Wyant v. State

• Decision Date: 04 February 2020
• Docket Number: S-19-0080
• Parties: Shantell Ann WYANT, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

458 P.3d 13

Shantell Ann WYANT, Appellant (Defendant),

v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

S-19-0080

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

February 4, 2020

Representing Appellant: Valerie Schoneberger, Schoneberger Law, P.C., Lander, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: Bridget Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney General; Joshua C. Eames, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Russell Farr, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

KAUTZ, Justice.

[¶1] Shantell Ann Wyant was convicted by a jury of three counts of second-degree sexual assault in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) (LexisNexis 2019). She appeals from her convictions, arguing the district court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury on the mens rea element of second-degree sexual assault. Specifically, she claims that because second-degree sexual assault is a general intent crime, it required a voluntary act and, as a result, the district court erred in not instructing the jury it had to find her actions were voluntary. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] We restate the single issue as:

Did the district court plainly err in failing to instruct the jury that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Wyant acted voluntarily?

FACTS

[¶3] In February 2015, Ms. Wyant was employed by the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) as a shipping and receiving clerk in the warehouse at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP) in Rawlins, Wyoming. While employed there, she began a sexual relationship with WSP inmate David Edgerson, who was assigned to work in the warehouse. The relationship included Ms. Wyant performing oral sex on Mr. Edgerson (fellatio) once and having sexual intercourse with him twice. All three acts occurred in the warehouse, in an area where the surveillance cameras were obscured by boxes. In June 2015, Mr. Edgerson was transferred from WSP to a halfway house in Gillette, Wyoming. Ms. Wyant traveled to Gillette on three separate occasions to see him. Each time, Ms. Wyant and Mr. Edgerson had sexual intercourse in her hotel room.

[¶4] The State charged Ms. Wyant with three counts of second-degree sexual assault in violation of § 6-2-303(a)(vii) based on the one act of fellatio and the two acts of sexual intercourse occurring at the warehouse.¹ At trial, the jury was instructed that to find Ms. Wyant guilty of second-degree sexual assault, it had to find that: 1) between February 1, 2015 and July 31, 2017; 2) in Carbon County; 3) Ms. Wyant; 4) inflicted sexual intrusion (fellatio or sexual intercourse) on Mr. Edgerson; 5) Ms. Wyant was an employee of a state operated adult correctional system (WDOC); and 6) Ms. Wyant knew Mr. Edgerson was a resident of a facility within the system (WSP). Ms. Wyant did not contest the dates or location of the offenses, that the sexual conduct occurred, that she was a WDOC employee, or that she knew Mr. Edgerson was a WSP resident. Her defense was she did not "inflict anything on Mr. Edgerson," but rather he was a "wolf" who took advantage of her weaknesses for his own sexual gratification.² The jury found Ms. Wyant guilty of all three counts. The district court sentenced her to three concurrent terms of 3-6 years in prison, suspended in favor of three years of supervised probation. Ms. Wyant appeals from the judgment.

DISCUSSION

[¶5] Ms. Wyant argues the district court erred in not instructing the jury that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that her actions were voluntary. She concedes plain error review applies because she did not object to the failure to provide a voluntariness instruction. Granzer v. State , 2008 WY 118, ¶¶ 18-19, 193 P.3d 266, 271-72 (Wyo. 2008). See also, Sindelar v. State , 2018 WY 29, ¶ 16, 416 P.3d 764, 768 (Wyo. 2018) ; Guy-Thomas v. Thomas , 2015 WY 35, ¶ 10, 344 P.3d 782, 786 (Wyo. 2015) ("Failure to object constitutes waiver of whatever alleged error occurred, unless the error rises to the level of plain error." (citing W.R.A.P. 9.05 )). To satisfy the plain error standard, Ms. Wyant must show "1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) the district court transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) [s]he was denied a substantial right resulting in material prejudice." Sindelar , ¶ 16, 416 P.3d at 768 (citing Johns v. State , 2018 WY 16, ¶ 12, 409 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Wyo. 2018) ). Because the allegedly deficient jury instructions clearly appear in the record, the first prong of plain error review is satisfied. Ms. Wyant, however, has not satisfied her burden on the second or third prongs.

Clear and Unequivocal Rule of Law

[¶6] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-303(a)(vii) provides in relevant part:

(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first degree:

...

