Wright v. Wysowatcky
| Citation | 147 Colo. 317,363 P.2d 1046 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 19541,19541 |
| Parties | Scott W. WRIGHT, Plaintiff in Error, v. Andrew WYSOWATCKY, Administrator of the Estate of William Scott Wright, Deceased, Defendant In Error. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Winner, Berge & Martin, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Rothgerber, Appel & Powers, Denver, for defendant in error.
Charles R. Enos, Denver, amicus curiae.
We will refer to the parties by name. William Scott Wright was the adopted son of Scott W. Wright, and was unmarried and childless. Upon his death the adoptive father sought letters of administration which were denied and Wysowatcky, Public Administrator, was appointed to administer the estate. In refusing to issue letters of administration to Wright, the court said: 'It is the view of the court an adoptive parent does not inherit from the adopted child and the court so rules.' Claiming distributive shares of the estate are six natural brothers and sisters, or the children of some of them.
Where an adopted child dies intestate and without spouse or issue, is an adoptive parent entitled to inherit under the intestate laws of Colorado?
This question is answered in the affirmative.
Adoption being unknown to the common law, inheritable interest was deemed to follow the blood line, and it is only by statute that the common-law rule of descent and distribution may be changed or modified. Russell et al. v. Jordan et al., 58 Colo. 445, 147 P. 693. Whether the Colorado statute does or does not alter the common-law rule is the pivotal point of the present controversy.
The pertinent statutes in effect at the time of the death of William are as follows:
C.R.S. '53, 4-1-11: (Adoption)
'Legal effects of final decree.--From and after the entry of a final decree of adoption the following legal effects shall result:
C.R.S. '53, 152-2-4: (Descent and Distribution)
'* * * Legally adopted children and their descendants shall be, to all intents and purposes, descendants of the persons adopting such children and such adopted children and their descendants shall be entitled to inherit under the intestate laws of this state as if such adopted children had been born in lawful wedlock to such foster parents, * * *.'
These provisions were considered and construed with respect to inheritance tax assessments in People ex rel. Dunbar v. White, 144 Colo. 212, 355 P.2d 963, 965, where it was said:
(Emphasis added.)
The question presented is new in this jurisdiction. The courts of other states have had occasion to pass on the question, but decisions are at variance, depending chiefly upon specific statutory provisions, hence afford no satisfactory guide to a determination of the issues in the present case.
Under our statute an adopted child is accorded the same legal status as a natural child, its rights and obligations as such differ in no respect from that of a child born in lawful wedlock. Does the status of adoptive parents differ from that of natural parents, assuming all of the obligations of parenthood with respect to the adopted child, but foregoing all the benefits arising from that relationship? While courts were formerly inclined to regard adoption statutes as in derogation of the common law and therefore to be strictly construed, the humanitarian purposes of such statutes came to be recognized, and courts generally have evinced a disposition to afford them a more liberal construction. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Children § 6, p. 375.
Including the adopted child in the family picture on an equal basis with natural children of adoptive parents has been accomplished in Colorado deliberately after a history of litigation and decisions which limited or qualified the legal status of adopted children. When this court, in considering words of limitation in an earlier statute concluded that an adopted child could inherit from but not through its adoptive parents (Russell v. Jordan, supra), the General Assembly amended the statute and removed the words upon which that decision was based. That decision and the cases following it are therefore no longer authority for the proposition that an adopted child may not inherit though its adoptive parents, and no wording of our recent statutes warrants a conclusion consonant with that of Russell v. Jordan.
If, as said in the White case, an adopted child has the same legal status as a natural child, and if as stated in Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134, Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246, 249, 'It is clear that the legislative intent existing in 1927 was to make the...
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In re Atws
..."enacted for the protection of life and property and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good."); Wright v. Wysowatcky , 147 Colo. 317, 363 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1961) ("While courts were formerly inclined to regard adoption statutes as in derogation of the common law and therefore ......
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In re MAJB
..."enacted for the protection of life and property and to introduce regulations conducive to the public good."); Wright v. Wysowatcky , 147 Colo. 317, 363 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1961) ("While courts were formerly inclined to regard adoption statutes as in derogation of the common law and therefore ......
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In re Estate of Kirkpatrick
...inherit from the adopted child).3 [¶ 23] Two cases with similar facts provide this Court with further support. Wright v. Wysowatcky, 147 Colo. 317, 363 P.2d 1046 (1961), found that, when an adopted child dies intestate, an adoptive father has the sole right to inherit and the child's biolog......
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