Phillips v. Travelers Insurance Company of Hartford
| Decision Date | 03 June 1921 |
| Parties | MIRIAM H. PHILLIPS v. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, Connecticut, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. -- Hon. Moses Hartmann Judge.
Reversed.
Jones Hocker, Sullivan & Angert for appellant.
(1) This insurance policy was an Illinois contract, because each renewal was a new contract. Grocery Co. v. Fidelity Co., 130 Mo.App. 430; Stokel v. Heywood, 1 Ch Div. (Law Rep. 1897) 459; Palmer v. Ins Assn., 128 N.E. 501. (2) The burden was on the plaintiff to prove that death was due to accidental means. Laissig v. Protective Assn., 169 Mo. 272; Brunswick v. Ins. Co., 213 S.W. 48. (3) The unexpected result of an intended act is not "accidental means." Riley v. Acc. Assn., 152 N.W. 617; Acc. Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S. 121; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Spitz, 246 F. 817; Rock v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. 462; Smith v. Travelers Ins. Co., 219 Mass. 147; Life & Acc. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 593; Atlanta Acc. Assn. v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 711; Newman v. Ry. Acc. Assn., 15 Ind.App. 33; Ludwig v. Acc. Ins. Co., 130 Minn. 510; Shoyer v. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 68 N.H. 577. (4) A finding that death was the result of bodily injuries effected through accidental means cannot be reached in this case but by an inference based upon an inference, or a presumption based upon a presumption, which is not permissable. Yarnell v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 113 Mo. 580; Swearingen v. Wabash Ry. Co., 221 Mo. 644; Hamilton v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 250 Mo. 714; Atherton v. Ry. Mail Assn., 221 S.W. 756; Wright v. United Commercial Travelers, 188 Mo.App. 457; Whitesides v. Ry. Co., 186 Mo.App. 619; United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 283; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Gerisch, 163 Ill. 625; Keefer v. Life Ins. Co., 201 Pa. 448. (5) Where under the evidence it is uncertain whether death was due to an accidental injury or to disease, the plaintiff cannot recover. Warner v. Railroad Co., 178 Mo. 134; State ex rel. Bush v. Sturgis, 221 S.W. 91; Atherton v. Ry. Mail Assn., 221 S.W. 756; Ins. Co. v. Murray, 90 S.E. 620; Transylvania Casualty Co. v. Allen's Admr., 209 S.W. 44; Carnes v. Traveling Men's Assn., 106 Iowa 281. (6) Death from accident aggravated by pre-existing disease, or from pre-existing disease aggravated by accident is not death from "accidental means, independent of all other causes." (a) Under the Illinois decisions, whose rules control this case. Crandall v. Casualty Co., 179 Ill.App. 330; Robinson v. Ins. Co., 192 Ill.App. 475; Moore v. Assn., 166 Ill.App. 38. (b) Under the accord of American judicial utterance. Natl. Masonic Assn. v. Shryock, 73 F. 755; Casualty Co. v. Shields, 155 F. 54; Casualty Co. v. Morrow, 213 F. 595; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fulton, 79 F. 423; Commercial Men's Assn. v. Parks, 179 F. 794; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 255 F. 483; Acc. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 213 F. 595; Postal Clerks' Assn. v. Scott, 155 F. 92; Stokely v. Fidelity Co., 193 Ala. 90; Stanton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 83 Conn. 708; Binder v. Natl. Masonic Assn., 127 Iowa 25; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bethel, 140 Ky. 609; Thomas v. Fidelity Co., 106 Md. 299; Jiroch v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 145 Mich. 375; White v. Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77; Ward v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 85 Neb. 471; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorney, 68 Ohio St. 15; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Glass, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 159. (7) The insurance was against death by accident alone, and not against death due to accident and existing disease. Under such a policy there can be no inquiry into proximate cause, where both such causes contribute. White v. Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77; Commercial Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fulton, 79 F. 423; Commercial Men's Assn. v. Parks, 179 F. 794; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 255 F. 483; Crandall v. Casualty Co., 179 Ill App. 330.
Fordyce, Holliday & White for respondent; John S. Lord and Wilbur B. Jones of counsel.
