Worthington v. Westnet
| Citation | 341 P.3d 995,182 Wash.2d 500 |
| Decision Date | 22 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 90037–0.,90037–0. |
| Parties | John WORTHINGTON, Petitioner, v. WESTNET, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
John Worthington, Renton, WA, pro se.
Ione Susan George, Kitsap County Prosecutors Office, Port Orchard, WA, Pamela Beth Loginsky, Washington Assoc of Prosecuting Atty, Olympia, WA, for Respondent.
Solicitor General Division Attorney General, Attorney at Law, Peter B. Gonick, Washington Attorney General's Office, Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of State of Washington.
¶ 1 This case involves the application of the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56 RCW, to task forces formed under the Interlocal Cooperation Act (ICA), chapter 39.34 RCW. We accepted review to address whether the West Sound Narcotics Enforcement Team (WestNET), a multijurisdictional drug task force, is an entity subject to the PRA. Because the trial court granted the defendant's CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we reach only a narrower procedural issue: can the parties to an interlocal agreement establish, as a matter of law, that their own task forces do not exist for the purpose of the PRA?
¶ 2 We hold that the ICA does not provide the contributing agencies with such an unqualified power. In concluding that the terms of the agreement alone conclusively established WestNET's capacity for suit, the trial court deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to present evidence in support of his argument that WestNET's actual operational structure subjects it to the PRA's purview. That approach is inconsistent with our general approach to PRA issues and the ICA itself. RCW 39.34.030(5). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further factual determination proceedings.
¶ 3 WestNET is a multiagency, multijurisdictional drug task force formed by an “Interlocal Drug Task Force Agreement” (Agreement) executed in June 2009 among several Washington State municipalities and the federal Naval Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS).1 Resp't's Suppl. Clerk's Papers at 125. The Agreement was executed pursuant to chapter 39.34 RCW, a statute that permits various agencies and municipalities to create multijurisdictional task forces in order to coordinate activities and make the most efficient use of their resources. Because the focus of chapter 39.34 RCW is to promote efficiency and coordination, the statute allows the parties to enter into interlocal agreements without necessarily forming a separate legal entity. RCW 39.34.030(4). The Agreement at issue here explicitly provides that because WestNET “does and must operate confidentially and without public input,” “[t]he parties do not intend to create through, this Agreement, a separate legal entity subject to suit.” Resp't's Suppl. CP at 127.
¶ 4 In 2010, the petitioner, John Worthington, filed a public records request that WestNET disclose records related to a raid of his residence four years earlier, which he alleged was conducted by the WestNET drug task force. WestNET did not respond, and instead, the Kitsap County Sheriff's Office made some initial disclosures. The sheriff's office did not indicate why it responded instead of WestNET—neither explaining that WestNET did not exist as a legal entity or that WestNET was otherwise exempt from the PRA requirements. But Worthington would have been aware that the response came from the sheriff's office, rather than WestNET, because the sheriff's office sent the disclosures on its own letterhead.
¶ 5 Dissatisfied with the response, Worthington sued for relief under the PRA, serving the complaint on the address shared by the Kitsap County Sheriff's Office and the Kitsap County Prosecutor's Office. However, the complaint named WestNET as the only defendant. Per the Agreement, a Kitsap County deputy prosecutor appeared on behalf of WestNET and filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that Worthington failed to identify WestNET as a county or public corporation that may be sued under RCW 4.08.120.2 The prosecutor later amended that motion, asserting that WestNET was not a government agency subject to the PRA. The trial court denied the CR 12(b)(6) motion.
¶ 6 WestNET moved for reconsideration, arguing for the first time that WestNET was not an independent legal entity under the terms of the Agreement. Worthington's complaint contended that WestNET was a “ ‘functional equivalent’ ” of a government agency and therefore subject to suit under the PRA. Clerk's Papers at 6. The trial court did not review any evidence and only considered the pleadings and the Agreement.3 Finding that the terms of the Agreement conclusively established how WestNET operates, the trial court concluded that WestNET was not a sufficient “ ‘something’ ” to constitute an agency subject to the PRA's requirements. Verbatim Record of Proceedings at 26. The trial court granted WestNET's CR 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we granted review. Worthington v. WestNET, 179 Wash.App. 788, 320 P.3d 721, review granted, 180 Wash.2d 1021, 328 P.3d 903 (2014).
