Yong-Myun Rho v. Ambach

• Decision Date: 19 October 1989
• Docket Number: YONG-MYUN
• Citation: 546 N.E.2d 188,546 N.Y.S.2d 1005,74 N.Y.2d 318
• Parties: , 546 N.E.2d 188 In the Matter ofRHO, Appellant, v. Gordon M. AMBACH, as Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 1005

546 N.Y.S.2d 1005

74 N.Y.2d 318, 546 N.E.2d 188

In the Matter of YONG-MYUN RHO, Appellant, v. Gordon M. AMBACH, as Commissioner of Education of the State

of New York, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 19, 1989.

[74 N.Y.2d 319] Joseph Frost, New York City, for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (John J. O'Grady and O. Peter Sherwood, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ALEXANDER, Judge.

In 1985, the State Board of Professional Medical Conduct charged petitioner, who had been licensed to practice medicine in New York since 1970, with professional misconduct under Education Law § 6509(2). ¹ The Board alleged that petitioner, a Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the New York City Medical Examiner's office, had improperly conducted two autopsies. In particular, it charged that in one autopsy petitioner had inappropriately recorded the events leading to decedent J's death under a heading on the death certificate titled cause of death and that, in the other autopsy, he had made seven specified errors in investigating and reporting decedent B's gunshot wound. ²

After a hearing, a committee of the Board determined that the charges concerning decedent J had not been sustained but that two of the specifications of negligence or incompetence had been sustained regarding the autopsy of decedent B--petitioner had neglected to explain in the autopsy report why he could not ascertain the order in which the decedent had worn his clothes and had improperly and inadequately performed, documented, and interpreted a sodium rhodizonate test.

Nevertheless, the committee concluded that petitioner had not practiced medicine with negligence or incompetence "on more than one occasion" and recommended that no disciplinary action be taken. The Commissioner of Health recommended to respondent Board of Regents that the hearing committee's findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations be accepted in full.

Declaring that it "took a more serious view" of the case than the hearing committee, the Regents Review Committee found that in addition to the two instances of negligence cited by the hearing committee, petitioner also had been negligent in describing decedent B's bullet wound inadequately and incompletely. The Regents Review Committee concluded that these three deficiencies constituted negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion and recommended that petitioner be censured and reprimanded. Respondent Commissioner of Education accepted this recommendation and directed that a copy of the order of censure and reprimand, along with a copy of the report and vote of the Regents Review Committee, be added to petitioner's permanent file.

Petitioner instituted this article 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division (see, Education Law § 6510-a [4], seeking to annul the Commissioner's determination. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination and dismissed the petition, concluding that it was not unreasonable for the respondents to consider the multiple acts of negligence during one autopsy separate derelictions for purposes of appraising petitioner's professional conduct (144 A.D.2d 774, 776, 534 N.Y.S.2d 758). Leave to appeal was granted by this court.

For the reasons that follow, we now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and annul the determination of the Commissioner of Education.

I.

Education Law § 6509(2) defines as professional misconduct: "Practicing the profession fraudulently, beyond its authorized scope, with gross incompetence, with gross negligence on a particular occasion or negligence or incompetence on more than one occasion." The dispute between the parties centers on the interpretation of the phrase "on more than one occasion"--whether three acts of negligence during one autopsy constitute negligence "on more than one occasion".

Initially, we reject respondents' contention that because the Board of Regents is the agency charged with the enforcement of Education Law § 6509(2), its construction of the statute should be afforded great weight and accepted unless irrational. When "the question is one of pure statutory reading and analysis, dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent, there is little basis to rely on any special competence or expertise of the administrative agency" (Kurcsics v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459, 426 N.Y.S.2d 454, 403 N.E.2d 159). This is so because " 'statutory construction is the function of the courts' " (Matter of Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 271 N.E.2d 528, quoting Matter of Mounting & Finishing Co. v. McGoldrick, 294 N.Y. 104, 108, 60 N.E.2d 825).

Respondents urge that the use of the word "occasion" in the phrase "negligence * * * on more than one occasion" renders the phrase ambiguous; thus a reasonable interpretation of the phrase would be "more than one occurrence, happening or incident of negligence." Particularly is this true, respondents argue, in light of the statute's purpose of disciplining errant professionals in order to discourage negligence.

When a statute is free from ambiguity, a court must construe it so as to give effect to its plain meaning (Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 71 N.Y.2d 669, 674-675, 529 N.Y.S.2d 732, 525 N.E.2d 454; McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes §§ 76, 94). "[T]he plain and obvious meaning of a statute is always preferred to any...