Wuori v. Otis

• Decision Date: 03 March 2020
• Docket Number: Docket: Wal-19-121
• Citation: 226 A.3d 771
• Parties: Erik WUORI v. Travis OTIS
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

226 A.3d 771

Erik WUORI

v.Travis OTIS

Docket: Wal-19-121

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: October 10, 2019

Decided: March 3, 2020

Aaron Fethke, Esq. (orally), Fethke Law Offices, Searsport, for appellant Travis Otis

Christopher K. MacLean, Esq., and Laura P. Shaw, Esq. (orally), Camden Law LLP, Camden, for appellee Erik Wuori

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.^*

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶1] Travis Otis appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Belfast, Mathews, J. ) ordering the turnover and sale of his boat to satisfy a money judgment against him in favor of Erik Wuori. See 14 M.R.S. § 3131 (2018). In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the court erred in concluding that "First Team"—a thirty-six-foot boat owned by Otis—was not used "primarily for commercial fishing" and, therefore, was not exempt from attachment and execution. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9) (2018). We vacate the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The relevant procedural record of this case begins on December 10, 2018, when a judgment was entered in favor of Wuori and against Otis in the amount of $60,000. On January 31, 2019, Wuori served Otis with a disclosure subpoena to appear before the trial court to determine Otis's ability to satisfy the judgment. See 14 M.R.S. § 3122 (2018). The court held a disclosure hearing on February 15, 2019, at which Otis appeared and testified. See 14 M.R.S. § 3125(1) (2018). On March 13, 2019, the court entered an order of turnover and sale of Otis's boat in favor of Wuori, see 14 M.R.S. § 3131, after finding the following facts.

[¶3] Otis owns a thirty-six-foot boat named "First Team" that is worth $55,000. Otis has not used his boat to catch and sell lobsters since 2014. Instead, he uses the boat to catch lobsters for the Maine Department of Marine Resources (the Department) to collect data on juvenile lobsters.¹

[¶4] The court concluded that the boat was not exempt from attachment and execution within the meaning of 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9) because Otis "does not harvest the lobster he catches but returns them to the ocean"² and thus, he "does not use the boat ‘primarily for commercial fishing.’ "³ The court ordered that Otis turn over the boat to Wuori to be sold in order to satisfy the $60,000 money judgment previously entered in Wuori's favor. See 14 M.R.S. § 3131.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶5] The sole issue we address in this appeal is whether the court erred in concluding, pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9), that Otis's use of his boat in his work for the Department does not constitute "commercial fishing."⁴ Otis contends that, because he is a licensed lobsterman and is compensated for using his boat to provide a service to the Department by hauling and catching lobsters for its data collection program, he is engaged in "commercial fishing." He argues that the statute does not require him to sell the lobsters he catches for the use of his boat to be a "commercial" activity.

A. Standard of Review

[¶6] We review the "court's interpretation and application of a statute de novo, looking first to the plain meaning of the statutory language to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Teele v. West-Harper , 2017 ME 196, ¶ 10, 170 A.3d 803. We interpret the plain language "by taking into account the subject matter and purposes of the statute, and the consequences of a particular interpretation," Ford Motor Co. v. Darling's , 2016 ME 171, ¶ 24, 151 A.3d 507 (quotation marks omitted), and give "technical or trade expressions ... a meaning understood by the trade or profession," Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure , 2006 ME 48, ¶ 12, 896 A.2d 271 ; see 1 M.R.S. § 72(3) (2018). In doing so, we seek "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results." Andrews v. Sheepscot Island Co. , 2016 ME 68, ¶ 9, 138 A.3d 1197. We also "consider the whole statutory scheme of which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved." Urrutia v. Interstate Brands Int'l , 2018 ME 24, ¶ 12, 179 A.3d 312 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶7] If the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, only then "will we look beyond that language to examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history." Scamman v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. , 2017 ME 41, ¶ 14, 157 A.3d 223. "Statutory language is considered ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