(1) The trial court properly refused motions at the close of plaintiff's case and at the close of all the evidence to direct the jury to find a verdict for defendant. (a) That physical infirmity may be a necessary condition to the accidental result does not deprive an injury of its distinction of being the sole producing cause, under a policy insuring against death only from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external and accidental means. Campbell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 222 S.W. 778; Fetter v. Fidelity Co., 174 Mo. 256; Beile v. Protective Assn., 155 Mo.App. 629; Driskell v. Ins. Co., 117 Mo.App. 362; Goodes v. United Com. Travelers, 174 Mo.App. 330; Hooper v. Ins. Co., 166 Mo.App. 209; Greenlee v. Casualty Co., 192 Mo.App. 303; Wright v. United Com. Travelers, 188 Mo.App. 457; Baehr v. Union Casualty Co., 133 Mo.App. 541; Ry. Acc. Assn. v. Coady, 80 Ill.App. 563; Fessenden v. Travelers Ins. Co., 205 Ill.App. 108; Continental Casualty Co. v. Lloyd, 165 Ind. 52; Hall v. Acc. Ins. Co., 16 Ga.App. 66; Thornton v. Travelers Ins. Co., 116 Ga. 121; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Meyer, 106 Ark. 99; Modern Woodmen v. Shyrock, 54 Neb. 250; Mfgrs. Acc. Co. v. Dorgan, 58 F. 945. The fall was the proximate cause of Mr. Phillips' death, and any disease of his organs that may have been found was the remote cause, or rather a condition Cases above cited. Plaintiff made out a prima-facie case by showing that Mr. Phillips had a fall, that a bruise was found upon his forehead thereafter, and that death was caused by a cerebral hemorrhage due to an arterial rupture. Whether he first fell and ruptured an artery which produced the cerebral hemorrhage, or the hemorrhage occurred first and caused the fall, were questions of fact for the jury. Cases above; Moon v. Commercial Travelers, 96 Neb. 65; Taylor v. Acc. Assur. Corp., 208 Pa. 439. (b) The evidence was amply sufficient to submit the issue to the jury as to whether or not Mr. Phillips had a fall which produced the arterial rupture, or the fall was caused by the rupture and the consequent cerebral hemorrhage. The fact that he was found in a fallen position at the foot of the stairs struggling to regain his feet; that he complained of pain in his side and eye, and that thereafter a bruise was found over his eye, and he vomited, made a prima-facie showing that the bruise and the vomiting were due to accidental means. U. S. Mutual Acc. Assn. v. Barry, 131 U.S. 111; Lamoreux v. Ill. Comm. Men's Assn., 212 Ill.App. 263; Acc. Ins. Co. v. Fielding, 35 Colo. 19; Cronkhite v. Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 116; Lickleider v. Iowa Assn., 166 N.W. 363; McEwen v. Life Ins. Co., 129 P. 598; MacDonald v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 219 Mo. 468. (3) As the defendant alleged in its answer that Mr. Phillips died from the disease of arterio-sclerosis, the burden was on the defendant to prove it. Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174 Mo. 269; Beile v. Protective Assn., 155 Mo.App. 644; Anthony v. Mercantile Assn., 162 Mass. 354. (4) From the facts and circumstances appearing in evidence in this case the accidental character of the fall is clearly proven. Taylor v. Acc. Assur. Corp., 208 Pa. 439. When plaintiff showed in addition to the facts above stated, that Mr. Phillips' arteries had been tested and found strong enough to withstand a certain pressure, that they would not rupture within a few hours under a lesser pressure while walking downstairs, and that a fall and the injuries received would account for the necessary sudden increase of blood pressure, plaintiff went beyond what the above cases hold is sufficient to make out a prima-facie case.
This is a suit by the beneficiary on a policy of accident insurance. It is admitted that said policy insured Milton C. Phillips, therein and herein referred to as the "insured," against bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes, through external, violent and accidental means, and that in case of death the principal sum, with accrued accumulations, amounted to $ 7,500, was in full force and effect at insured's death and was payable to plaintiff, the respondent here, if she is entitled to recover under the terms thereof. The death of said insured occurred at Chicago, Illinois, on August 2, 1916. The policy was issued to insured in 1904 while he was a resident of the State of Wisconsin. He moved to Chicago about 1913, and consent of defendant to such removal was evidenced by a rider attached to said policy of insurance. Plaintiff is the daughter of insured, and was a resident of Ohio at the time the case was tried.
Insured was a man about sixty years of age at the time of his death. He had been engaged in the practice of law in Wisconsin, and had moved to Chicago to engage in business with his sons in that city. For some reason, stated by some of the witnesses to be on account of failing health, insured had been taking a vacation during the summer months of 1916, and had largely given up active office work and had taken up outdoor exercises, including golf.
There is some evidence that his blood pressure had become high. On the evening before his death he visited friends in Chicago, a Mr. and Mrs. Vaughan, had dined with them and afterwards remained an hour or two visiting and chatting with them. The Vaughans lived in a third-story apartment, and insured had climbed two flights of stairs to reach their apartment. About 8:30 he started to leave, and the Vaughans bade him goodnight at the top of the stairs leading to their apartment. Mrs Vaughan suggested to her husband, after insured had started away, that he get his hat and go with him. She then went out on the porch and, failing to observe insured go out on the street below, became alarmed and followed her husband down the stairs leading up to their apartment. At the foot of the same and on a landing she...
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