Zapata v. Department of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 30 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. A052137,A052137
• Citation: 2 Cal.App.4th 108,2 Cal.Rptr.2d 855
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Carlos Villa ZAPATA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 855

2 Cal.Rptr.2d 855

2 Cal.App.4th 108

Carlos Villa ZAPATA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Defendant and Appellant.

No. A052137.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Dec. 30, 1991.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., N. Eugene Hill, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jose R. Guerrero, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Landra E. Rosenthal, Deputy Atty. Gen., Oakland, for defendant and appellant.

No appearance for respondent.

REARDON, Associate Justice.

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appeals a superior court judgment issuing a writ directing DMV to vacate its order revoking respondent's driving privilege for a period of three years. We affirm.

FACTS

Respondent Carlos Villa Zapata was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol on January 19, 1990. He was charged by criminal complaint filed in the San Francisco Municipal Court with a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), ¹ and it was also alleged that he refused to complete a chemical test pursuant to section 23159, subdivision (b). Respondent moved to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. Evidence was taken and argument heard. In its written order entitled "Finding of Fact and Order Suppressing Evidence After Hearing on § 1538.5 PC Motion," the municipal court concluded that the activity of the police "constituted an arrest of the Defendant without probable cause." The municipal court ordered suppressed all observations made by the arresting police officers, any statements made by the respondent, and any evidence concerning respondent's refusal to submit to chemical testing. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the People were represented by a prosecuting attorney from the San Francisco District Attorney's Office. No review of the order suppressing evidence was sought by the district attorney (see Pen.Code, § 1538.5, subd. (j)) and, respondent alleges, the criminal case was thereafter dismissed on May 9, 1990.

On May 11, 1990, two days following dismissal of the criminal action, an administrative hearing was held before a DMV referee to determine whether respondent's driving privilege should be revoked for failure to submit to chemical testing. (See § 13353.) In order to support a revocation under section 13353, as expressly recognized by the referee, a finding must be made that respondent was "lawfully arrested." (See Music v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 841, 270 Cal.Rptr. 692.) Respondent opposed revocation on the basis that DMV was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of the lawfulness of respondent's arrest because that issue had been previously resolved by the municipal court in ruling on the suppression motion. In support of his opposition, respondent introduced into evidence the written order of the municipal court. The matter was taken under submission by the referee.

On July 3, 1990, an order revoking respondent's driving privilege was entered. With respect to the defense of collateral estoppel, the referee concluded: "With regard to the illegal arrest, the referee notes that the hearing held before the judge was not an adjudication of the DUI charge, but rather a specialized hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. Although the judge's ruling consequently affects the ability to try the DUI charge, it does not specifically adjudicate that charge. As the court has no privity with the Department of Motor Vehicles and vice versa, in regard to the adjudication of action taken pursuant to Section 13353 of the California Vehicle Code, this referee determines that the evidence presented at this hearing is sufficient to make findings on the four Implied Consent issues...." The referee then found, on the issue of the lawfulness of respondent's arrest, that "Carlos Villa Zapata was lawfully arrested."

Respondent then sought writ relief in the superior court contending, as he did before the DMV referee, that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the arrest issue. The superior court agreed and issued a writ vacating the revocation.

DISCUSSION

Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. (Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439.) In order to establish collateral estoppel, several threshold requirements must be met: "First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision Clearly, the issue of the lawfulness of respondent's arrest is the "identical" issue previously decided by the municipal court. Since the decision of the municipal court that respondent's arrest was unlawful followed a contested evidentiary hearing, the issue was unquestionably "actually litigated." The issue was also "necessarily decided" because the unlawfulness of respondent's arrest was the basis of the motion and the basis upon which the order suppressing evidence issued. The decision of the municipal court was "final" at the time of the DMV hearing because the prosecutor did not seek review of the court's order (see Pen.Code, § 1538.5, subd. (j)) and, in any event, the criminal case had been dismissed. The decision was also "on the merits" of the arrest issue, which is the issue that respondent contends cannot be relitigated by DMV.

                in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits.  Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.  [Citations.]"  (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223;  see also People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.)   In our view, these threshold requirements have been met by respondent in the instant case
                

Appellant's principal challenge is to the last threshold requirement that "the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding." (Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d 1223.) This precise challenge has been rejected in two appellate decisions on facts identical to those presented in the instant one. In Shackelton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 327, 119 Cal.Rptr. 921, the court found privity between the prosecuting attorney in the criminal proceedings and DMV in the subsequent revocation proceedings, and that "appellant [DMV] was bound by the finding of the municipal court that respondent's arrest was unlawful." (Id., at p. 330, 119 Cal.Rptr. 921.) In Buttimer v. Alexis (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 754, 194 Cal.Rptr. 603, the court, relying on Shackelton and Sims, reached the same conclusion: "We see no reason for finding the El Dorado District Attorney and DMV are not in privity. DMV may have no control over the actions of the District Attorney, however, the district attorney represents the State of California in criminal matters, and DMV represents the interests of the State of California in its hearings. We conclude the State of California is the real party in interest in both proceedings and the requirement of privity as an element of collateral estoppel is satisfied." (Id., at p. 760, 194 Cal.Rptr. 603.) The appellate court upheld the trial court's ruling that DMV was collaterally estopped from relitigating the arrest issue.

Appellant urges us to reject Shackelton and Buttimer, two cases directly on point, in favor of Lofthouse v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 730, 177 Cal.Rptr. 601 and Pawlowski v. Pierce (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 692, 249 Cal.Rptr. 49. In Lofthouse, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was found to be inapplicable because the validity of the arrest was not decided in the prior criminal proceedings. Although the Lofthouse court unquestionably expressed a disagreement with Shackelton, this disagreement must be treated as dicta: "While we do not believe that the holding in that case [Shackelton ] correctly states the law, the fact remains that in the instant case the issue of the legality of the respondent's arrest was irrelevant to and was never in fact determined in the criminal proceedings." (Lofthouse, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 738, 177 Cal.Rptr. 601.)

In Pawlowski v. Pierce, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 692, 249 Cal.Rptr. 49 the court determined that collateral estoppel did not prevent DMV from finding that appellant refused chemical testing even though a jury at the prior criminal trial had found in favor of appellant on that issue. The court's ruling was based upon two grounds: (1) no privity between the district attorney and DMV and (2) no identity of issues in that a refusal in the criminal proceeding must be willful (§ 23159) whereas a simple refusal will suffice for "Privity is essentially a shorthand statement that collateral estoppel is to be applied in a given case; there is no universally applicable definition of privity." (Lynch v. Glass (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 943, 947, 119 Cal.Rptr. 139.) The concept of privity refers "to a relationship between the party to be estopped and the unsuccessful party in the prior litigation which is 'sufficiently close' so as to justify application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel [citations]." (Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 865, 875, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 587 P.2d 1098; see also People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 486-487, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.) It is not necessary that the party to be estopped be an actual party to the prior proceedings. (Id., at p. 486, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.)

                license suspension (§ 13353).  With respect to the issue of privity, the Pawlowski court read Sims as requiring "a close association of entities representing the state's interests...."

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