Wright v. State
| Decision Date | 06 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | A22A0940 |
| Parties | WRIGHT v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
G. Richard Stepp, for Appellant.
Patsy A. Austin-Gatson, District Attorney, Clifford Louis Kurlander, Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Norvee-Arthur Daniel Wright appeals after a Gwinnett County jury found him guilty of rape and incest. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred when it charged the jury as to general intent, the amount of force needed to effectuate rape, and the definitions of penetration and lack of consent; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon a close review of the record and the relevant law, we determine that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it charged the jury, and the evidence was sufficient to support Wright's convictions, so we affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdicts,1 the evidence adduced at trial showed that Wright is the father of D. W., who was born in July 2000. D. W. testified that, one night in February 2016, Wright "tried to penetrate inside of [her] while [she] was asleep." According to D. W., Wright did "not fully" have sex with her, and his penis did not go "inside of" her, but she felt it. D. W. stated that she awoke during the incident but was "frozen" and "scared" because Wright was "bigger than [her]" and because "[h]e's [her] dad." D. W. also testified that Wright had done this "many" times over the previous six months.
The next day, D. W. was speaking to her high school track coach, who noticed that "something was bothering her." D. W. told her coach that she was having problems with her dad, and when the coach asked her if her father was physically abusing her, she replied, "No, the other way." The coach referred D. W. to the school counselor, who then contacted the police. Law enforcement conducted a search of Wright's house and found seminal fluid on D. W.’s panties and a blanket. A nurse conducted a sexual assault exam on D. W., which involved swabbing "in the posterior portion of the vaginal canal." The forensic examiner found a "very large amount" of male DNA and sperm cells in D. W.’s vagina which matched Wright's DNA.
A grand jury indicted Wright on two counts of rape ( OCGA § 16-6-1 ) and two counts of incest ( OCGA § 16-6-22 ) stemming from the 2016 incident and another incident that allegedly occurred in December 2014. At trial, the jury found Wright guilty of the counts of rape and incest arising from the 2016 incident but acquitted him of the counts arising from the 2014 incident. The trial court sentenced Wright to a total of life plus 29 years’ imprisonment and one year of probation. Wright filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied after a hearing. This appeal followed.
1. In four enumerations of error, Wright challenges the trial court's instructions to the jury on various legal points and definitions. Wright specifically challenges the instructions pertaining to general criminal intent, the amount of force needed to effectuate rape, the definition of penetration, and what constitutes lack of consent. After considering all four challenges, we ultimately conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error when it instructed the jury.
"We review de novo an allegedly erroneous jury instruction, which is a legal question." (Citation omitted.) Johnson v. State , 323 Ga. App. 65, 68 (2), 744 S.E.2d 921 (2013).
In assessing an assertion of an erroneous jury instruction,... the instruction must be evaluated in the context of the trial court's jury instructions as a whole. The only requirement regarding jury charges is that the charges, as given, were correct statements of the law and, as a whole, would not mislead a jury of ordinary intelligence.
and punctuation omitted.) Pye v. State , 322 Ga. App. 125, 129 (2), 742 S.E.2d 770 (2013). Still, "instructions to the jury must be tailored to fit the charge in the indictment and the evidence admitted at trial[.]" Williams v. State , 309 Ga. App. 688, 691 (2), 710 S.E.2d 884 (2011). Additionally, "an erroneous charge does not warrant a reversal unless it was harmful and, in determining harm, the entirety of the jury instructions must be considered." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mubarak v. State , 305 Ga. App. 419, 421 (2), 699 S.E.2d 788 (2010).
(a) Wright first argues that the trial court erred when it charged the jury as to general criminal intent when he was charged with specific intent crimes.2 In Wright's view, the charge on general intent was erroneous, misled the jury, and potentially resulted in convictions based on a lower intent than is required by the relevant statutes. Because we conclude that the crimes of forcible rape and incest are general intent crimes, we reject this enumeration of error.
Georgia law defines a "crime" as "a violation of a statute of this state in which there is a joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence." OCGA § 16-2-1. Therefore, "criminal intent is an essential element of every crime where criminal negligence is not involved." Matos-Bautista v. State , 353 Ga. App. 773, 777 (1), 839 S.E.2d 260 (2020). Criminal intent, however, "does not always equate to mental fault, guilty knowledge, or purposeful violation of the law[,]" State v. Ogilvie , 292 Ga. 6, 8 (2) (a), 734 S.E.2d 50 (2012), and "criminal intent does not always require specific intent." Downey v. State , 298 Ga. 568, 569 (1), 783 S.E.2d 622 (2016). A crime may instead only require that the State prove "general criminal intent, which is simply the intent to do the act which results in the violation of the law, and not the intent to commit the crime itself." (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Ogilvie , supra, 292 Ga. at 8 (2) (a), 734 S.E.2d 50. Nevertheless, "some crimes require an additional showing of specific intent." Tam v. State , 232 Ga. App. 15 (1), 501 S.E.2d 51 (1998). Our case law generally requires that, for a crime to be considered a specific intent crime, the statute must "contain plain language providing that specific intent to violate the law" because "it [is] a matter for the General Assembly to phrase a statute to include such a specific intent requirement." Evans v. State , 360 Ga. App. 596, 616 (18), 859 S.E.2d 593 (2021).
Here, Wright was convicted of forcible rape under OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) and incest under OCGA § 16-6-22 (a) (1). OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) provides that "[a] person commits the offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of [a] female forcibly and against her will[.]" Under OCGA § 16-6-22 (a) (1), "[a] person commits the offense of incest when such person engages in sexual intercourse or sodomy... with a person whom he or she knows he or she is related to either by blood or by marriage as follows:...Father and child or stepchild[.]" Neither statute contains any particular provisions defining any specific intent required by the perpetrator, nor does it specify that any particular result must be intended to come about as a result of the criminalized acts. These statutes instead only require proof that the offender engaged in the acts specified. We must therefore conclude that only a general criminal intent is required under each statute. See Evans , supra, 360 Ga. App. at 616 (18), 859 S.E.2d 593 (); Patterson v. State , 299 Ga. 491, 493-496, 789 S.E.2d 175 (2016) (); Myers v. State , 302 Ga. App. 753, 756 (2) n.11, 691 S.E.2d 650 (2010) () (citation and punctuation omitted). See also People v. Langworthy , 416 Mich. 630, 643-644 (B) & n.21, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982) ().
Because rape and incest are general intent crimes, the trial court correctly denied Wright's request that the jury be instructed on specific intent.
(b) Wright next argues that the trial court erred when it charged the jury as to the element of force needed to effectuate forcible rape, arguing that the trial court's instructions were superfluous and not tailored to the specific facts of this case. We discern no error.
In this case, D. W. testified that she was "frozen" and "scared" during the incident because Wright was "bigger than [her]" and because "[h]e's [her] dad." Thus, this jury charge was indeed tailored to the facts of this case. Moreover, Wright has not shown that the jury was confused by this additional instruction because it set out a correct statement of the law regarding force in rape cases. Frady v. State , 359 Ga. App. 255, 258-259 (4), 857 S.E.2d 260 (2021) ; Williams v. State , 304 Ga. App. 592, 593-594 (1), 696 S.E.2d 512 (2010).3 Thus, we conclude that Wright has not shown that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the element of force. See Shadron v. State...
To continue reading
Request your trial