Young v. Sangster

• Decision Date: 05 April 1929
• Docket Number: No. 27558.,27558.
• Citation: 16 S.W.2d 92
• Parties: BENJAMIN W. YOUNG, Appellant, v. JOSEPH J. SANGSTER and ROBERT C. SANGSTER.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

16 S.W.2d 92

BENJAMIN W. YOUNG, Appellant, v. JOSEPH J. SANGSTER and ROBERT C. SANGSTER.

No. 27558.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division Two.

April 5, 1929.

Appeal from Adair Circuit Court. — Hon. James A. Cooley, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

J.M. Wattenbarger, Higbee & Mills and M.D. Campbell for appellant.

(1) The antenuptial agreement is invalid and ineffectual to bar the widow of dower, and inasmuch as it was invalid and not binding on her, the same was and could not be binding on appellant. An antenuptial agreement between husband and wife, that upon the death of either, the other should claim no interest in the estate of deceased, is not admissible against the widow in a suit by her for her statutory allowance, when she has received nothing on account of said agreement. Mowser v. Mowser, 87 Mo. 437. An agreement to bar dower must be expressed upon its face that it is in satisfaction of dower as provided in Sec. 330, R.S. 1919. King v. King, 184 Mo. 99. As a legal jointure it seems too clear for argument that the antenuptial contract between Mr. and Mrs. King was ineffectual for the same reason that it nowhere expresses that it is in satisfaction of her dower and the statute being imperative it must be ruled. (2) Appellant is in the position of a dowress having renounced the will and elected under the statute. Laws 1921, p. 119. There was no defense that he released all his marital rights in the property of his intended wife. Blackington v. Blackington, 110 Mass. 461. (3) Inasmuch as the agreement was not binding on the wife to be, it would not bind appellant. Banholzer v. A.O.U.W., 119 Mo. App. 177; Morgan v. Stewart, 173 Mo. 207; Reger v. Reger, 293 S.W. 535. (4) It is also against public policy to allow a man by an agreement before marriage which does not secure to the wife after his death, proper support during her life, to bar her of dower. There was, therefore, total lack of mutuality in the antenuptial agreement. It is not sufficient to say that a promise is a good consideration for a promise. Hudson v. Browning, 264 Mo. 58. (5) An attempt to carry out the void contract by either party, in the case at bar, does not validate or ratify the void contract, because neither party was bound thereby. Reigart v. Coal Co., 217 Mo. 142. (6) The wife, having sued appellant for divorce and the appellant having made settlement of the property rights involved in that suit by the deeds introduced in evidence, was not only estopped by that act, but the fact that the wife demanded and accepted said conveyances would estop her from claiming the antenuptial contract was binding on either. Estoppel applies, and applies only, in cases where the truth is not known to both parties or if one of them has not the means of knowing the truth. If the truth be known to both parties, or if they have equal means of knowledge, there can be no estoppel. Bales v. Perry, 51 Mo. 449; Spence v. Renfro, 179 Mo. 417; Perry v. McVey, 206 Mo. 57; Milan Bank v. Richmond, 217 S.W. 74; Mathews v. Vancleve, 221 S.W. 38. Estoppel arises only in circumstances where one has been misled to his hurt, by the conduct of another. DeLashmutt v. Teetor, 261 Mo. 412. It was, therefore, error for the court to admit the deeds in evidence on behalf of defendant.

Franklin & Son and Murrell & Murrell for respondents.

(1) Marriage is a good and sufficient consideration to support an antenuptial agreement, being regarded not only as a valuable consideration but a consideration of the highest value. 30 C.J. 632, sec. 192; Kennedy v. Koopman, 166 Mo. 86; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 210 Mo. App. 34; Lowe v. Lowe, 163 Mo. App. 309; Bank v. Reed, 131 Mo. 553; 13 R.C.L. 1015, par. 36; Prewit v. Wilson, 103 U.S. 22. An unilateral instrument in the nature of an antenuptial agreement is binding on the party who accepts the same if the marriage ceremony is performed. 30 C.J. 628, sec. 185. (2) The appellant by his conduct as well as by the terms of the antenuptial agreement is now estopped from making any claim of any right, title or interest in and to the estate of his deceased wife, Ann E. Young. McBreen v. McBreen, 154 Mo. 232; O'Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris, 672-673; Marston v. Catterlin, 239 Mo. 390; Heisen v. Heisen, 21 L.R.A. 434; 13 R.C.L. 1027, sec. 481, 1360, sec. 404, 1373, sec. 419; 10 R.C.L. 799, sec. 3, 694, sec. 22. (3) Respondents' motion to dismiss for failure of appellant to file a motion for a new trial within four days should be sustained. Sec. 1456, R.S. 1919; Schwettman v. Sanders, 7 S.W. (2d) 301; State ex rel. Conant v. Trimble, 311 Mo. 128.

