Xiao Yang Chen v. Fischer

• Decision Date: 15 December 2005
• Citation: 6 N.Y.3d 94,843 N.E.2d 723
• Parties: XIAO YANG CHEN, Appellant, v. Ian Ira FISCHER, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 723

843 N.E.2d 723

6 N.Y.3d 94

XIAO YANG CHEN, Appellant, v. Ian Ira FISCHER, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

December 15, 2005.

Law Office of Paul Grobman, New York City (Paul Grobman of counsel), for appellant.

Bleakley Platt & Schmidt, LLP, White Plains (Robert D. Meade of counsel), for respondent.

Law Offices of Annette G. Hasapidis, South Salem (Annette G. Hasapidis, Alayne Katz and Andrea Phoenix of counsel), for Women's Bar Association of the State of New York, amicus curiae.

Amanda B. Norejko, New York City, and Laura A. Russell for Sanctuary for

Families' Center for Battered Women's Legal Services, amicus curiae.

Cynthia B. Rubin, New York City, Sheila A. Agnew and Jennifer A. Covell for Association of the Bar of the City of New York, amicus curiae.

Elliot Scheinberg, New York City, for American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, New York Chapter, amicus curiae.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CIPARICK, J.

Plaintiff Xiao Yang Chen and defendant Ian Ira Fischer were married on March 11, 2001. Shortly thereafter, Fischer commenced an action for divorce on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment. Chen counterclaimed for divorce — also alleging cruel and inhuman treatment — and asserted an additional cause of action for fraudulent inducement. Specifically, as grounds for divorce, Chen alleged that on May 6, 2001, Fischer "grabbed [her] and violently slapped her across the face and ear causing [her] to suffer bruising, pain and swelling" and that he threw her on the ground and attempted to suffocate her. As a result of that incident, each party filed a family offense petition against the other in Family Court and received a temporary order of protection. The parties agreed to consolidate these petitions with the matrimonial action. At the conclusion of the matrimonial trial, they further agreed to withdraw the petitions without prejudice on the record in open court.

On October 15, 2001, prior to trial of the matrimonial action, the parties entered into a stipulation on the issue of fault. "[I]n satisfaction of the stipulation," the parties agreed to withdraw all their fault allegations — including those related to the May 6 incident — save one. After trial on the remaining issues — including equitable distribution and a fraudulent inducement cause of action — on May 8, 2002 a dual judgment of divorce was granted on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment based on each party's sole remaining fault allegation.

Chen allegedly commenced the instant personal injury action on January 18, 2002, while the matrimonial action was pending.¹ The complaint asserted two causes of action — one for intentional infliction of emotional distress and a second for assault and battery. As to the second cause of action, the complaint alleged that on May 6, 2001, Fischer slapped her in the face and ear, causing permanent injury, necessitating continuing medical treatment and rendering her unable to perform her usual and customary activities. Fischer answered, raising several affirmative defenses, including res judicata and various theories of estoppel.

Fischer moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and Chen cross-moved to dismiss several of Fischer's affirmative defenses. Supreme Court granted Fischer's motion and denied Chen's cross motion. The court found that the allegations in Chen's personal injury action were "virtually identical" to those in her counterclaim for divorce and arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Thus, the court determined that the tort action was barred by res judicata.

The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that the action was barred because the tort claim could have been litigated with the divorce action and Chen did not expressly reserve the right to bring that claim when she withdrew her fault allegations for purposes of the stipulation. The Court extended the rule we set forth in Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284, 290, 525 N.Y.S.2d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1375 [1988]—that issues relating to marital property be decided with the matrimonial action — to interspousal tort actions. Specifically, the Court found that "[s]ocietal needs, logic, and the desirability of bringing spousal litigation to finality now compel us to ... hold that an interspousal tort action seeking to recover damages for personal injuries commenced subsequent to, and separate from, an action for divorce is... barred by claim preclusion" (12 A.D.3d 43, 47, 783 N.Y.S.2d 394 [2004]).² We granted Chen leave to appeal and now reverse.

Typically, principles of res judicata require that "once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy" (O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 357, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158 [1981]). In the context of a matrimonial action, this Court has recognized that a final judgment of divorce settles the parties' rights pertaining not only to those issues that were actually litigated, but also to those that could have been litigated (Rainbow v. Swisher, 72 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 531 N.Y.S.2d 775, 527 N.E.2d 258 [1988]; see also O'Connell v. Corcoran, 1 N.Y.3d 179, 184-185, 770 N.Y.S.2d 673, 802 N.E.2d 1071 [2003]). The primary purposes of res judicata are grounded in public policy concerns and are intended to ensure finality, prevent vexatious litigation and promote judicial economy (see Matter of Hodes v. Axelrod, 70 N.Y.2d 364, 372, 520 N.Y.S.2d 933, 515 N.E.2d 612 [1987]; Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 28, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172 [1978]). However, unfairness may result if the doctrine is applied too harshly; thus "[i]n properly seeking to deny a litigant two `days in court', courts must be careful not to deprive [the litigant] of one" (Reilly, 45 N.Y.2d at 28, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172).

It is not always clear whether particular claims are part of the same transaction for res judicata purposes. A "pragmatic" test has been applied to make this determination — analyzing "whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage" (Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 24[2]; see Smith v. Russell Sage Coll., 54 N.Y.2d 185, 192-193, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68, 429 N.E.2d 746 [1981]; Reilly, 45 N.Y.2d at 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172).³

Applying these principles, it is apparent that personal injury tort actions and divorce actions do not constitute a convenient trial unit. The purposes behind the two are quite different. They seek different types of relief and require different types of proof. Moreover, a personal injury action is usually tried by a jury, in contrast to a matrimonial action, which is typically decided by a judge when the issue of fault is not contested. Further, personal injury attorneys are compensated by contingency fee, whereas matrimonial attorneys are prohibited from entering into fee arrangements that are contingent upon the granting of a divorce or a particular property settlement or distributive award (see Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106[c][2][i] [22 NYCRR 1200.11(c)(2)(i)]).

This case is distinguishable from the situation presented by Boronow. There, we noted that title issues are "intertwined" with the dissolution of the marriage relationship and could usually "be fairly and efficiently resolved" along with the matrimonial action (see Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d at 290, 525 N.Y.S.2d 179, 519 N.E.2d 1375). Typically, however, a personal injury action is not sufficiently intertwined with the dissolution of the marriage relationship as to allow for its efficient resolution. Thus, the interspousal tort action does not form a convenient trial unit with the divorce proceeding, and it would not be within the parties' reasonable expectations that the two would be...