Sebastian v. State

• Decision Date: 13 November 1998
• Citation: 680 N.Y.S.2d 370,250 A.D.2d 260
• Parties: , 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 9712 Anthony SEBASTIAN and Kathleen Sebastian, Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 370

680 N.Y.S.2d 370

250 A.D.2d 260, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 9712

Anthony SEBASTIAN and Kathleen Sebastian, Appellants, v. STATE of New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Fourth Department.

Nov. 13, 1998.

Magner & Love, P.C. by Shawn W. Carey, Buffalo, for appellants.

New York State Department of Law by Lisa Lecours, Albany, for Respondent.

Before GREEN, J.P., LAWTON, CALLAHAN, BOEHM and FALLON, JJ.

LAWTON, Justice:

The issue on this appeal is whether defendant, the State of New York (State), may be held liable for injuries caused by an escapee from a New York State Division for Youth (DFY) facility in the absence of a special relationship between the State and the injured person.

In 1992 Daniel Chadderdon was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent. He was placed in the custody of DFY and was initially held at DFY's Masten Park Facility in Buffalo. In March 1994 he was transferred to a DFY facility outside of Rochester and in July 1995 he was transferred to a DFY facility in Binghamton. He escaped from that facility 11 days later. Approximately one month after the escape, Chadderdon robbed and beat Anthony Sebastian (claimant) into unconsciousness, dragged him out of his cab and ran over him with his cab. Chadderdon subsequently was convicted, inter alia, of attempted murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree.

Nineteen months after the assault, claimant and his wife moved for leave to file a late claim against the State. In support of their motion for leave to file a late claim, claimants enumerated the serious injuries claimant had suffered, which had incapacitated him for an extensive period of time, and stated that they were unable to ascertain earlier Chadderdon's violent history because of the confidentiality of DFY records (see, Social Services Law § 372[4]; Executive Law § 501-c[1][b] ). The Court of Claims properly denied the motion on the ground that claimants had failed to show a "special relationship" with the State.

The proposed claim alleges that claimant's injuries are the result of the State's negligence in failing to prevent the escape of Chadderdon, provide adequate notice of the escape or take reasonable measures to capture him. Because those negligence claims arise out of the State's performance of a governmental function and because no special relationship exists between the State and claimant, the State cannot be held liable to claimant for its alleged negligence (see, Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 255-256, 544 N.Y.S.2d 995, 543 N.E.2d 443; Miller v. State of New York, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 510, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 467 N.E.2d 493; Williams v. State of New York, 308 N.Y. 548, 556-558, 127 N.E.2d 545; Cossano v. State of New York, 129 A.D.2d 671, 514 N.Y.S.2d 431).

In reaching that conclusion, I reject the dissent's position that the detention of a juvenile delinquent in a DFY facility constitutes proprietary activity analogous to the State's provision of in-patient medical and psychiatric care. Unlike patients receiving medical or psychiatric care at State facilities, all juvenile delinquents are placed in the custody of DFY by court order (see, Family Ct. Act § 353.3). More significantly, medical and psychiatric patients are admitted to State facilities for treatment of their illnesses, while juvenile delinquents are placed with DFY because they "committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult" (Family Ct. Act § 301.2[1] ). The fact that rehabilitation is the ultimate aim of the juvenile justice system does not transform the detention of juvenile delinquents into a proprietary function. Indeed, the Legislature has recognized that, with respect to the placement of juvenile delinquents, "the presentment agency's paramount responsibility [is] to protect the safety of the community" (L.1985, ch. 880, § 1). Protecting society by removing persons who commit criminal acts from the community and placing them in appropriate facilities is a uniquely governmental function. Whether the placement is in an adult prison or a juvenile facility, the governmental function is the same, i.e., the protection of the community. Thus, absent the existence of a special relationship, the State is not liable for injuries caused by an adult prisoner or a juvenile delinquent who escapes from the State's custody (see, Williams v. State of New York, supra, at 556-558, 127 N.E.2d 545; Cossano v. State of New York, supra; see also, Marilyn S. v. City of New York, 134 A.D.2d 583, 584, 521 N.Y.S.2d 485, affd. 73 N.Y.2d 910, 539 N.Y.S.2d 293, 536 N.E.2d 622). Finally, I note that the conclusion reached by the dissent will have a deleterious impact on the rehabilitative goals it emphasizes. To avoid the potential liability created by the dissent, those who have custody of juvenile delinquents will be required to focus their efforts and resources on confinement rather than rehabilitation. Accordingly, for reasons of sound precedent and policy, the order should be affirmed.

