Zornes v. State

Decision Date15 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. A15–1102.,A15–1102.
Citation880 N.W.2d 363
PartiesTracy Alan ZORNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Tracy Alan Zornes, Stillwater, MN, pro se.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Brian Melton, Clay County Attorney, Moorhead, MN, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.

OPINION

HUDSON

, Justice.

In November 2011 appellant Tracy Alan Zornes was convicted in Clay County of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder for the killing of Megan Londo and John Cadotte. Zornes was also convicted of first-degree arson of a dwelling and theft of a motor vehicle. After we affirmed Zornes' convictions on direct appeal, he sought postconviction relief. His postconviction petition alleged numerous grounds for relief, including various claims of trial error, ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The postconviction court denied Zornes' petition without granting an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the claims of trial error and ineffective assistance of trial counsel were procedurally barred, and that the ineffective-appellate-counsel claims were meritless. Because we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zornes' petition without granting an evidentiary hearing, we affirm.

I.

Following an early-morning apartment fire in Moorhead in February 2010, the bodies of Megan Londo and John Cadotte were discovered by emergency personnel. Londo and Cadotte had both been beaten and stabbed, and had died before the apartment was set ablaze. An investigation led law enforcement to suspect that Tracy Zornes committed the murders, and roughly 2 weeks later police found Zornes hiding in a remote makeshift campsite in the woods. When Zornes was arrested, officers recovered a pocketknife from his person and several more of his possessions, including a hammer, box cutter, screwdriver, and scissors, from the campsite.

Zornes was indicted for two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.185, subd. (a)(1) (2014)

; two counts of second-degree intentional murder, Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. (1)(1) (2014) ; first-degree arson of a dwelling, Minn.Stat. § 609. 561, subd. 1 (2014); and theft of a motor vehicle, Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(17) (2014).1

Zornes' counsel made several pre-trial motions in limine, including a motion to exclude the items seized from his person and his campsite on the grounds that the items were irrelevant and substantially more prejudicial than probative. See Minn. R. Evid. 401

–03. In support of the motion to exclude, Zornes' counsel argued that the State had offered no evidence that the items were in fact linked to the crimes with which Zornes was charged. That motion was denied.

After trial, Zornes was found guilty on all counts except for the second-degree murder charges. The district court sentenced him to concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of release for the murders, a consecutive term of 45 months in prison for the arson, and a concurrent term of 30 months for the theft conviction. The court also ordered him to pay restitution.

On direct appeal, Zornes argued for reversal of his convictions on the grounds that (1) his right to a public trial was violated; (2) admission of a statement he made to police violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (3) the district court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence the items (including the pocketknife) found on his person and at his campsite when he was arrested; and (4) the district court abused its discretion when it ruled the state could impeach him with evidence of his prior felony convictions if he chose to testify. State v. Zornes, 831 N.W.2d 609, 617–18 (Minn.2013)

. We rejected those arguments and affirmed his convictions. Id. at 612.

Zornes subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that numerous trial errors denied him a fair trial. Zornes also alleged that both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to effectively argue or raise the issues identified in his petition. The postconviction court denied the petition without granting an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the trial issues and the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims were procedurally barred, and that Zornes' ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims constituted mere argumentative assertions without factual support.

II.

On appeal, Zornes argues that the postconviction court erred and that his postconviction claims entitle him to either an evidentiary hearing to expand the record in support of his claims or a new trial.

We review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, including the petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Colbert v. State, 870 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn.2015)

. In doing so, we review legal issues de novo and the postconviction court's factual findings for clear error. Id.

A postconviction court may only deny a petition without holding an evidentiary hearing if the petition, the files of the proceedings, and the trial court record conclusively show the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Minn.Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014)

; Schleicher v. State, 718 N.W.2d 440, 450 (Minn.2006). In making this determination, the court must consider the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Matakis v. State, 862 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Minn.2015). However, a petitioner's allegations must constitute more than argumentative assertions without factual support. Id.

III.

We turn first to Zornes' claims of trial error. Zornes argues that seven trial errors denied him a fair trial, and that his convictions must therefore be reversed. Specifically, Zornes argues that the prosecution: (1) improperly argued that he had the “means” to commit the murders although his pocketknife was incapable of inflicting some of the victims' wounds

; (2) submitted a “false and misleading” witness list to the court; (3) entered photos and testimony into evidence without foundation; (4) committed misconduct in its questioning of a witness. Zornes also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by (5) improperly referring to his choice not to testify; (6) making other prejudicial statements; and (7) using an “inflammatory” computer-based slide presentation.

Under the Knaffla rule, when a postconviction petition follows a direct appeal, all claims raised in the direct appeal and all claims that were known or should have been known at the time of the direct appeal are procedurally barred. Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 787 (Minn.2013)

; see also

State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976).2

Because Zornes' claims of trial error are all based on events that occurred during his trial, they were all known or should have been known at the time of the direct appeal. Zornes makes no specific argument that either of the two exceptions to the Knaffla rule applies.3 Accordingly, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Zornes' claims of trial error are procedurally barred and denying them without granting a hearing on those issues.

IV.

Zornes also argues that the postconviction court erred in denying his petition with respect to eight claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. He contends that his counsel's performance with regard to the seven trial issues discussed in Part III, supra, was ineffective. He also argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain exclusion of the pocketknife entered into evidence at trial.

The Knaffla rule applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus Zornes' claims are barred if they are based on the trial record and were known or should have been known to him at the time of his direct appeal. Reed v. State, 793 N.W.2d 725, 732 (Minn.2010)

. However, an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim brought in a postconviction proceeding following direct appeal is not Knaffla -barred if review of the claim requires consideration of facts outside those in the trial court record. Sanchez–Diaz v. State, 758 N.W.2d 843, 847 (Minn.2008).

A.

First, Zornes' claims that his trial counsel was ineffective with regard to the issues discussed in Part III, supra, are based on events that occurred on the record at his trial. Zornes identifies no particular reason why he could not have raised these claims on direct appeal or why facts other than those contained in the records and files of the proceedings are needed to review his counsel's performance. These ineffective-assistance issues can be reviewed on the basis of the trial court record alone, and are therefore Knaffla -barred. See Schleicher, 718 N.W.2d at 450

.

B.

Zornes also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to prevent the pocketknife, recovered from Zornes' person at the time of his arrest, from being entered into evidence at trial. He contends that this issue is not Knaffla -barred because facts outside the trial court record are necessary to review it. In support of this contention, he submitted as an exhibit to his postconviction petition the victims' autopsy reports, which were disclosed to the defense but not entered into evidence and are thus not part of the trial court record. Zornes contends that the reports show that the blade of his pocketknife was incapable of inflicting several of the victims' wounds

. He asserts that, though his attorney moved to exclude the knife, the attorney failed to recognize and make the wound-incompatibility argument, which Zornes characterizes as the most compelling argument for the pocketknife's exclusion. He argues that an evidentiary hearing is needed to determine whether his counsel adequately reviewed the autopsy reports and to examine counsel's reasons for choosing not to present expert testimony regarding the knife's...

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