Woodroof v. City of Nashville

• Decision Date: 05 March 1946
• Citation: 192 S.W.2d 1013,183 Tenn. 483
• Parties: WOODROOF v. CITY OF NASHVILLE et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

192 S.W.2d 1013

183 Tenn. 483

WOODROOF v. CITY OF NASHVILLE et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

March 5, 1946

Appeal from Chancery Court, Davidson County; Thomas A. Shriver Chancellor.

Suit by Alfred R. Woodroof against the City of Nashville and another. From the decree, an appeal was taken which appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals. On petition to rehear.

Application to reconsider dismissed.

Elvin Woodroof and Seay, Stockell & Edwards, all of Nashville, for complainant.

Andrew D. Tanner, of Nashville, for Nashville Fire Fighters Ass'n.

Claude Callicott, of Nashville, for City of Nashville.

GREEN Chief Justice.

This case was formerly heard by the Court and transferred to the court of appeals upon authority of Cumberland Trust Co v. Bart, 163 Tenn. 272, 43 S.W.2d 379. We assumed that the appeal was taken to this Court upon the theory that the case below was tried on stipulation of facts. In reality, the stipulation was merely one as to the evidence to be included in the transcript and not a stipulation as to the determinative and ultimate facts. The case cited ruled that this Court had no jurisdiction of a matter of this kind.

A petition to rehear has been filed, from which it appears that the appeal was taken to this Court on the theory that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction under § 9015 of the Code which provides that a party dissatisfied with the decree of the lower court may 'appeal to the supreme court' from a decree of the lower court in a case arising from a board or commission and reviewed in the lower court by certiorari proceedings prosecuted under code, §§ 9008-9018.

We had thought that this question was concluded by Memphis and Shelby County Bar Association v. Himmelstein, 165 Tenn. 102, 53 S.W.2d 378, which was an appeal from the chancery court to review the decree of that court in disbarment proceedings. Section 9977 of the Code, taken from chapter 42 of the Acts of 1919, which regulates disbarment proceedings, provided that in such proceedings either party might except to the judgment of the trial court and might prosecute an appeal to the Supreme Court. In transferring to the court of appeals a case of this nature appealed to the Supreme Court, after giving another reason for our action, we said: 'Moreover, section 13 of the Code provides: 'If provisions of different chapters or articles of the Code appear to contravene each other, the provisions of each chapter or article shall prevail as to all matters and questions growing out of the subject matter of that chapter or article.' The matter or question before us is the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and that is the subject-matter of section 10618 of the Code. That section accordingly prevails over the apparently contradictory provision of section 9977 of the Code, the subject-matter of which is the right of appeal of an attorney against whom disbarment proceedings have been instituted.' Memphis and Shelby County Bar Association v. Himmelstein, supra, 165 Tenn. at page 104, 53 S.W.2d at page 378.

While the foregoing seems to be determinative of the jurisdiction here, the matter, perhaps, deserves more elaboration, which we accordingly undertake. We set out § 9015 of the Code as to appeals in cases like this one and the first sentence of § 10618 of the Code in parallel columns:

'9015. Any party dissatisfied with the decree of the court may, upon giving bond as required by law in other chancery causes, appeal to the supreme court, where the cause shall be heard upon the transcript of the record from the chancery court. Said appeal shall be advanced upon the docket of the supreme court as one of such precedence, and heard as promptly as practicable.'

'10618. The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be appellate only, and shall extend to all civil cases except those involving constitutional questions, the right to hold a public office, workmen's compensation, state revenue, mandamus, in the nature of quo warranto, ouster, habeas corpus, and excepting cases which have been finally determined in the lower court on demurrer or other method not involving a review or determination of the facts, or in which all the facts have been stipulated.'

Quite obviously the above code sections 'appear to contravenue each other.' Code § 9015 gives the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in certiorari cases originating before boards or commissions, while code § 10618 gives jurisdiction of all civil cases to the court of appeals except cases enumerated, and it is a familiar rule of construction that enumeration of exceptions excludes all exceptions other than those enumerated. Turner v. Eslick, 146 Tenn. 236, 240 S.W. 786, and authorities cited.

The lawmakers were dealing specifically with the jurisdiction of the court of appeals when they enacted § 10618. That was the subject matter of the section. The lawmakers were dealing generally with the right of appeal in certain certiorari cases in the enactment of § 9015. That was the subject matter of that section, not the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Such being the situation, we think § 13 of the code is applicable and to this effect, in addition to Memphis and Shelby County Bar Association v. Himmelstein, supra, see State v. Safley, Chairman, et al., 172 Tenn. 385, 112 S.W.2d 831.

Aside from § 13 of the code there are certain well settled rules of statutory interpretation which strengthen our conclusion as to where jurisdiction of this appeal lies.

The code of 1932 is nothing but a comprehensive act of the General Assembly of 1931. An established rule of construction is that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between two sections of a statute, the one last mentioned will control. May Co. v. Anderson, 156 Tenn. 216, 300 S.W. 12; Southern R. Co. v. Grigsby, 155 Tenn. 285, 292 S.W. 3. Under this rule, § 10618 prevails over § 9015.

Another rule of statutory interpretation is that a special statute or a special provision of a particular statute controls a general provision in another statute or a general provision in the same statute. This rule is learnedly...