Zimmerman v. Hoard

• Decision Date: 25 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 4:97-CV-0066 AS.,4:97-CV-0066 AS.
• Citation: 5 F.Supp.2d 633
• Parties: William K. ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff, v. Lee W. HOARD Sheriff of Carroll County, Carroll County Commissioners, and Correctional Officer Aaron Doe, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

5 F.Supp.2d 633

William K. ZIMMERMAN, Plaintiff, v. Lee W. HOARD Sheriff of Carroll County, Carroll County Commissioners, and Correctional Officer Aaron Doe, Defendants.

No. 4:97-CV-0066 AS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

March 25, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William K. Zimmerman, Carlisle, IN, pro se.

Inmates of Carroll County Jail, pro se.

James S. Stephenson, Stephenson Daly Morow and Kurnik, Indianapolis, IN, for Lee Hoard.

Michael R. Morow, Stephenson Daly Morow and Kurnik, Indianapolis, IN, for Carroll County Commissioners.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ALLEN SHARP, District Judge.

William Zimmerman, a state prisoner confined at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, submitted the complaint in this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, dealing with events that occurred while he was confined at the Carroll County Jail. The court screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, dismissing some issues and defendants, and an answer has been filed. Mr. Zimmerman now requests leave of the court, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), to amend his complaint and has submitted a proposed amended complaint.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that leave to amend the complaint should be "freely given when justice so requires." However, it is appropriate to deny leave to amend where the proposed amendment would be futile, and an amendment is futile if it could not withstand a motion to dismiss. Arazie v. Mullane, 2 F.3d 1456, 1464 (7th Cir.1993); Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir.1993). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires the court to conduct an initial review of the merits of a prisoner complaint and to dismiss it if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A also requires the court to screen proposed amended complaints submitted by prisoners. Accordingly, the court will screen the proposed amended complaint, and grant the plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint to the extent the claims presented therein are capable of surviving a dismissal motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

A complaint states no actionable claim when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts consistent with his complaint that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Panaras v. Liquid Carbonic Indus. Corp., 74 F.3d 786, 791 (7th Cir.1996). When reviewing pro se complaints, the court must employ standards less stringent than if the complaint had been drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). The court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and "construe such allegations in favor of the plaintiff." Sherwin Manor Nursing Ctr. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir.1994); cert. denied, 516 U.S. 862, 116 S.Ct. 172, 133 L.Ed.2d 113 (1995). Although ambiguities in the complaint should be interpreted in the plaintiff's favor, Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 188 (7th Cir.1994), the court need not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff which are not apparent on the face of the complaint, Coates v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 447 (7th Cir.1977), or ignore factual allegations set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim. City Nat'l Bank of Florida v. Checkers, Simon & Rosner, 32 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir.1994).

Mr. Zimmerman complains of incidents that occurred while he was a pretrial detainee. His amended complaint names Carroll County Sheriff Lee Hoard, the Carroll County Commissioners, and Jailer Aaron Doe as defendants in their individual and official capacities. The amended complaint alleges that Mr. Zimmerman suffered a wide variety of problems at the jail, and that the defendants' actions and inactions violated the United States Constitution's First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state directives and recommendations by the Indiana Jail Inspections Service.

Mr. Zimmerman seeks to sue the defendants in their individual and official capacities. A § 1983 action against an official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir.1986). "An official-capacity suit is not a suit against the official as an individual; the real party in interest is the entity." Wilson v. Civil Town of Clayton, Indiana, 839 F.2d 375, 382 (7th Cir.1988). Municipalities cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 unless a governmental policy or custom caused the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. A plaintiff may establish the existence of an official policy or custom by proving the existence of an express municipal policy that caused the alleged violation of his rights, Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir.1994), by establishing that the person who committed the constitutional tort was an official with policy-making authority, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), or by establishing the existence of a practice or custom so widespread or persistent that it rises to the level of a policy which can fairly be attributed to the municipality. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). In order to show personal capacity liability for damages, a plaintiff must show the defendant's personal involvement or participation, or direct responsibility for the conditions of which he complains. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d at 273; Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983). The doctrine of respondeat superior, under which a supervisor may be held liable for an employee's actions, has no application to § 1983 actions. Adams v. Pate, 445 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir.1971).

Mr. Zimmerman alleges that Sheriff Hoard and the Carroll County Commissioners are policy making officials bearing responsibility for the policies he alleges violated his federally protected fights. He alleges Sheriff Hoard's direct personal involvement in some of the claims he presents, but does not allege the Commissioners' direct personal involvement in any of these incidents. Aaron Doe, a non-policy making jail employee, is only alleged to have been involved in one claim. Accordingly, the court will dismiss the personal capacity damage claims against the Commissioners and the official capacity damage claims against defendant Doe.

In his original complaint, Mr. Zimmerman alleged that jail officials ignored state directives, and recommendations by the Indiana Jail Inspections Service. The court dismissed this claim because under § 1983, courts may consider only alleged deprivations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Casines v. Murchek, 766 F.2d 1494 (11th Cir.1985); see also French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1251 (7th Cir. 1985); cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817, 107 S.Ct. 77, 93 L.Ed.2d 32 (1986). Mr. Zimmerman devotes a large portion of his amended complaint to discussing the alleged failure of the defendants to implement the Indiana Jail Standards and Rules, which he states were drafted by a representative group of Sheriffs appointed by the Governor, and the failure of Carroll County officials to comply with recommendations from the State Jail Inspector. The court reiterates that the Constitution, not the Indiana Jail Standards and Rules or any other state source, establish the standards by which the court will review the plaintiff's complaint. Accordingly, the court dismisses any claims in the amended complaint arising from jail officials' alleged failure to comply with state directives and recommendations.

The amended complaint contains twelve causes of action denoted as grounds 1 through 12. Some of the factual allegations clearly deal only with other inmates, and at several points in his amended complaint, Mr. Zimmerman appears to be attempting to present claims which impacted only on other inmates. A plaintiff cannot assert a claim premised upon the legal rights and interests of another person. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir.1996). So, to the extent Mr. Zimmerman's amended complaint seeks to present claims relating to other inmates, the court must dismiss those claims. At the screening stage, however, the court will give Mr. Zimmerman the benefit of the doubt and assume that unless the complaint indicates otherwise, the conditions he complains of applied to him personally.

In his first cause of action, Mr. Zimmerman alleges that Sheriff Hoard allowed subordinates to violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by arbitrarily punishing prisoners for alleged disciplinary infractions without affording a due process hearing. In his fourth cause of action, Mr. Zimmerman asserts that Jailor Aaron Doe denied him due process by arbitrarily and capriciously imposing a telephone restriction on him "for an action confessed to by other jail inmates, and without benefit of disciplinary hearing."

In his amended complaint, Mr. Zimmerman cites the due process procedures recommended by the Indiana Jail Standards and Rules before disciplinary sanctions can be imposed on jail inmates. This document, of course, creates no right enforceable in Federal Court. Casines v. Murchek, 766 F.2d at 1501 (§ 1983 protects only against violation of federally protected rights); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir.1980) (due process...