Yorker v. State
| Decision Date | 29 April 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. S96A0164,S96A0164 |
| Citation | 266 Ga. 615,469 S.E.2d 158 |
| Parties | YORKER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Laurens County, Superior Court, No. 94FE085F; H. Gibbs Flanders, Judge.
Roosevelt Warren, Greensboro, for James Yorker, Jr.
Ralph M. Walke, Dist. Atty., Dublin, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Caroline Wight Donaldson, Dept. of Law, Atlanta, Jeffrey James Connor, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dublin, for the State.
James Yorker, Jr., was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment for the malice murder of George Danielly, III. 1 We affirm the conviction.
The evidence, viewed in favor of the verdict, established that Danielly approached Yorker and accused him of firing gunshots at an automobile. The two exchanged words and began to scuffle. Yorker was thrown to the ground. While on the ground, Yorker drew a gun from the waistband of his pants and fatally shot Danielly.
Yorker claimed he was justified in shooting Danielly because he was receiving a severe beating and kicking from Danielly and two other men. However, eyewitnesses testified that the only blow received by Yorker was when Danielly threw him to the ground and that Danielly did not have a weapon.
1. Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Yorker did not act in self-defense and was guilty of malice murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Yorker contends that "[t]he trial court erred in allowing juror (Mosely) to remain on the jury after a Batson 2 challenge was made by Appellant during jury selection." However, the record discloses that the trial court excused juror Mosely from further service on the jury after determining that the State articulated a racially-neutral basis for using the peremptory strike. We, therefore, conclude that Yorker is attacking the trial court's denial of his Batson challenge of the State's peremptory strike of juror Mosely.
In a Batson challenge, the opponent of a peremptory strike must establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination before the proponent is required to articulate a race-neutral explanation for removing the juror in question. Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899(2), 463 S.E.2d 699 (1995). In this case, the trial court did not rule on whether Yorker established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. It did, however, find that the State articulated a racially-neutral basis for using a peremptory strike. The State related that the basis for removing Mosely was his statement, during voir dire, that he was uncomfortable sitting in judgment on his fellow man and that he was familiar with the club where the incident occurred. Yorker failed to present any evidence that cast doubt on the State's explanation for striking Mosely or any evidence that established a discriminatory intent. Id. Therefore, the trial court properly rejected the Batson challenge.
3. Yorker contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of his bond hearing testimony because it compelled him to incriminate himself. However, "[a]bsent objections grounded on the Fifth Amendment at the bail hearing, the decision of defense counsel to bring the extraneous issue of guilt or innocence into the bail proceeding [does] not preclude, on Fifth Amendment grounds, use of incriminating testimony given at the bail hearing." Cowards v. State, 266 Ga. 191, 193(2), 465 S.E.2d 677 (1996). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the bond hearing testimony.
4. In three separate enumerations of error, Yorker complains that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence, following a Jackson-Denno 3 hearing, his custodial statements because they were not freely and voluntarily made. Yorker maintains that the statements were involuntary because he was a juvenile, under duress, operating under insufficient sleep, and was without the aid of counsel and did not totally understand the consequences of his interrogation.
A trial court's conclusions of fact and credibility following a Jackson-Denno hearing are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Berry v. State, 254 Ga. 101, 104(1), 326 S.E.2d 748 (1985); Sanborn v. State, 251 Ga. 169, 170(2), 304 S.E.2d 377 (1983). Here the trial court found that Yorker was advised of each of his Miranda 4 rights, that he understood them, that he voluntarily waived them, and that he thereafter gave his...
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Murphy v. State
...waived his constitutional rights. Thus, there was no error in the court ruling in favor of admissibility. Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615, 617(4), 469 S.E.2d 158 (1996)." Berry v. State, 267 Ga. 605, 610(8), 611, 481 S.E.2d 6. Defendant's eighth enumeration, regarding alleged improprieties in ......
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Berry v. State
...waived his constitutional rights. Thus, there was no error in the court ruling in favor of admissibility. Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615, 617(4), 469 S.E.2d 158 (1996). 9. Berry and Monroe challenge the trial court's refusal to sever their trials. Berry contends that severance was required be......
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Metts v. State
...and voluntarily waived them, and we accept those findings since they have not been shown to be clearly erroneous. Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615(4), 469 S.E.2d 158 (1996). The post-Miranda statement to the Atlanta officers was a spontaneous statement made by appellant and was not subject to e......
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Jack v. State
...credibility following a Jackson-Denno3 hearing must be accepted by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous. Yorker v. State, 266 Ga. 615, 617(4), 469 S.E.2d 158 (1996). Here, the trial court found that Jack's preMiranda inculpatory statement to Officer Allen was not subject to suppressi......