Zwingle Independent School Dist. v. State Bd. of Public Instruction

• Decision Date: 18 July 1968
• Docket Number: No. 52855,52855
• Citation: 160 N.W.2d 299
• Parties: ZWINGLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for the State of Iowa, State Department of Public Instruction for the State of Iowa, and Paul F. Johnston, Appellants. OTTER CREEK TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for the State of Iowa, State Department of Public Instruction for the State of Iowa, and Paul F. Johnston, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 299

160 N.W.2d 299

ZWINGLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for the State of Iowa, State Department of Public Instruction for the State of Iowa, and Paul F. Johnston, Appellants.

OTTER CREEK TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee, v. STATE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for the State of Iowa, State Department of Public Instruction for the State of Iowa, and Paul F. Johnston, Appellants.

No. 52855.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 18, 1968.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth A. Nolan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Gilloon, Klauer, Stapleton & Ernst, Dubuque, for appellees.

LeGRAND, Justice.

These two cases were consolidated for trial. They present identical issues on this appeal. At stake is whether Zwingle Independent School District (hereafter called Zwingle) and Otter Creek Township School District (hereafter called Otter Creek) shall be merged with Dubuque Community School District under the provisions of section 275.40, Code of Iowa, 1962, as amended.

Such a plan was submitted to and approved by the Board of Directors of Dubuque Community School District and by Dubuque County Board of Education. Zwingle lies partly in Dubuque County and partly in Jackson County. Otter Creek lies completely in Jackson County. The Jackson County Board of Education objected to such merger and thereafter the State Board of Public Instruction (hereafter called Board) disapproved the proposed merger, basing such action largely on the recommendation of the defendant, Paul F. Johnston, who is Superintendent of Public Instruction of the State of Iowa. Such disapproval prevented completion of the merger under section 275.40, Code of Iowa.

Zwingle and Otter Creek brought certiorari proceedings in Dubuque District Court assailing the actions of the Superintendent and the Board, and the trial court sustained the writ finding the conduct of both to be 'arbitrary and unreasonable and in excess of their respective jurisdictions.' The trial court's judgment further ordered the Board to 'proceed to determine the controversy raised by the proposed merger after a full and fair hearing.'

Although the State Department of Public Instruction is named as a separate defendant, neither the trial court's findings of fact nor conclusions of law make any reference to the State Department of Public Instruction as distinct from the State Board of Public Instruction. The action was tried and decided as being against the State Board of Public Instruction and Paul F. Johnston, the Superintendent of Public Instruction. We therefore consider this matter as though the Board and the Superintendent were the only named defendants.

This is the second time the problems of Zwingle and Otter Creek have been before us, although the first appeal did not involve those issues which now present themselves. See LaMotte Independent School District et al. v. Jackson County Board of Education, Iowa, 155 N.W.2d 423.

In 1958 the Jackson County Board of Education and Dubuque County Board of Education adopted a tenatative joint county Education adopted a tentative joint county 1958. This plan remained in effect until February, 1966, when more than 20 percent of the qualified voters of Zwingle and, in a separate proceeding, more than 20 percent of the qualified voters of Otter Creek petitioned for merger with Dubuque Community School District pursuant to section 275.40, Code of Iowa, 1962, as amended. Each proposed merger was approved by the Board of Directors of Dubuque Community School District and by the Dubuque County Board of Education. All procedural requirements of section 275.40, Code, were complied with.

As permitted by this section and within the time allowed, the Jackson County Board of Education filed notice with the Department of Public Instruction stating a controversy existed over the county plans and objecting to the proposed mergers. Under these circumstances section 275.40, Code, requires the approval of the Board before the plan may be completed.

At the request of the Superintendent, all records pertaining to the proposed merger were certified to his office by Dubuque County Board of Education. The Superintendent notified all interested parties a hearing on the objections would be held at his office on a specified date. Thereafter a hearing, which the trial court refers to as a 'proceeding', was held before the Superintendent and two members of his staff. The only information considered was that contained in the files certified to the Superintendent from Dubuque County. No record was made of this hearing.

Subsequent thereto the Superintendent filed a written opinion recommending disapproval of each proposed merger. The Board by formal resolution adopted this recommendation and disapproved each merger.

The Board took this action without notice to any interested party of its intention to consider the matter and without giving anyone an opportunity to appear in resistance thereto.

It is this action of the Board, based upon the recommendation of the Superintendent, which the trial court found to be arbitrary and unreasonable and to be without jurisdiction. We quote the following excerpts from the trial court's judgment which show its reasons for such conclusion:

'The first consideration is the legality of the action of the State Board of Public Instruction. No notice was given to anyone of its intention to act on the merger or consider the controversy. No hearing was held. No record of any prior hearing by referral was presented to the Board. It merely approved, in a summary manner, the decision of Mr. Johnston. * * * From the foregoing it appears the routine approval of Mr. Johnston's decision was not the considered judgment required of the Board by section 275.40 but completely arbitrary and not based upon proper consideration. * * *'

It is apparent that the trial court's judgment was based upon two fundamental conclusions: (1) A hearing was required under section 275.40 before the Board could approve or disapprove the merger; and (2) such hearing must be before the whole Board and not before the Superintendent and members of his staff. Before considering these matters we state a few well-established principles concerning certiorari and our review thereof on appeal.

I. Certiorari is permitted under rule 306, Rules of Civil Procedure, to test the jurisdiction of an inferior court or body, or to challenge its action as illegal, arbitrary or capricious. It is not an appeal and may not be used to correct mere errors on the part of the trial court or inferior body. County Board of Education, etc. v. Parker, 242 Iowa 1, 45 N.W.2d 567; Hohl v. Board of Education, 250 Iowa 502, 94 N.W.2d 787; Christopher v. District Court, 255 Iowa 694, 123 N.W.2d 892, 894; Hinrichs v. Iowa State Highway Commission, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 248; Board of Education of Green Mountain Independent School District v. Iowa State Board of Public Instruction, Iowa, 157...