Zuck v. State
| Decision Date | 15 November 1988 |
| Docket Number | CA-CV,No. 1,1 |
| Citation | 159 Ariz. 37,764 P.2d 772 |
| Parties | Perl A. ZUCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Arizona; Department of Corrections, a division thereof; Ellis MacDougall, former Director of the DOC, Defendants-Appellees. 88-039. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Appellant Perl A. Zuck (plaintiff) appeals from the trial court's order granting appellees' (defendants') motion for summary judgment. The main issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly interpreted the amendment of the statute changing the effect of imprisonment as a disability, A.R.S. § 12-502(B), in applying the statute of limitations to bar plaintiff's claims that he was denied prompt medical care and treatment while an inmate with the Arizona Department of Corrections. Because we hold that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the applicable statute of limitations and because the motion is not supportable on other grounds, we reverse the granting of summary judgment.
In February 1986 plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that in July 1981, while he was an inmate at Arizona State Prison, he was diagnosed as having an abscess or infection in his left testicle, and was prescribed antibiotics by prison medical personnel, who also recommended a urological consultation. He complained that prison officials failed to provide him with the prescribed drugs for more than six weeks, and that he experienced repeated difficulty in receiving refills of prescribed medication. He also complained that prison officials delayed his consultation with a specialist for more than four months. He claimed that, because of these delays and denial of medical care and treatment, his condition worsened to the point that surgical removal of his left testicle was required in March 1982. He also stated that although he developed a similar infection in his right testicle later in 1982, because he received prompt medication and treatment for that condition, it resolved without surgery. His complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages based on four claims for relief: (1) violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) breach of the Department of Corrections' statutory duty to provide medical care for prisoners pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-201.01(D); (3) personal injury caused by negligent medical care; and (4) violation of his eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that plaintiff's claims were all barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. They also argued that plaintiff had failed to state a civil rights violation based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and that plaintiff had failed to establish negligence because his treatment did not fall below the applicable standard of care. Defendants filed, in support of their motion, an affidavit by Patricia Stapler, M.D., a board-certified family practitioner employed by the Arizona State Prison, which stated, in part:
I have reviewed the medical records of Perl Zuck ADC 27748 which date back to February 1980.
....
My review of Mr. Zuck's medical treatment indicates that at all times the care given Mr. Zuck met or exceeded the medical standards for the community. Mr. Zuck's surgery was required as a result of the failure of the antibiotics prescribed to cure the problem.
My review of the records indicates that at no time did the Department of Corrections personnel fall below the standard of care required in this matter.
Plaintiff responded that his complaint was filed within the applicable statute of limitations, and also argued that he had stated a claim for relief under both the eighth amendment and § 1983. As to defendants' argument that his negligence claim must fail, plaintiff attacked the sufficiency of Dr. Stapler's affidavit. Defendant also filed his own affidavit in opposition, which stated in part:
[A]ffiant was prescribed some antibiotics.... The prison failed to provide the prescribed drug for over six weeks; although as early as July, 1981, he was recommended for urological consultation with the contract urologist, the prison delayed the consultation, the medical staff continually asking affiant "how soon do you get out?"
... By late August, when affiant was finally given the prescribed medication, it proved to be ineffectual; he was switched to another family of medicine; into the fall and winter, affiant did not always get from the prison staff his prescribed medicine; he had to constantly petition the department to get the prescription renewed or refilled....
After considering the motions, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state, in the following order:
The Defendant has made a motion for summary judgment to which the Plaintiff has responded in opposition. The court holds that the applicable statute of limitations is 12-505(C), and that the Plaintiff's claim was barred one year after the amendment to A.R.S. § 12-502 which became effective in 1984.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED granting summary judgment to the Defendant.
Plaintiff timely appealed from this order.
In reviewing summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Webster v. Culbertson, --- Ariz. ----, ----, 761 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1988).
The parties agree that plaintiff's eighth amendment and § 1983 claims are subject to the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, A.R.S. § 12-542(1). See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Gunter v. State, 153 Ariz. 386, 736 P.2d 1198 (App.1987). Plaintiff's negligence claim is also subject to the two-year limitation in which to bring personal injury suits. A.R.S. § 12-542(1). Plaintiff's claim that the prison officials breached their duty to provide medical care pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-201.01(D), however, is one that is conferred by statute and thus is subject to the one-year statute of limitations imposed by A.R.S. § 12-541(3).
This appeal does not question the time periods of limitation; rather, the parties' dispute centers on the statutory effect of the plaintiff's imprisonment in tolling portions of the applicable limitations periods between the date of his injury in 1981 and the filing of his complaint in 1986.
In July 1981, when plaintiff's alleged injury occurred, A.R.S. § 12-502 provided as follows:
If a person entitled to bring an action ... is at the time the cause of action accrues ... imprisoned, the period of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the period limited for commencement of the action. Such person shall have the same time after removal of the disability which is allowed to others.
Thus, imprisonment was a statutory disability that tolled the two-year statute of limitations period for an inmate's civil rights or negligence suit. See Smith v. MacDougall, 139 Ariz. 22, 676 P.2d 656 (App.1983); Marks v. Darra, 785 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.1986).
Effective August 3, 1984, however, the legislature amended that statute, in pertinent part, as follows:
B. If a person entitled to bring an action ... is at the time the cause of action accrues imprisoned, the period of such disability shall exist only until such time as the person imprisoned discovers the right to bring the action or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the right to bring the action, whichever occurs first, and such person shall have the same time after the disability ceases to exist which is allowed to others.
A.R.S. § 12-502(B). In other words, effective August 3, 1984, incarceration was no longer a "disability" that tolled the statute of limitations. However, because defendant was imprisoned and thus under a "disability" from the date of his injury until the amended statute took effect, the applicable limitations periods could not start to run until August 3, 1984 when the "disability" was removed. Thus, the applicable limitations periods were tolled from July 1981 until August 1984. After August 3, 1984, a prisoner had the same time others would have to bring a claim, from that date, or a later date if that was when the prisoner first reasonably discovered his or her right to bring the action. Therefore, plaintiff was obligated to file his civil rights and negligence claims within the two-year period of A.R.S. § 12-542(1) and to file his breach of statutory duty claim within the one-year period of A.R.S. § 12-541(3), from the time after the effective date of the amendment that he discovered or with reasonable diligence should have discovered his right to bring those claims. Because his civil rights and negligence claims were filed on February 3, 1986, within the applicable two years of the effective date of the amendment, they were not time barred, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on that basis.
Plaintiff's remaining claim under A.R.S. § 31-201.01(D), however, having only a one-year limitations period, could have been time barred as early as August 1985 if he was aware of his right to bring the action when the amended statute took effect in August 1984. However, summary judgment on the statutory duty claim would need to be supported by a finding of his awareness; in the absence of such a finding in the present record we must remand that claim to the trial court for determination of when plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the existence of this claim. See Sato v. Van Denburgh, 123 Ariz. 225, 599 P.2d 181 (1979). The applicable one-year period of A.R.S. § 12-541(3) should apply from that point to determine whether the claim was barred in February 1986 when plaintiff filed his complaint.
The trial court based its conclusion...
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