(vii) The actor is an employee ... of a state, county, city or town, or privately operated adult ... correctional system ... and the victim is known or should be known by the actor to be a resident of [a correctional system] facility or under supervision of the correctional system[.]

"Sexual intrusion" includes "[s]exual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without emission." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(vii)(B) (LexisNexis 2017).

[¶7] Ms. Wyant argues § 6-2-303(a)(vii) is a general intent crime which required the State to show she undertook the prohibited act voluntarily. As a result, she claims the district court erred in not instructing the jury that voluntariness is an element of the charged crimes. She contends such error transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law because case law requires juries to be instructed on a crime’s elements.

[¶8] We agree second-degree sexual assault under § 6-2-303(a)(vii) is a general intent crime because its definition " ‘consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence ....’ " See Kite v. State , 2018 WY 94, ¶ 23, 424 P.3d 255, 263 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Sam v. State , 2017 WY 98, ¶ 69, 401 P.3d 834, 857 (Wyo. 2017) ). See also, Cox v. State , 829 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Wyo. 1992) ("[O]nly those crimes which refer to an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence are specific intent crimes."). We disagree, however, that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on voluntariness violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Causey v. State , 2009 WY 111, ¶¶ 14, 20, 215 P.3d 287, 292-94 (Wyo. 2009) (to satisfy the second prong of plain error review, the error must be so "plainly erroneous that the judge should have noticed and corrected the mistake even though the parties failed to raise the issue").

[¶9] Ms. Wyant relies on Seymore v. State , 2007 WY 32, 152 P.3d 401 (Wyo. 2007) (abrogated on other grounds by Granzer , ¶¶ 13-19, 193 P.3d at 270-72 )), for the proposition that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on voluntariness violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law.³ Mr. Seymore was convicted by a jury of escape under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 6-5-206(a) (LexisNexis 2019) for failing to return to a community corrections facility at the scheduled time. Seymore , ¶¶ 2-4, 152 P.3d at 403. On appeal, he argued the jury instructions were erroneous because they failed to inform the jury that escape is a specific intent crime requiring him to have "specifically intended to ‘evade the course of justice’ by ‘avoiding confinement.’ " Id. , ¶¶ 13-14, 152 P.3d at 405-06. We rejected that argument because escape is a general intent crime. Id. , ¶ 14, 152 P.3d at 406. We went on to conclude, however, that the instructions were inadequate because they failed to require the jury to find that Mr. Seymore voluntarily failed to return to the community corrections facility on time. Id. , ¶ 15, 152 P.3d at 406. "[W]ithout voluntary conduct, there is no mens rea . No crime has been committed, for instance, if an adult community corrections resident fails to return to the facility because of disabling injuries suffered in an automobile accident or a natural calamity." Id .

[¶10] In concluding the district court’s failure to instruct on voluntariness was error, Seymore relied on the following statement from Reilly v. State , 2002 WY 156, ¶ 8, 55 P.3d 1259, 1262 (Wyo. 2002), which was quoted from Dorador v. State , 573 P.2d 839, 843 (Wyo. 1978) : "When the statute sets out the offense with only a description of the particular unlawful act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence, the trial judge asks the jury whether the defendant intended to do the outlawed act. " Seymore , ¶ 15, 152 P.3d at 406-07 (emphasis added). Ms. Wyant relies on this same statement to support her claim the district court erred in failing to provide the jury a voluntariness instruction. Seymore and Ms. Wyant take this broad statement out of context. Dorador harkens back to the days when district courts were required to provide instructions defining general and specific intent, including that the defendant knowingly performed an act which the law forbids and defined knowingly as "voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason." Reilly , ¶ 9 n.1, 55 P.3d at 1262 n.1. We have since acknowledged such instructions are unnecessary due to their "vagueness and general failure to enlighten juries." Compton v. State , 931 P.2d 936, 941 (Wyo. 1997). See also, Keats v. State , 2003 WY 19, ¶ 11-13, 64 P.3d 104, 107-08 (Wyo. 2003) (concluding the district court did not err in refusing to provide the jury the defendant’s requested instruction defining specific intent which mirrored former pattern criminal instruction 3.504 because the jury was properly instructed as to the intent element of first-degree arson, pattern instruction 3.504 no longer existed, and we had since acknowledged a trend in the law to...