People ex rel. McDonough v. Beemsterboer

• Decision Date: 08 June 1934
• Docket Number: Nos. 22290,22291.,s. 22290
• Citation: 356 Ill. 432,190 N.E. 920
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. McDONOUGH, County Collector, v. BEEMSTERBOER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

356 Ill. 432

190 N.E. 920

PEOPLE ex rel. McDONOUGH, County Collector,

v.BEEMSTERBOER.

Nos. 22290, 22291.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 21, 1934.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 8, 1934.

Error to Cook County Court; Edmund K. Jarecki, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Joseph B. McDonough, County Collector, against Simon Beemsterboer. To review an adverse judgment, defendant brings error.

Affirmed.William J. Grace, of Chicago (Joseph A. Crowe, and Donal Hartford, both of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Hayden N. Bell and Robert S. Cushman, both of Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.

JONES, Justice.

The county court of Cook county entered two sale judgments overruling objections of plaintiff in error to taxes extended against his real estate for the years 1928 and 1929, respectively. Two writs of error to review the judgments were sued out of this court, and the causes have been consolidated.

Under the quadrennial assessment made in 1927, the assessed value of the property in controversy was fixed by the board of review at $5,400. Under a reassessment ordered in 1928 by the tax commission in substitution for the quadrennial assessment, the assessed value was fixed by the board of assessors and the board of review at $22,464. It is urged that the acts of 1919 hereinafter referred to, relating to the state tax commission, are unconstitutional; that the acts conferred no authority on the tax commission to enter the reassessment orders; that the proceedings were irregular, void, and violated the due process clause of the Federal Constitution; that the assessment was made by persons not authorized by law; and that the property was arbitrarily and fraudulently overassessed.

The state tax commission was created by the act of 1919 which amended sections 5, 9, and 13 of the Civil Administrative Code and added a new section 39-a. Laws of 1919, p. 9. Section 39-a provides: ‘The State Tax Commission created by this Act shall, in its name, without any direction, supervision or control by the Director of Finance, exercise and discharge all duties now or hereafter imposed by law on it with reference to the assessment of property for taxation. All clerical and administrative functions pertaining to the business of the Tax Commission shall be discharged by the Director of Finance who shall, for that purpose, act as its secretary and executive officer.’ Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 127, § 39-a.

It is contended that section 39-a amends sections 4 and 36 of the original act (Laws 1917, pp. 5, 17) by taking away powers granted by those sections from the department of finance and the director thereof, and bestowing duties not prescribed by section 36 upon the tax commission, and that the amended sections are not inserted at length in the new act, in violation of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution. Section 4 of the Civil Administrative Code (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 127, § 4) provides: ‘Each department shall have an officer at its head who shall be known as a director, and who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, execute the powers and discharge the duties vested by law in his respective department.’ Section 36 (see Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 127, § 36) enumerates the powers of the department of finance, none of which relate to the assessment of property for taxation. The tax commission was created to take the place of the state board of equalization, which existed until the passage of the act of 1919 and over which the department of finance had no control. It is manifest that the act could not take away powers which did not exist and in that respect could not be amendatory. Section 39-a adds nothing to the powers of the department of finance, and therefore does not amend section 36. The duty of discharging the functions of secretary and executive officer of the tax commission, imposed upon the director of finance by section 39-a, has no connection with his duty to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of the department of finance. Section 39-a makes no change in the duties prescribed by the original act. It merely designates the officer who shall perform the duties of secretary and executive officer of the tax commission and prescribes those duties. The section is complete in itself, and it is unnecessary to refer to the original act in order to determine the effect of the amendment. The purpose of the constitutional provision is to avoid confusion arising from patchwork legislation, but does not require practically endless reiteration of amended statutes, nor that, when a new act is passed, all prior acts in any way modified by it shall be published at length in the amendatory act. Michaels v. Hill, 328 Ill. 11, 159 N. E. 278. Where a new law is complete in itself and entirely intelligible without reference to prior legislation, it is valid, though incidentally its effect is to modify existing law. Chicago Motor Club v. Kinney, 329 Ill. 120, 160 N. E. 163;Steinhagen v. Trull, 320 Ill. 382, 151 N. E. 250;People v. Moyer, 298 Ill. 143, 131 N. E. 280;Maulding v. Skillet Fork River Outlet Union Drainage District, 313 Ill. 216, 145 N. E. 227.

[5] It is further contended that the act of 1919 defining the powers and duties of the state tax commission (Laws of 1919, p. 718 [Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, § 338 et seq.]) amends portions of the Civil Administrative Code and the Revenue Act without setting forth the amended sections at length; that it contains more than one subject-matter and also a subject not expressed in its title, thereby violating section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution.The act is entitled, ‘An Act in relation to the assessment of property for taxation.’ It does not purport to amend any other law, and is an independent act in itself as to the subject with which it deals. Although it may have the practical effect of modifying prior acts, that fact does not place it within the inhibition of the Constitution. People v. Tokoly, 313 Ill. 177, 144 N. E. 808;People v. Loeffler, 175 Ill. 585, 51 N. E. 785; Steinhagen v. Trull, supra. The act deals with the powers and duties of the tax commission with reference to the assessment of property, its power to order reassessments, the procedure to be followed, and the procedure in equalizing assessments. All these matters relate to the assessment of property for taxation and are embraced within the subject of the enactment expressed in the title.

It is also claimed that the title is so broad as not to fairly point out the subject-matter. In People v. Stacker, 322 Ill. 232, 153 N. E. 354, we called attention to the fact that many comprehensive acts have general titles, and that, although the numerous provisions are not expressed in the general title, yet, when they are related and have some connection, more or less direct, with the subject of the legislation, the title is sufficient. To the same effect are People v. City of Chicago, 349 Ill. 304, 182 N. E. 419, and People v. Swanson, 340 Ill. 188, 172 N. E. 3. Neither of the acts is unconstitutional for any of the reasons urged.

Plaintiff in error also contends that the Tax Commission Act conferred no jurisdiction on the tax commission to order a reassessment except in the year of a quadrennial assessment. We held to the contrary in People v. Sweitzer, 339 Ill. 28, 170 N. E. 728.

[10] It is also claimed that the proceedings of the tax commission in ordering the reassessment were irregular and void. The commission adopted three orders concerning the reassessment. The first was made on May 7, 1928, before the board of review had completed the revision of the 1927 quadrennial assessment. The commission afterwards concluded the order was prematurely made and invalid. Thereafter the General Assembly, in special session, passed an act effective July 1, 1928 (Laws 1928 [3d Sp. Sess.] p. 107 [see Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1933, c. 120, § 349]), which provides for ordering a reassessment whether or not the original assessment be completed. Under the authority of that act, the tax commission on July 10, 1928, ordered a reassessment of all real estate in Cook county....