Yusuf v. Vassar College

• Decision Date: 19 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92 Civ. 5462 (KTD).,92 Civ. 5462 (KTD).
• Citation: 827 F. Supp. 952
• Parties: Syed Saifuddin YUSUF, Plaintiff, v. VASSAR COLLEGE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

827 F. Supp. 952

Syed Saifuddin YUSUF, Plaintiff, v. VASSAR COLLEGE, Defendant.

No. 92 Civ. 5462 (KTD).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

April 19, 1993.

Judith Reed, New York City (Judith Reed, of counsel); Ronald L. Wilson, New Orleans, LA (Ronald L. Wilson, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Anderson, Banks, Curran & Donoghue, Mount Kisco, NY (Maurice F. Curran, of counsel), for defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY, District Judge:

Plaintiff Syed Saifuddin Yusuf ("Yusuf") brings this action against Vassar College ("the College") alleging the following four causes of action: (1) discrimination on the basis of race under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; (3) breach of an implied contract to provide students with a fair hearing; and, (4) intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. The latter two causes of action are based upon the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees.

Defendant now moves, pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss plaintiff's first and second causes of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The complaint, which I must take as true for the purposes of the instant motion to dismiss, alleges the following chain of events which led to this action. Plaintiff Yusuf is a native and citizen of the Republic of Bangladesh. Complaint ("Compl.") at ¶ 3. He enrolled as a student at defendant College in the 1989 Fall semester, and his record was exemplary until February of 1992. Id. at ¶ 5. On February 11, 1992, plaintiff was allegedly physically attacked by his roommate, James Weisman ("Weisman"), a Caucasian student. Id. at ¶ 6. As a result of that attack, the plaintiff suffered unconsciousness, and sustained physical injuries, including a black eye, swollen jaw and contusions. Id. Weisman was arrested by Poughkeepsie police and charged with the crimes of battery, intoxication and falsification of identification. Id. at ¶ 7. Additionally, the attack was reported to College officials. Id.

Thereafter, Weisman and his girlfriend, Tina Kapur ("Kapur"), pleaded with the plaintiff on several occasions to refrain from pursuing the case against Weisman with the local authorities and the College. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff agreed not to pursue said charges if Weisman would agree to pay plaintiff's medical expenses incurred as a result of the attack. Id. Initially Weisman agreed to pay those expenses, but then apparently equivocated. Id. On or about February 17, 1992, the plaintiff advised Kapur that he would not drop the charges against Weisman because Weisman had not paid the plaintiff's medical expenses. Id. at ¶ 10.

On February 17, 1992, pursuant to College regulations, Weisman appeared before the College Regulations Panel ("the Panel") at a hearing on the alleged assault of the plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 11. The plaintiff appeared as the sole witness against Weisman. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Panel found Weisman guilty of assaulting the plaintiff and imposed a suspended suspension against Weisman for the 1992 Spring semester. Id. at ¶ 12. Weisman was permitted to remain in school and continue working towards his graduation, which was anticipated at the completion of the 1992 Spring semester. Id.

On April 8, 1992, the plaintiff received a letter notifying him that Kapur filed sexual harassment charges against him with the College, and a hearing before the Panel was scheduled for April 13, 1992. Id. at ¶ 14. Thereafter, the plaintiff offered a list to Ms. Nichols ("Nichols"), the Chairperson of the Regulations Committee, for approval of twelve potential witnesses that would testify at the hearing.¹ Id. at ¶ 16. However, Nichols told the plaintiff to cut that list down to seven witnesses. Id. In addition, the plaintiff offered Nichols a written statement from his key witness, who could not be present at the hearing. Id. at ¶ 17. However, Nichols refused to allow the plaintiff to present this written statement at the hearing because the witness could not be cross-examined. Id. The plaintiff also alleges that he was never informed that the hearing could be postponed due to the absence of a material witness. Id. at ¶ 18.

On April 13, 1992, at the start of the hearing, Nichols informed the participants that the matter must be wrapped up within four hours. Id. at ¶ 19. Accordingly, Nichols terminated the hearing at the conclusion of four hours, even though the plaintiff had two witnesses who had yet to testify. Id. at ¶ 24. Additionally, the Panel would not allow Yusuf to introduce medical records indicating that he was at the College infirmary on the day of one of the alleged incidents in question. Id. at ¶ 22.

On April 14, 1992, the Panel found the plaintiff guilty of sexual harassment and rendered the following decision against him: (1) he was banned from Main Hall, effective immediately; (2) he received a suspended suspension for the remainder of the 1992 Spring semester; and, (3) he was suspended from May 20, 1992 until Spring of 1993. Id. at ¶ 25. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed the Panel's decision to Mr. Colton, the Dean of Student Life, who affirmed the decision of the panel. Id. at ¶ 27. The plaintiff then appealed to Dr. Nancy Dye, the acting President of the College, but had yet to receive a response from her at the time he initiated this action on June 22, 1992.² Id. at ¶ 28.

DISCUSSION

On a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be read in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir.1984). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that the rule stated in Conley applies with even greater force where the plaintiff alleges a violation of his civil rights. See Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1015 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1943, 118 L.Ed.2d 548 (1992); Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir.1991).

A. The Section 1981 Claim

Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 states, in pertinent part, that:

all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens ..., and shall be subject to like punishment....

42 U.S.C. § 1981 (emphasis added).

On November 21, 1991, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted. Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp.1992)) ("1991 Act"). The 1991 Act specifically amended § 1981 by adding, inter alia, subsection (b) which states that, "for purposes of this section, the term `make and enforce contracts' includes ... the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (Supp.1992).

Section 1981 has been construed as a prohibition against racial discrimination. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2026, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987); Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 384-91, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3146-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-69, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2593, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976) (citations omitted). The provisions of § 1981 extend to private acts of racial discrimination. See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168-75, 96 S.Ct. at 2593-96. The purpose of § 1981 is "to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics." Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 613, 107 S.Ct. at 2028. In its broad terms, § 1981 "proscribes the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2586, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976).

To state a claim under § 1981, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant's actions were purposefully discriminatory and racially motivated. See Gen. Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 391, 102 S.Ct. at 3150; Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 571-72 (2d Cir.1988). In this circuit, "a complaint consisting of nothing more than naked assertions, and setting forth no facts upon which a court could find a violation of the Civil Rights Acts, fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)." Martin v. New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.1978) (citation omitted). Thus, under § 1981, the events of the intentional and purposeful discrimination, as well as the racial animus constituting the motivating factor for the defendant's actions must be specifically pleaded in the complaint to withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See Gen. Bldg. Contractors, 458 U.S. at 391, 102 S.Ct. at 3150; Albert, 851 F.2d at 572; Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir.1989); Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir.1982).

In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant violated his rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by virtue of the fact that: (1) he is a native and citizen of the Republic of Bangladesh; (2) the Panel found him guilty of...