Order affirmed without costs.

GREEN, J.P., and CALLAHAN, J., concur with LAWTON, J.

BOEHM, J., dissents and votes to reverse in the following Opinion in which FALLON, J., concurs:

The issue on this appeal is whether the State of New York (State) may be held liable for injuries caused by an escapee from a New York State Division for Youth (DFY) facility in the absence of a special relationship between the State and the injured person. I respectfully dissent from the majority's position that it may not.

Anthony Sebastian (claimant) was robbed and beaten into unconsciousness by Daniel Chadderdon, who then dragged claimant out of his cab and drove the rear wheel of the cab over claimant's head and face. Claimant survived but has sustained permanent and extensive disfigurement of his face. All of his facial bones were fractured, requiring three surgical procedures and the insertion of nine permanent metal plates. Metal plates were also inserted to stabilize his neck. Claimant further sustained a crushed larynx and traumatic brain injuries. Chadderdon subsequently was convicted, inter alia, of attempted murder in the second degree and robbery in the first degree.

Before the incident, which occurred in 1995, Chadderdon had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent in July 1992. He was placed in the custody of DFY and was initially held at DFY's Masten Park Facility in Buffalo. In March 1994 he was transferred to a DFY facility outside of Rochester and in July 1995 he was transferred to a DFY facility in Binghamton. He escaped from that facility 11 days later and, on August 19, 1995, he called a young woman with whom he had become friendly while he was at the Masten Park Facility. He arranged to visit her in Buffalo, where she and some of her friends met him. None of them was aware of his escape. They went to Tonawanda and, late in the evening, they called a cab. Claimant, who was driving the cab, was directed by Chadderdon to drive him to a school parking lot in Tonawanda, where Chadderdon robbed and assaulted claimant.

Nineteen months after the assault, claimant and his wife moved for leave to file a late claim against defendant, the State. In support of their motion for leave to file a late claim, claimants enumerated the serious injuries claimant had suffered, which had incapacitated him for an extensive period of time, and they asserted that they were unable to ascertain earlier whether DFY had a record of Chadderdon's violent history because of the confidentiality of DFY records (see, Social Services Law § 372[4]; Executive Law § 501-c[1][b] ). Claimant first became aware of Chadderdon's lengthy violent history when he spoke to Chadderdon's sister after Chadderdon was convicted. Claimant was informed that Chadderdon had beaten another DFY facility resident into a coma with a chair, set fire to a barn, assaulted children and threatened to kill his own mother. Further, the District Attorney's Office made its confidential case file available to claimants only after the prosecution of Chadderdon was completed. Although the Court of Claims determined that the State had knowledge of Chadderdon's violent and dangerous "criminal propensities and, therefore, should have been aware that inaction would lead to harm", it nevertheless denied the motion, holding that claimants had failed to show a "special relationship" with the State.

The State concedes that the only factor at issue in determining whether to permit the filing of a late claim is "whether the claim appears to be meritorious" (Court of Claims Act § 10[6] ). Claimants contend that the "special duty" rule has no application where the State engages in a proprietary function when it places a juvenile in a juvenile facility or group home.

Government agencies are immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of a governmental function "unless the injured person establishes a special relationship with the entity, which would create a specific duty to protect that individual, and the individual relied on the performance of that duty" (Miller v. State of New York, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 510, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 467 N.E.2d 493; see, Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 74 N.Y.2d 251, 255-256, 544 N.Y.S.2d 995, 543 N.E.2d 443). Thus, the State is not liable for injuries caused by an escaped prison inmate in the absence of a special relationship between the State and the injured person (see, Williams v. State of New York, 308 N.Y. 548, 554-555, 127 N.E.2d 545; Cossano v. State of New York, 129 A.D.2d 671, 514 N.Y.S.2d 431).

When the State acts in a proprietary capacity, however, it is subject to the same principles of tort law regarding liability as are private persons or institutions (see, Miller v. State of New York, supra, at 511, 478 N.Y.S.2d 829, 467 N.E.2d 493). "[A] public entity may not escape liability for negligent acts which it performs in a proprietary capacity and which are a proximate cause of an injury which was sustained...