Woods v. LOCAL U. NO. 613 OF INT. BRO. OF ELEC. WKRS.

• Decision Date: 12 November 1975
• Docket Number: No. C74-1633A.,C74-1633A.
• Parties: Warren R. WOODS, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 613 OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

404 F. Supp. 110

Warren R. WOODS, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 613 OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Defendant.

No. C74-1633A.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

November 12, 1975.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David H. Flint, Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Robert L. Mitchell, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant.

ORDER OF COURT

MOYE, District Judge.

This is an action under Section 101(a)(1) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1), for injunctive and other appropriate relief filed by Warren R. Woods against Local Union No. 613 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 613. The case is presently before the Court on the defendant Local 613's motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiff Woods is a member in good standing of Local 379 of the IBEW, Charlotte, North Carolina, and is classified as a journeyman-wireman. Defendant is a labor union affiliated with the IBEW and subject to the IBEW Constitution. Local 613 has jurisdiction over plaintiff's job classification and over construction projects in metropolitan Atlanta and most counties in north Georgia. Local 613 maintains the exclusive hiring hall for referrals of electrical workers to members of the National Electrical Contractors Association in the defendant's jurisdiction.

Since 1966 Woods has lived in Rockdale County, Georgia, and has worked in Local 613's jurisdiction as a "traveler." Woods has made several requests for a transfer of his membership from Local 379 to Local 613, but on all occasions Local 613 has refused to accept Woods into membership. Plaintiff's requests for transfer have occurred by depositing his travel card with Local 613 and by oral and written demands.

Job referrals of electrical workers by Local 613 to members of the National Electrical Contractors Association are controlled by procedures established in the collective bargaining agreement between Local 613 and the Association. Woods alleges that the referral procedures are being manipulated by Local 613 in a manner such that members of Local 613 receive the most desirable referrals and travelers receive the less desirable referrals, although often in the same referral priority group.

On two occasions Woods orally requested representatives of the IBEW to assist him in effectuating his transfer of membership to Local 613. On both occasions the IBEW orally informed Woods that the IBEW could not assist him. Woods also filed a written complaint regarding Local 613's referral practices with the defendant's business agent. Apparently no action was taken on this complaint. Subsequent to unsuccessfully seeking informal relief from the National Labor Relations Board, Woods filed the instant action.

The action at bar seeks relief and damages resulting from Local 613's denial of membership and the concomitant denial of equal rights and privileges, and Local 613's breach of its duty to fairly represent plaintiff in the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining agreements. Plaintiff asserts both claims pursuant to provisions of the LMRDA.

The issues presently before the Court are the following: First, whether the instant action is pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board NLRB; second, whether the instant action is barred by plaintiff's failure to exhaust intraunion remedies; third, whether the action is barred by the statute of limitations; fourth, whether this Court has the power to order Local 613 to grant Woods union membership; and fifth, whether punitive damages are allowable in an action under the LMRDA.

Pre-emption by the NLRA

Local 613 challenges the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter on the ground that the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, pre-empts the instant action. Local 613 relies on San Diego Building Trades Council, Millmen's Union v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed. 2d 775 (1959), in which the Supreme Court held:

"When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 and § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 780 (emphasis added)

The instant action has been brought under Section 101(a)(1) of the LMRDA which provides as follows:

"Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws."

Section 102 provides that an individual whose rights secured by Section 101 have been infringed by any violation of Section 101 may bring a civil action in a United States District Court for appropriate relief.

Section 101(a)(1) of the Act secures certain equal rights and privileges to members of a labor organization within such organization. Woods's allegations that he has not been recognized by Local 613 as one of its members must be deemed to be the equivalent of an assertion that he is not being accorded the equal rights and privileges within Local 613 secured to members of labor organizations by Section 101(a)(1) and other provisions of the LMRDA. If an individual has complied with the membership requirements of a labor organization then such individual is entitled to the rights and privileges guaranteed by Section 101(a)(1) and may bring a cause of action under the LMRDA. Hughes v. Local No. 11 of International Assoc. of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829, 82 S.Ct. 51, 7 L.Ed.2d 32 (1961); Parish v. Legion, 450 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1971); Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961).

Local 613 suggests that the refusal to accept a transfer of membership is "arguably" an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, and that exclusive jurisdiction therefore lies with the NLRB. This assertion is erroneous on two counts.

First, "the purpose of the Garmon rule is to prevent conflicts between federal and state policy. Here, if there is any conflict at all, it is between two federal organs expressing federal policy, and Congress has declared that federal courts, and not the National Labor Relations Board are to have the primary role." International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 196 (5 Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935, 88 S.Ct. 1848, 20 L.Ed.2d 854 (1968).

Second, even if the conduct is arguably subject to the NLRA it is also a violation of the LMRDA. "A clear Congressional directive that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits for damages has precedence over application of the primary jurisdiction rule." International Bro. of Boilermakers, etc. v. Braswell, supra at 196. Moreover, the rights secured by the LMRDA overlap those available under state law and other federal legislation, such as the NLRA, and Congress expressly provided in Section 103 of the LMRDA that these rights are to be cumulative. International Bro. of Boilermakers, etc. v. Braswell, supra; Parish v. Legion, supra. See also, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Rights guaranteed under the LMRDA are not subject to pre-emption by the NLRA. Fulton Lodge No. 2 of the International Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212 (5 Cir. 1969).

Thus, the Court has jurisdiction over the instant action pursuant to Section 102 of the LMRDA. If plaintiff has complied fully with the membership requirements of Local 613 then he is entitled to the rights and privileges guaranteed by Section 101(a)(1) of the LMRDA. The assertion of a substantial claim under a federal statute, such as the LMRDA, gives the Court jurisdiction of that claim even though the Court may ultimately determine that no cause of action upon which relief may be granted is alleged. Hughes v. Local No. 11, etc., supra, at 814.

Furthermore, the pre-emption doctrine is equally inapplicable to the plaintiff's fair representation claim. Although the NLRB regards a union's breach of its duty of fair representation to be an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) of the NLRA, see Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1963), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), this does not bar this Court from exercising jurisdiction over Woods's action against Local 613 for breach of this duty under the LMRDA. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967).

Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies

Local 613 asserts that Woods failed to exhaust intraunion remedies and that this action is therefore barred. Plaintiff contends that he complied with the spirit of the exhaustion doctrine and that further pursuit of intraunion remedies would be futile.

Section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA provides in part that "any such union member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4).

There are two internal union remedies claimed to be available to plaintiff. First Article IV, Sections 16 and 17, of the Agreement between Local 613 and the Atlanta Chapter, National Electrical Contractors' Association, provides for the establishment of an Appeals Committee to consider any complaint of any employee or applicant for employment arising out of the administration by Local 613 of other provisions of the Agreement. Plaintiff attempted to comply with this provision...