HENWOOD, C.

This is a suit to determine the title to, and for partition of, certain real estate, in which appellant (plaintiff below) claims an interest. Defendants deny that plaintiff has any interest in said real estate, assert that they are the sole owners thereof, and join in the prayer for a determination of the title thereto. Under the pleadings, the suit was converted into a proceeding in equity. The chancellor found the issues for defendants and rendered judgment accordingly, and plaintiff appealed.

In his petition, plaintiff alleges that he is the surviving husband of Ann E. Young, deceased, and that defendants are her children and sole heirs at law; that he has duly renounced his wife's will and elected to take a child's part of all lands owned by her at the time of her death; and that he and defendants are each entitled to an undivided one-third interest in said lands. The lands in question are located in Adair County, Missouri, and are described in the petition as follows:

"The East half of the Southeast Quarter of Section Thirty-five (35) except one acre in the Northeast corner owned by Maple Ebert; also a tract beginning at the Southeast corner of the Northeast quarter of Section Thirty-five, thence South four rods, three and one-half feet, thence South twenty degrees, West five rods, thence West six and one-half rods, thence Northwest nine rods, seven feet, to a point twenty feet South of the South line of the Northeast Quarter of Section Thirty-five, thence West to a point twenty feet due South of the Southwest corner of the East half of the Northeast quarter of Section Thirty-five, thence North twenty feet, thence East along South line of the East half of the Northeast quarter of Section Thirty-five to the place of beginning; all in Section Thirty-five (35), Township Sixty-two (62), Range Fourteen (14), also the following lands situated in the City of Kirksville, in Adair County, Missouri:

"That part of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section Nine (9), Township Sixty-two (62), of Range Fifteen (15), commencing at the intersection with the North line of Patterson Avenue and the East line of Lewis Street, thence North one hundred and twenty-seven feet and eight inches, thence East one hundred and forty-five (145) feet, thence South one hundred and twenty-seven (127) feet and eight (8) inches, thence West one hundred and forty-five (145) feet to place of beginning, and also "An undivided one-half interest in Lots Three (3) and Four (4), Block Three (3), of Dodson's Addition to said City of Kirksville."

Defendants admit, in their answer, that plaintiff is the surviving husband of Ann E. Young, that they are her children and sole heirs at law, and that she died seized of the lands described in plaintiff's petition, and deny the other allegations in the petition. Further answering, they say that, under the will of the said Ann E. Young, they are the sole owners of said lands and that, by reason of an antenuptial contract (hereinafter quoted), plaintiff is precluded from claiming any interest therein; that, throughout their married life, both plaintiff and the said Ann E. Young, recognized said antenuptial contract as valid and binding upon each of them, and, in conformity with the provisions thereof, each of them dealt with their respective properties, free and independent of any claim, right or interest of the other therein; that, during their married life and without the knowledge of the said Ann E. Young, plaintiff made various conveyances of his lands without requesting or requiring her to join in such conveyances, and thereby denied that she had any inchoate dower interest in the lands so conveyed by him; and that plaintiff is now estopped from claiming any interest in the lands owned by her at the time of her death.

In his reply, plaintiff admits the execution of the antenuptial contract, but says it was void and, therefore, not binding upon either of the parties thereto, and denies the other allegations of the answer. Further replying plaintiff says that the said Ann E. Young repudiated the antenuptial contract by instituting a suit against him for a divorce and alimony and accepting, in settlement of said suit, a conveyance of lands from him, and by making a bequest to him in her will; and that defendants are estopped from denying his right under the law, to share in the lands of which she died seized.

There is no dispute as to the facts. It is admitted that plaintiff and Ann E. Young (nee Sangster) were lawfully married in Orange County, California, on July 6, 1912; that he is her surviving husband; that defendants are her children and sole heirs at law; and that, at the time of her death, she was the owner of the lands involved in this suit. The proof offered by both sides is entirely documentary.

Plaintiff offered in evidence the affidavit filed in the Probate Court of Adair County, showing the death of Ann E. Young on May 26, 1925, and a list of her heirs, as above named; the last will and testament of Ann E. Young, dated February 16, 1922, and admitted to probate on June 1, 1925; and plaintiff's renunciation of the will and his election to take a child's part of her lands in lieu of dower, filed December 17, 1925. By her will, Ann E. Young gave plaintiff one dollar, and devised all of her property to defendants. The bequest to plaintiff is in...