World Wide Imports, Inc. v. Bartel

• Citation: 193 Cal.Rptr. 830,145 Cal.App.3d 1006
• Parties: WORLD WIDE IMPORTS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Peggy BARTEL and Harry Glassman, Defendants and Appellants. AO11993. Civ. 51811.
• Decision Date: 15 August 1983
• Court: California Court of Appeals

Page 830

193 Cal.Rptr. 830

145 Cal.App.3d 1006

WORLD WIDE IMPORTS, INC., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Peggy BARTEL and Harry Glassman, Defendants and Appellants.

AO11993.

Civ. 51811.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Aug. 15, 1983.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1983.

Cartwright, Sucherman, Slobodin & Fowler, Inc., Robert E. Cartwright, Dennis Kruszynski, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Richard Haas, Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

CALDECOTT, Presiding Justice.

This is an appeal from an order denying motion to vacate a sister state money judgment.

The parties to the action are plaintiff World Wide Imports, Inc., a Washington corporation (hereinafter respondent), engaged in selling wholesale jewelry, and defendants Peggy Bartel and Harry Glassman, California residents (hereafter appellants), in the business of buying wholesale jewelry.

In 1977 and 1978, appellants bought jewelry on credit from respondent in Seattle, Washington. When they refused to pay the purchase price, on October 5, 1978, respondent brought an action against them in the Superior Court of King County, State of Washington, alleging that in violation of the contract, appellants failed to pay the agreed upon price of $18,286.45.

On December 28, 1978, the matter was set for trial for September 27, 1979. The same day the parties signed a "Stipulation for Agreed Setting," stating that the "case is Nonjury." In Washington, the right to jury trial is preserved only if, at the time of filing the "Stipulation for Agreed Setting," a written demand for jury is filed and a jury fee is deposited by the party (Washington Civil Rules for Superior Court, rule 38(b); see also Revised Code of Washington, § 36.18.020(5). Appellants concede that they did not demand a jury trial or deposit the jury fee at either the time of filing the "Stipulation for Agreed Setting" on January 3, 1979, or at the granting of two continuances on September 17, 1979 and October 5, 1979, respectively. Appellants made a belated request for a jury trial only on March 5, 1980, when they requested a third continuance.

After the matter came up for trial on May 5, 1980, the court ruled that appellants had waived their right to a jury trial by a failure to comply with rule 38(b), which requires that a written demand for a jury shall be made and jury fees posted at the time the case is first set for trial. Thereupon a court trial was held at the conclusion of which money judgment was entered against appellants in the sum of $16,956.60.

Appellants failed to move for a new trial and/or appeal the judgment in the forum state. Rather they attacked the judgment collaterally when respondent initiated an action in California in order to enforce the Washington judgment under the Uniform Sister State Money Judgments Act (Uniform Act). (Cal.Code Civ.Proc., § 1710.10 et seq.) ¹ After the clerk of the San Francisco Superior Court entered a "judgment on the sister state judgment" in accordance with the Uniform Act, appellants moved to vacate the sister state judgment on the basis that the Washington judgment was unenforceable in California because it had been rendered in violation of appellants' constitutional right to a jury trial. After a hearing and legal arguments of the parties, the superior court denied appellants' motion. The present appeal followed.

Repeating their argument made in the trial court appellants contend on appeal that the Washington judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit and should have been vacated under section 1710.40, because it violated a fundamental California public policy which favors a jury trial and interprets the waiver of jury more liberally than the laws of the State of Washington.

In addressing appellants' contention, we initially point out that a sister state money judgment entered pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Act may be vacated in California only when the statutory ground or grounds therefor have been established. Section 1710.40 provides in relevant part that "A judgment entered pursuant to this chapter may be vacated on any ground which would be a defense to an action in this state on the sister state judgment." In elaborating on the defense available under section 1710.40, the Law Revision Commission makes the following comment: "Common defenses to enforcement of a sister state judgment include the following: the judgment is not final and unconditional (where finality means that no further action by the court rendering the judgment is necessary to resolve the matter litigated); the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud; the judgment was rendered in excess of jurisdiction; the judgment is not enforceable in the state of rendition; the plaintiff is guilty of misconduct; the judgment has already been paid; suit on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations in the state where enforcement is sought." (19A West's Anno.Codes (1982) p. 694; accord: 5 Witkin, California Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Enforcement of Judgment, §§ 194-195, pp. 3549-3550; Rest.2d, Conflict of Laws, §§ 103-121.)

Appellants candidly concede that none of the defenses enumerated above are available in this case and that based upon the traditional legal principles they are entitled to no relief. Appellants insist, however, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. (1980) 448 U.S. 261, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757, a case recently decided by the Supreme Court, has radically changed the existing law and that case permits the denial of enforcement of a foreign judgment if the latter violates a fundamental public policy of the enforcing state. Since in the case at bench, continue appellants, the Washington procedure, in essence, denied their right to a jury trial and the judgment so rendered is thus violative of a fundamental California public policy favoring trials by the jury, California should not give full faith and credit to the sister state money judgment. Appellants' contention is unfounded and must be rejected for a variety of reasons.

To start with, the law is well established that upon a claim that a foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, the permissible scope of inquiry is limited to a determination of whether the court of forum had fundamental jurisdiction in the case. Accordingly, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if the state of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested parties were given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. (Durfee v. Duke (1963) 375 U.S. 106, 116, 84 S.Ct. 242, 247, 11 L.Ed.2d 186; Milliken v. Meyer (1940) 311 U.S. 457, 462, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McConnell (1955) 44 Cal.2d 715, 725, 285 P.2d 636; Thorley v. Superior Court (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 907-908, 144 Cal.Rptr. 557.) In the case at bench, the Washington court had indisputable jurisdiction over both subject matter, and the persons and the parties who appeared and in fact litigated the matter in the State of Washington were given not only reasonable notice, but also ample opportunity to defend the case against themselves. In short, since in the present instance the sister state court had the requisite fundamental jurisdiction in the action and the questions raised in the suit have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided by the foreign forum, we cannot but accord full faith and credit to the judgment at issue.

Second, contrary to appellants' argument, the California law is clear that the differing public policy or laws of the enforcing state cannot contravene the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. As has been repeatedly stated, California must, regardless of policy objections, recognize the judgment of another state as res judicata, and this is so even though the action or proceeding which resulted in the judgment could not have been brought under the law or policy of California. (New York Higher Education Assistance Corp. v. Siegel (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 684, 688, 154 Cal.Rptr. 200; Harrah v. Craig (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 67, 247 P.2d 855; 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (8th ed. 1974) Constitutional Law, § 19, pp. 3262-3263.) This is in harmony with Restatements, Second, Conflict of Laws, section 117, which sets forth that: "A valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States will be recognized and enforced in a sister State even though the strong public policy of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim." (Emphasis added.)

Third, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. does not change the basic rules set out above and does not stand for the proposition that the contrary public policy of the enforcing state constitutes a bar to according full faith and credit to a foreign judgment. Washington Gas dealt with the narrow issue of whether the workers' compensation award...