Young v. State

• Decision Date: 01 October 2012
• Docket Number: No. S12A1403.,S12A1403.
• Citation: 291 Ga. 627,732 S.E.2d 269
• Parties: YOUNG v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

291 Ga. 627

732 S.E.2d 269

YOUNG

v.The STATE.

No. S12A1403.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Oct. 1, 2012.

Michael Scott Phillips, Phillips & Sellers LLP, Columbus, for appellant.

Julia Fessenden Slater, Dist. Atty., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Katherine Ruth Thrower, Asst. Atty. Gen., David R. Helmick, Asst. Dist. Atty., Columbus for appellee.

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant Christopher Young was tried and convicted with his codefendant, Patrick Satterfield, for the 2008 felony murder and armed robbery of Richard Boynton, Sr., the burglary of the Boynton home, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Young, who also was convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, appeals the judgment entered on the convictions.¹

1. The State presented evidence that the 78–year–old victim was shot inside his Muscogee County home on December 5, 2008, and died as a result of a single gunshot wound to the chest. Entry to the home had been gained by breaking a bedroom window. Several of the victim's grandsons who occasionally lived with him testified that the glass doors of a gun cabinet had been shattered and the contents (two handguns and several old rifles and shotguns) removed, and a shoebox containing $7000 that one grandson had stored in a closet had been emptied. Dominic Tinch, who admitted driving appellant and Satterfield to and from the crime scene, testified against his cohorts in exchange for immunity from prosecution of the charges surrounding the death of Mr. Boynton.

Tinch testified that Satterfield had contacted him about stealing money from a house and, during the evening the victim was killed, Tinch met Satterfield and Young. Using Tinch's car, the trio drove to within a block of the victim's house. After appellant and Satterfield exited Tinch's vehicle, Tinch drove around the corner and parked in front of an empty house; he was instructed via a phone call from Satterfield to approach the victim's house and ascertain if anyone was home by ringing the doorbell and knocking on the door. Tinch did as instructed and called Satterfield to report that no one was at home. Shortly thereafter, Tinch, now drivinghis vehicle, picked up Satterfield, who reported that someone had been in the house. Tinch and Satterfield then met appellant, who was carrying three rifles and a handgun, near the side of the victim's home. Tinch testified that appellant stated he “shot him” as appellant entered Tinch's car. A neighbor of the victim testified that Satterfield told him the day after the shooting that appellant had shot the victim after Satterfield and appellant had entered the victim's home through a window.

The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of felony murder, with burglary as the underlying felony, burglary, armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and misdemeanor possession of marijuana.²Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). However, because the burglary conviction served as the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction, it was error to sentence appellant for both felony murder and burglary. OCGA § 16–1–7. Sapp v. State, 290 Ga. 247(1), 719 S.E.2d 434 (2011). Accordingly, we must vacate the separate judgment of conviction and sentence for burglary. Id.

2. Appellant contends on appeal that the State did not present sufficient corroboration of Tinch's testimony connecting appellant to the crimes to authorize appellant's conviction. OCGA § 24–4–8 provides that in “felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient [to establish a fact]. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness....” “Slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a verdict.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Baines v. State, 276 Ga. 117(1), 575 S.E.2d 495 (2003). The necessary corroboration must be independent of the accomplice's testimony, must directly connect the defendant with the crimes or lead to the inference of the defendant's guilt, and must do more than merely cast a grave suspicion of guilt on the defendant. Id. In the case at bar, the testimony of the victim's neighbor that Satterfield told him the day after the crimes were committed that appellant had participated in the burglary of the victim's home and had shot the victim is admissible under the co-conspirator exception to the rule against the admission of hearsay (OCGA § 24–3–5) and is the necessary slight evidence that constitutes sufficient corroboration of accomplice Tinch's testimony that appellant was a participant in the crimes.

3. Appellant contends his constitutional right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court denied his motion in limine to redact from the testimony of the victim's neighbor all references to appellant. As stated earlier, the neighbor's testimony recounted a statement made to the witness by appellant's co-defendant the day after the crimes were committed, identifying appellant as a participant in the crimes and as the one who shot the victim. Codefendant Satterfield did not testify at his and appellant's joint trial. OCGA § 24–3–5 provides that “[a]fter the fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all.” ³ The co-defendant's statement to the victim's neighbor was made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy and was admissible against appellant under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Allen v. State, 288 Ga. 263(4), 702 S.E.2d 869 (2010). The admission of the co-defendant's statement to the neighbor did not violate the...