Wright v. Wright

• Docket Number: 7:23-cv-02178-MGL-MGB
• Decision Date: 28 June 2023
• Parties: Douglas Alexander Wright, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Chuck Wright; Judge Cole; and Spencer Smith, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina

1

Douglas Alexander Wright, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Chuck Wright; Judge Cole; and Spencer Smith, Defendants.

No. 7:23-cv-02178-MGL-MGB

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Spartanburg Division

June 28, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Douglas Alexander Wright (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis brings this civil action challenging recent criminal proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other South Carolina state law. (See Dkt. No. 1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently detained at the Spartanburg County Detention Center. On November 19, 2019, Plaintiff was arrested for murder; attempted armed, or allegedly armed, robbery; and possession of a weapon during a violent crime (if not also sentenced to life without parole or death).^[1](See Indictment Nos. 2020-GS-42-01397, -01398). The status of these criminal proceedings is somewhat unclear, but Plaintiff seems to suggest that on or around January 23, 2023, he entered into some sort of plea agreement. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 4-6.) Notwithstanding Plaintiff's claim, there is no notation of a guilty plea, final disposition, judgement, or sentence in the current state court docket, and the proceedings appear to be ongoing at this time.^[2]

Plaintiff now brings the instant action against Solicitor Spencer Smith, who he claims “forced” him into the plea agreement; Judge Cole, who is apparently presiding over Plaintiff's ongoing criminal proceedings; and Sheriff Chuck Wright, “whose deputies arrested [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff raises only two causes of action in the Complaint: (1) a violation of the Due Process Clause based on the ongoing delay in Plaintiff's sentencing following the entry of his plea agreement in January 2023; and (2) defamation of character based on an unidentified news outlet publicizing Plaintiff's guilty plea. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff asks that the Court order his “release from Spartanburg County Detention Center” and $3 million in damages for “pain and suffering.” (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's Complaint.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.

As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).

DISCUSSION

I. Due Process Violation

As stated above, the Complaint alleges a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on an apparent delay in his sentencing proceedings before the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's due process claim falls short under § 1983 for several reasons.

First, with respect to Defendant Wright, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). Here, there is no indication that Defendant Wright is personally involved in the purported delay in Plaintiff's sentencing or in the pending criminal proceedings generally. To the contrary, the only mention of Defendant Wright in the Complaint is that his deputies arrested Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff intended to include Defendant Wright in his due process claim, his allegations are insufficient under § 1983. See Hamilton v. United States, No. 2:20-cv-1666-RMG-MHC, 2020 WL 7001153, at *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2020) (dismissing claims where plaintiff failed to include sufficiently clear allegations of any personal conduct or wrongdoing in connection with the alleged federal violations), adopted, 2020 WL 5939235 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2020); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that while the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., require only a “short and plain” statement of the claim, the plaintiff must “offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant”) (internal citations omitted).

With respect to Plaintiff's allegations against Judge Cole, it is well-settled that judges have absolute judicial immunity for their judicial actions. See Mireless v. Waco 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 F. App'x. 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (holding that absolute judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from damages, meaning that “claims seeking injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions taken in his judicial capacity . . . [are] barred by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Notably, judicial immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith, nor will a judicial officer “be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, “[a] judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Id. at 359. Because Plaintiff's claims against Judge Cole appear to arise from the judicial actions taken in his underlying criminal proceedings, Judge Cole-as...