¶ 7 A CR 12(b)(6) motion may be granted only where there is not only an absence of facts set out in the complaint to support a claim of relief, but there is no hypothetical set of facts that could conceivably be raised by the complaint to support a legally sufficient claim. San Juan County v. No New Gas Tax, 160 Wash.2d 141, 164, 157 P.3d 831 (2007). Consideration of extraneous materials on a CR. 12(b)(6) motion is permissible so long as the court can say, “no matter what facts are proven within the context of the claim, the plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief.” Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 109 Wash.2d 107, 121, 744 P.2d 1032, 750 P.2d 254 (1987). Otherwise, the complaint must be transmuted into a motion for summary judgment. CR 56. For the foregoing reasons, CR 12(b)(6) motions are granted only “ ‘sparingly and with care.’ ” Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 254, 692 P.2d 793 (1984) (quoting 27 Federal Procedure Pleadings and Motions § 62:465 (1984)).
¶ 8 In this case, the appropriateness of the trial court's CR 12(b)(6) dismissal depends on whether the Agreement can conclusively establish that WestNET is a nonentity for PRA purposes, such that no conceivable set of facts could have been raised to support Worthington's claim. “Whether dismissal was appropriate under CR 12(b)(6) is a question of law that we review de novo.” San Juan County, 160 Wash.2d at 164, 157 P.3d 831 (citing State ex rel. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 140 Wash.2d 615, 629, 999 P.2d 602 (2000) ).
¶ 9 We start our analysis looking at the scope of the PRA. The PRA (previously known as the public disclosure act (PDA), former chapter 42.17 RCW (2004))4 is a “strongly worded mandate” aimed at giving interested members of the public wide access to public documents to ensure governmental transparency. Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wash.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 (1978). The PRA requires agencies to make certain records available for inspection and copying, and it enables individuals to sue to enforce those obligations. RCW 42.56.080, .550. The chapter applies to state and local agencies, which are defined as follows:
¶ 10 With respect to the scope of the act, the statute unambiguously provides for a liberal application of its terms, explicitly subordinating other statutes to its provisions and goals:
The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies that serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the instruments that they have created. This chapter shall be liberally construed and its exemptions narrowly construed to promote this public policy and to assure that the public interest will be fully protected. In the event of conflict between the provisions of this chapter and any other act, the provisions of this chapter shall govern.
RCW 42.56.030 (emphasis added).
¶ 11 The statute's language “reflects the belief that the sound governance of a free society demands that the public have full access to information concerning the workings of the government.” Amren v. City of Kalama, 131 Wash.2d 25, 31, 929 P.2d 389 (1997). Accordingly, courts must avoid interpreting the PRA in a way that would tend to frustrate that purpose. Hearst Corp., 90 Wash.2d at 127, 580 P.2d 246.
¶ 12 In light of this liberal construction, reviewing courts have used a “functional equivalency” analysis to determine whether the PRA applies to a particular organization.See Clarke v. Tri–Cities Animal Care & Control Shelter, 144 Wash.App. 185, 192, 181 P.3d 881 (2008) ; Telford v. Thurston County Bd. of Comm'rs, 95 Wash.App. 149, 161, 974 P.2d 886 (1999), review denied,138 Wash.2d 1015, 989 P.2d 1143 (1999). In Telford, the court considered four factors5 and concluded that two private nonprofit corporations that were formed to coordinate county officials were subject to suit under the PRA because they operated as a functional equivalent to a public agency. Telford, 95 Wash.App. at 165, 974 P.2d 886. The Court of Appeals applied the four-factor Telford analysis again in Clarke, concluding that a privately owned nonprofit animal shelter was required under the PRA to disclose its euthanasia logbooks because the Tri–Cities municipality had contracted out the county's animal control services to the shelter,...
To continue reading
Request your trial