Zelenak v. Indus. Comm.

• Decision Date: 01 August 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01AP-1310.,01AP-1310.
• Parties: ZELENAK, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 769

774 N.E.2d 769

148 Ohio App.3d 589

2002 Ohio 3887

ZELENAK, Appellant, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO et al., Appellees.

No. 01AP-1310.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided August 1, 2002.

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Patrick J. Perotti, Painesville, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees Industrial Commission of Ohio and Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

DESHLER, Judge.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, David Zelenak, filed a class action complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking, on his own behalf and others similarly situated, declaratory and other relief against defendants-appellees, the Industrial Commission of Ohio and Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Plaintiffs-appellants (hereinafter "plaintiffs") collectively are former temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation recipients whose TTD benefit payments were terminated after state-hired doctors examined them and opined that each claimant had reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). In each case, TTD compensation was discontinued as of the date of the medical examination that yielded the MMI determination, prior to any hearing on the issue of termination of compensation. Defendants either terminated payment of TTD compensation without a hearing or, where payments continued, deemed the payments made after the MMI determination to be overpayments. Subsequently, defendants collected the overpayments by withholding the amounts paid from future compensation payments or by other means.

{¶ 2} On August 5, 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court held, "The appropriate date on which to terminate disputed TTD compensation on the basis of maximum medical improvement is the date of the termination hearing, and the commission may not declare an overpayment for payments received by the claimant before that date." State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 516, 696 N.E.2d 1069, syllabus. Following the mandate of the Russell decision, defendants reimbursed TTD recipients, including plaintiffs, from whom overpayments had been collected or payments withheld.

{¶ 3} Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case on July 30, 2001, praying for (1) class action certification, (2) a declaration that the conduct of defendants, as alleged in the complaint, entitles them to recovery, (3) "relief and equitable recovery * * * representing interest on * * * [their] disgorged funds from the date of withholding until the date of ultimate payment," and (4) "such other or further relief to which the Court finds * * * [them] entitled." The two claims for relief upon which plaintiffs based their demand for judgment were that defendants wrongfully withheld and converted to their own use funds to which plaintiffs were entitled and, upon reimbursing those funds, did not pay interest (count one); and that defendants, by not making payments of interest, were unjustly enriched (count two).

{¶ 4} Defendants moved, on August 8, 2001, to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1), contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Defendants asserted that, because plaintiffs sought monetary damages in addition to declaratory relief, exclusive jurisdiction to hear the claims was vested in the Ohio Court of Claims pursuant to the provisions of R.C. Chapter 2743. On September 24, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision granting the motion and directing counsel for defendants to prepare a judgment entry reflecting the court's decision. Although plaintiffs did not respond within rule¹ to the motion to dismiss prior to the date of the trial court's decision, they did file, on October 9, 2001, an objection to the proposed judgment entry in which they fully set forth their arguments as to why the court should exercise jurisdiction and deny the motion. Nonetheless, the trial court journalized its judgment dismissing the complaint on October 19, 2001.

{¶ 5} Plaintiffs have timely appealed from that judgment and present a single assignment of error for this court's consideration:

{¶ 6} "The Franklin County Court of Common Pleas erred in dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."

{¶ 7} For the reasons hereinafter discussed, we hold that the trial court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case on its merits. In rendering this opinion we refrain from considering whether the claims of plaintiffs-appellants ("appellants") on theories of conversion and unjust enrichment are meritorious. See Swaney v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (1998), Franklin App. No. 98AP-299, 1998 WL 808457, and Henley Health Care v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (1995), Franklin App. No. 94APE08-1216, 1995 WL 92101. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is the sole question presented by this appeal.

{¶ 8} The standard for reviewing this dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether any cause of action cognizable by the trial court was raised in the complaint. Keller v. Dailey (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 298, 301, 706 N.E.2d 28. Our review is undertaken de novo, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court. Estate of Jenkins v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., Cuyahoga App. No. 80445, 2002-Ohio-3268, at ¶ 10, 2002 WL 1396905. We are not limited in our consideration to the allegations of the complaint, but may consider other pertinent matters, if necessary. Canady v. Indus. Comm. (2000), Franklin App. No. 99AP-930, 2000 WL 664862, citing Howard v. Covenant Apostolic Church, Inc. (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 24, 27, 705 N.E.2d 385.

{¶ 9} By enacting the Court of Claims Act, R.C. Chapter 2743, the Ohio General Assembly waived the state's immunity and consented to suits against the state "in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties" in cases where the state had not previously consented to be sued. R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). The Court of Claims was created, effective January 1, 1975, as a court of record with "original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02," including "full equity powers in all actions within its jurisdiction." R.C. 2743.03(A)(1).

{¶ 10} Appellants rely on the holdings of the Ohio Supreme Court in Ohio Hosp. Assn. v. Ohio Dept. of Human Services (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 97, 579 N.E.2d 695, and of this court in Henley Health Care, supra, to argue that their claim for interest on monies collected or withheld from their compensation payments derives from underlying claims that are purely equitable and that, therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction over their action in equity. Appellants base their argument that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claims upon that portion of R.C. 2743.03(A)(2) that provides:

{¶ 11} "This division does not affect, and shall not be construed as affecting, the original jurisdiction of another court of this state to hear and determine a civil action in which the sole relief that the claimant seeks against the state is a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, or other equitable relief."

{¶ 12} Offering a similar argument, the plaintiffs in Friedman v. Johnson (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 85, 18 OBR 122, 480 N.E.2d 82, attempted to challenge the methods by which the Ohio Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities had recovered reimbursement of amounts previously paid on behalf of residents by the department to the facilities under state contracts for provision of their housing and care. The Friedman plaintiffs, who filed their complaint in common pleas court, sought class action certification, declaratory judgment in connection with the collection procedure, injunctive relief prohibiting the collection procedure and other necessary and proper relief. Id. at 85, 18 OBR 122, 480 N.E.2d 82. Holding that the plaintiffs sought more than declaratory relief, the case having been remanded by the appellate court for calculation of monetary damages, the Ohio Supreme Court dismissed it on the ground that the common pleas court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In so holding, the court commented:

{¶ 13} "A major purpose of the Court of Claims Act was to centralize the filing and adjudication of all claims against the state. The Court of Claims was created to become the sole trial-level adjudicator of claims against the state, with the narrow exception that specific types of suits that the state subjected itself prior to 1975 could be tried elsewhere as if the defendant was a private party. To permit the court of common pleas to have jurisdiction over claims such as the one herein would contravene this purpose. For example, any party wishing to avoid the Court of Claims, for whatever reason, would simply have to attach a prayer for declaratory relief onto his request for monetary damages * * *. This type of `forum-shopping' is not what was envisioned when the Court of Claims was established; rather, the exceptions to its exclusive jurisdiction should be strict and narrow." Id. at 87-88, 18 OBR 122, 480 N.E.2d 82.

{¶ 14} As was necessary for the court in Friedman, we must decide whether the trial court has concurrent jurisdiction over this cause or whether the Court of Claims has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 87, 18 OBR 122, 480 N.E.2d 82. There is a presumption that a claim against the state should be filed in the Court of Claims unless the plaintiff demonstrates otherwise. Santos v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp., Cuyahoga App. No. 80353, 2002-Ohio-2731, at ¶ 15, 2002 WL 1265568. We must determine if the relief sought by appellants constitutes specific equitable relief or, by contrast, includes a claim for monetary damages. See Keller, supra, 124 Ohio App.3d at 303, 706 N.E.2d 28. If the redress sought by appellants includes monetary damages, the Court of Claims...