B. The Exemption Statute— 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9)

[¶8] As a means of allowing judgment creditors to enforce money judgments, the Legislature established a process for obtaining orders requiring judgment debtors to turn over their property. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 3120 -38 (2018). However, as a matter of public policy, specific property is exempt from this process. See 14 M.R.S. § 4422. These exemptions from attachment and execution have existed since the earliest days of Maine's statehood. See, e.g. , Martin v. Buswell , 108 Me. 263, 264-65, 80 A. 828 (1911) (stating that "at a very early day" it was evident to the Legislature that it "was against sound public policy" to take tools from a debtor that could be used by the debtor to pay a debt); R.S. ch. 114, § 38 (1841) (listing property exempt from attachment and execution). As early as 1835, the Legislature determined that a debtor's interest in a boat "usually employed in the fishing business" would be exempt from attachment, see P.L. 1835, ch. 172 (codified as R.S. ch. 114, § 38 (1841)), and this exemption has remained in existence in various forms ever since.⁵

[¶9] Relevant to this appeal, the statute exempts from attachment and execution "[t]he debtor's interest in one boat, not exceeding 46 feet in length, used by the debtor primarily for commercial fishing." 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9). It is the debtor's burden to establish the elements necessary to qualify for the exemption—in particular that the boat is used for "commercial fishing." See Steelstone Indus., Inc. v. McCrum , 2001 ME 171, ¶¶ 8-10, 785 A.2d 1256 ; Daniels v. Daniels , 593 A.2d 658, 660 (Me. 1991). However, because neither "commercial" nor "fishing" is defined in the statutes governing money judgments or exempt property, see 14 M.R.S. § 3121 (2018) (providing definitions for the enforcement of money judgments); 14 M.R.S. § 4421 (2018) (providing definitions for property exempt from attachment), we begin our review by analyzing the plain meaning of those terms.

1. "Commercial Fishing"

[¶10] On its face, the statute exempts from attachment and execution a boat used primarily for "commercial fishing." 14 M.R.S. § 4422(9). The word "fishing" is commonly understood as the act of catching fish⁶ and, because we give "technical or trade expressions ... a meaning understood by the trade or profession," Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 12, 896 A.2d 271, it also encompasses the act of catching other marine organisms like lobsters and crabs. See, e.g. , 12 M.R.S. § 6421 (2018) (including the requirements to obtain a crab or lobster "fishing" license); 13-188 C.M.R. ch. 25 (effective August 21, 2018) (discussing "lobster fishing" pursuant to the Department of Marine Resources' lobster and crab regulations). As such, the word "fishing" is not ambiguous.

[¶11] The meaning of "commercial," however, can be understood in different ways. "Commercial" may mean "concerned with or engaged in commerce," Commercial , New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), or "of or relating to commerce," Commercial , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016). "Commerce," in turn, is defined as "the buying and selling of goods, especially on a large scale, as between cities or nations." Commerce , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016). Alternatively, "commercial" may be understood as "making or intended to make a profit," Commercial , New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed. 2010), or "having profit as a chief aim," Commercial , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016).

[¶12] Because the meaning of "commercial" is "reasonably susceptible to different interpretations," Scamman , 2017 ME 41, ¶ 14, 157 A.3d 223, the term is ambiguous. Therefore, we must "examine other indicia of legislative intent, such as legislative history," id. , and determine whether the Legislature intended to define "commercial" as relating to "the buying or selling of goods, especially on a large scale," Commerce , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016), or as "having profit as a chief aim," Commercial , American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2016).

2. Statutory History

[¶13] In 1981, the Legislature enacted P.L. 1981, ch. 431 (effective Sept. 18, 1981), which codified the current property exemptions at 14 M.R.S. 4422.⁷ The Legislature's purpose in enacting this new legislation was, in part, to "[m]erge into one list the statutory property exemptions for state collection proceedings and federal bankruptcy proceedings." L.D. 1642, Statement of Fact (110th Legis. 1981). However, there is no evidence in this enacting legislation from which we can glean the Legislature's intended meaning of "commercial fishing."

[¶14] More recently, the Legislature amended section 4422(9), updating the boat–size limitation from five tons to forty-six feet. See P.L. 2013, ch. 510 (effective April 2, 2014). In doing so, the Legislature stated that the change to the statute was necessary because "the description of a debtor's fishing boat that is used for income-generating purposes [was] out of date." P.L. 2013, ch. 510, Emergency Preamble (emphasis added). Absent the amendment to section 4422(9), the use of the outdated description would allow for "the attachment of fishing boats that are commonly used in commercial fishing, leading to an inability of the debtor to generate income , which is contradictory to the reason for the exemption." Id. (emphasis added).

[¶15] This rationale underlying the enactment of ...