources Association of Broward County, Amicus Curiae.
We have for review Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 793 So.2d 41, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001), a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal, which certified conflict with Cisko v. Phoenix Medical Products, Inc., 797 So.2d 11, 13-14 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal. The Third District in Woodham also certified the following question to be of great public importance:
WHETHER A CLAIMANT MUST PURSUE THE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES PROVIDED IN SECTION 760.11(7), FLORIDA STATUTES, WHEN THE CLAIMANT HAS FILED A COMPLAINT UNDER THE FLORIDA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT WITH THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION JOINTLY, AND HAS RECEIVED AN EEOC "DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS" STATING: ?
Woodham, 793 So.2d at 47. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we answer the certified question in the negative, quash the Third District's decision, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Woodham, an African-American, filed an action against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida (BCBS), her former employer, under the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA), §§ 760.01-.11, Fla. Stat. (1999), asserting that BCBS engaged in discriminatory practices against her. The Third District described Woodham's specific assertions of discrimination:
; Wells Fargo Guard Serv., Inc. v. Lehman, 25 Fla. L. Weekly D2307 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept.27, 2000); Sweeney v. Florida Power & Light Co., 725 So.2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).1
More than 300 days after filing the charge, Woodham requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. Woodham subsequently received from the EEOC Form 161, which is a printed form notice, entitled "DISMISSAL AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS." The form stated in part that "THE EEOC IS CLOSING ITS FILE ON THIS CHARGE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON." Listed below were ten boxes to be marked as applicable by the agency, each of which contained accompanying reasons why the EEOC was closing its file. The first seven boxes are procedural bases for dismissal. Woodham's form contained an "X" next to box 8 only. Box 8 contains the following accompanying language:
The EEOC issues the following determination: Based upon its investigation, the EEOC is unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes. This does not certify that the Respondent is in compliance with the statutes. No finding is made as to any other issues that might be construed as having been raised by this charge.
After Woodham filed a complaint in circuit court, BCBS filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted BCBS's motion, finding that Woodham's claim was barred because Woodham failed to request an administrative hearing as required by section 760.11(7) of the FCRA. The Third District affirmed the granting of the summary judgment, denied rehearing but certified conflict with Cisko, and certified a question of great public importance. See Woodham, 793 at So.2d at 42-43, 47.
The issue that we resolve is whether the notice received by Woodham precluded Woodham's right to file a complaint of discrimination in circuit court. We begin with the stated purpose of the FCRA, which is "to secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status." § 760.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). The Legislature has specifically declared that the FCRA "shall be liberally construed to further the general purposes stated in this section." § 760.01(3). In Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432 (Fla.2000), we recently explained:
The statute's stated purpose and statutory construction directive are modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Like Title VII, chapter 760 is remedial and requires a liberal construction to preserve and promote access to the remedy intended by the Legislature. Section 760.01(2) outlines the general purposes of the Act which include securing freedom from discrimination for all individuals and preserving the general welfare of all.
Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
As a prerequisite to bringing a civil action based upon an alleged violation of the FCRA, the claimant is required to file a complaint with the FCHR within 365 days of the alleged violation. See § 760.11(1). Under section 760.11(3), the FCHR is then required to determine within 180 days whether or not reasonable cause exists. Subsection (3) provides in full:
Except as provided in subsection (2), the commission shall investigate the allegations in the complaint. Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. When the commission determines whether or not there is reasonable cause, the commission by registered mail shall promptly notify the aggrieved person and the respondent of the reasonable cause determination, the date of such determination, and the options available under this section.
§ 760.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied).
If the FCHR makes a "reasonable cause" determination, section 760.11(4) provides the claimant with two options: he or she may (1) bring a civil action or (2) request an administrative hearing. Subsection (4) provides in full:
§ 760.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1999).
On the other hand, under section 760.11(7), if the FCHR makes a determination that there is not reasonable cause ("no cause"), the claimant may request an administrative hearing, but must do so within 35 days of the date of the "no cause" determination. If the request is not made within 35 days, the claim is barred. Subsection (7) provides in full:
If the commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause and any such hearing shall be heard by an administrative law judge and not by the commission or a commissioner. If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. If the administrative law judge finds that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, he or she shall issue an appropriate recommended order to the commission prohibiting the practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including back pay. Within 90 days of the date the recommended order is rendered, the commission shall issue a final order by adopting, rejecting, or modifying the recommended order as provided under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. The 90-day period may be extended with the consent of all the parties. In any action or proceeding under this subsection, the commission, in its discretion, may allow...
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