Woodson v. State
Decision Date | 25 August 2000 |
Citation | 794 So.2d 1226 |
Parties | Charles WOODSON v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Thomas M. Goggans, Montgomery, for appellant.
Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and Hense R. Ellis II, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Charles Woodson, was convicted of attempted murder, a violation of §§ 13A-4-2 and 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, a violation of § 13A-11-61(a), Ala.Code 1975. The trial court sentenced him, as a habitual offender, to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on the attempted murder conviction and to serve 20 years in prison on the discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle conviction. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied after conducting a hearing. This appeal followed.
The appellant argues that the trial court should have granted a continuance so sheriffs deputies could serve a subpoena on Rico Teague, who he alleges committed the offense. Although the appellant never specifically asked for a continuance, the parties and the trial court discussed the situation regarding Teague at length, and the trial court treated those discussions as a motion for a continuance to secure Teague's presence.
. It must be shown that substantially favorable testimony would be given by the witness and that the denial of a continuance would materially prejudice the defendant. Whitehead v. State, 429 So.2d 641 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). In addition, it must be established that the expected testimony is not merely cumulative or in the nature of impeachment, and the motion for a continuance must not be made merely for purposes of delay. Mitchell v. Moore, 406 So.2d 347 (Ala.1981); Malone v. State, 659 So.2d 1006 (Ala.Cr.App.1995); McClellan v. State, 628 So.2d 1026 (Ala.Cr.App.1993); Prince v. State, 623 So.2d 355 (Ala.Cr. App.1992).
Smith v. State, 698 So.2d 189, 205 (Ala. Crim.App.1996), aff'd, 698 So.2d 219 (Ala.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 957, 118 S.Ct. 385, 139 L.Ed.2d 300 (1997) (emphasis added). During the discussions regarding Teague, the following occurred:
(R. 56-57.) The appellant indicated only what he would ask Teague, not what he expected Teague's response to be or that the response would be substantially favorable to him. Furthermore, at trial, he elicited testimony from two other witnesses that Teague committed the offense. Thus, even if Teague had testified that he shot at the victim, such testimony would have been cumulative to the testimony of those other witnesses. Finally, during the discussions regarding Teague, a deputy sheriff, the prosecutor, and defense counsel described the difficulties the sheriffs department had encountered in attempting to serve the subpoena on Teague. When the trial court asked defense counsel what made him think Teague would be available or would show up if the sheriffs department found him, defense counsel responded, "The likelihood of him being in jail next time will be pretty good." (R. 59.) However, defense counsel admitted that he could not assure the court that Teague would appear if the cases were continued. In addition, Deputy Jerry Pritchett testified at trial that Teague had previously refused to make a statement to law enforcement officers. Therefore, the appellant did not show that there was a reasonable probability that Teague's testimony would be forthcoming if the cases were continued. For these reasons, the trial court did not err when it did not order a continuance.
The appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct. Specifically, he contends that "[j]urors' failure to disclose their knowledge of [him] and his family and of the person [he] contended actually committed the charged crimes deprived [him] of his right to an impartial jury." (Appellant's brief at p. 5.) "`[A]t a hearing on a motion for a new trial, the defendant has the burden of proving the allegations of his motion to the satisfaction of the trial court.'" Dawson v. State, 710 So.2d 472, 475 (Ala.1997) (citations omitted). Furthermore, "`[t]he ruling of the trial judge denying a motion for new trial will not be disturbed in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion, and this Court will indulge every presumption in favor of the correctness of his ruling.'" Reynolds v. City of Birmingham, 723 So.2d 822, 824 (Ala.Crim.App.1998) (quoting Hall v. State, 348 So.2d 870, 875 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 875 (Ala.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021, 98 S.Ct. 745, 54 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978)).
First, the appellant argues that jurors S.M. and M.L. committed misconduct when they did not respond during voir dire examination to the questions asking whether any members of the venire knew him. However, he did not allege in his motion for a new trial or during the hearing on the motion that S.M. or M.L. knew him. Accordingly, this argument is not properly before this court. See Marshall v. State, 629 So.2d 766 (Ala.Crim. App.1993)
(. )
Second, the appellant argues that jurors S.M. and M.L. committed misconduct when they did not disclose that they knew his family. The record does not reflect that the parties or the trial court asked the veniremembers whether they knew the appellant's family. "Veniremen cannot be expected to reveal information not elicited by the litigants." Davis v. State, 51 Ala.App. 200, 202, 283 So.2d 650 (Ala.Crim.App.1973). See also Marshall v. State, 668 So.2d 891 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)
. Therefore, because neither party specifically asked S.M. and M.L. whether they knew the appellant's family, they did not have an obligation to volunteer that information. Accordingly, the...
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Harris v. State
...(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting Parish v. State, 480 So. 2d 29, 30 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)). As this Court stated in Woodson v. State, 794 So. 2d 1226 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000):"[T]he appellant argues that jurors S.M. and M.L. committed misconduct when they did not disclose that they knew his f......
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Taite v. State
...the ruling. E.g., Apicella v. State, 809 So.2d 841, 847 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), aff'd, 809 So.2d 865 (Ala.2001); Woodson v. State, 794 So.2d 1226, 1230 (Ala.Crim.App.2000). Extraneous evidence Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides, in pertinent part:"[A] juror may not testify in impeachment of ......
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Taite v. State, No. CR-07-2246 (Ala. Crim. App. 11/13/2009)
...ruling. E.g., Apicella v. State, 809 So. 2d 841, 847 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), aff'd, 809 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2001); Woodson v. State, 794 So. 2d 1226, 1230 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000). Extraneous Rule 606(b), Ala. R. Evid., provides, in pertinent part: "[A] juror may not testify in impeachment of th......
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Harrison v. State
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