Swift v. California
| Decision Date | 05 October 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-57136.,02-57136. |
| Citation | 384 F.3d 1184 |
| Parties | Michael T. SWIFT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of CALIFORNIA; Department of Corrections; Keith Tandy, Defendants, and Steve Christian; Maritza Rodriguez, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Jack H. Swift, Grants Pass, Oregon, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Richard F. Wolfe, Deputy Attorney General, State of California, San Diego, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Judith N. Keep, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV 02-309-JNK.
Before: T.G. NELSON, TASHIMA, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Michael Swift appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against two California parole officers. Swift alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated as a result of: (1) the officers' investigation of suspected parole violations; (2) the officers ordering Swift's arrest pursuant to a parole hold; and (3) their recommendation for the initiation of parole revocation proceedings. The district court found the officers entitled to absolute immunity under Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.1981), and Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906 (9th Cir.1983). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and conclude that the officers' right to immunity is not controlled by these cases. Applying the functional approach to absolute immunity in accordance with Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 113 S.Ct. 2167, 124 L.Ed.2d 391 (1993), and Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc), we hold that parole officers are not absolutely immune from suits arising from conduct distinct from the decision to grant, deny, or revoke parole. Accordingly, we reverse.
In February 1994, Swift was committed to the custody of the California Department of Corrections ("CDC") for a term of 16 months after being convicted of issuing a forged check in the amount of $114.80. After completing his custody term, Swift was assigned to parole supervision in Iowa pursuant to the Interstate Parole Compact.
While on parole in Iowa, Swift was arrested on a charge of domestic violence. This fact was reported to the CDC Interstate Parole Supervision Unit ("IPSU"), which then suspended Swift's parole, issued a parolee-at-large arrest warrant, and reported the issuance of the warrant to the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC"). Swift was subsequently acquitted of the domestic violence charge. IPSU requested that the Iowa authorities conduct a Morrissey2 hearing regarding the alleged domestic violence incident. Swift was again acquitted after the magistrate found only minor parole violations. Swift continued his parole in Iowa, and he was released from further supervision in January 1998. Results of the domestic violence trial, the Morrissey hearing, and the continuance and completion of supervised parole were reported to IPSU, but IPSU failed to advise the California Board of Prison Terms ("BPT") or NCIC, officially reinstate parole, or recall the NCIC warrant.
When Swift learned of the outstanding NCIC warrant, he contacted IPSU and requested that the warrant be recalled. He was directed to report to the CDC Parole and Community Services Division ("P & CSD") in Chula Vista, California. He presented himself to an agent there on April 18, 2001, and advised the agent of the invalidity of the warrant. The agent released Swift on his own recognizance.
Swift alleges that during the week after his release, Steve Christian, an IPSU parole agent, and Maritza Rodriguez, a supervising P & CSD parole agent, investigated his situation, jointly determined to seize him pursuant to a parole hold, and conspired to effectuate his arrest.
The P & CSD requested that Swift return to the Chula Vista office on April 23, 2001. When Swift returned, Rodriguez ordered the issuance of a parole hold based on the investigation by Christian, and Swift was arrested and delivered to the custody of the San Diego County Sheriff. Swift was held in the county jail for one week before being transferred to state prison where he was incarcerated until June 7, 2001.
Christian submitted an investigative report to the BPT and requested that the BPT issue an order for a revocation hearing. Swift alleges that Christian falsified this report by deliberately suppressing all exculpatory evidence relating to the results of the domestic violence trial, the Morrissey hearing, the continuance of Swift's parole in Iowa, and Swift's discharge of parole by Iowa. Swift alleges that the report falsely stated that Christian was unable to procure criminal trial records and that an employee of the Iowa Department of Corrections had informed Christian that Iowa had closed its interest in the case "due to Swift's poor adjustment to the community."
The BPT conducted a parole revocation hearing, in which Christian and Rodriguez did not participate. The BPT hearing officer discharged Swift's parole, dismissed the parole hold order, recalled the warrant, and ordered that Swift be released immediately. The hearing officer specifically determined that Swift's parole was discharged by operation of law on November 16, 1997.
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Swift filed an action in state court against the CDC,3 as well as this action. Swift's operative federal complaint alleged one cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and four state causes of action. Christian and Rodriguez moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that they are entitled to absolute immunity or qualified immunity.
The district court held, pursuant to Sellars and Anderson, that Christian and Rodriguez are entitled to absolute immunity from liability because the functions they performed were "associated with [Swift's] parole revocation hearing." The district court declined to address Christian and Rodriguez's alternative argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity, and dismissed the state causes of action for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Judgment was entered in favor of Christian and Rodriguez, and Swift appealed.
We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.2004). "All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Am. Family Ass'n, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir.2002). "[W]e must determine ... whether the plaintiff can prove some set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief." Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir.2003).
Although state officials are entitled to some degree of immunity from § 1983 damages actions arising from their official acts, "[t]he presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). "[A]n official derives the appropriate degree of immunity not from his or her administrative designation but by the function he or she performs." Anderson, 714 F.2d at 908 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-12, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)).
It is well established that state judges are entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial acts. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). "When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are `functional[ly] comparab[le]' to those of judges — that is, because they, too, `exercise a discretionary judgment' as part of their function." Antoine, 508 U.S. at 436, 113 S.Ct. 2167 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)).
State "[o]fficials performing the duties of advocate or judge may enjoy [quasi-judicial] immunity for some functions ... but that protection does not extend to many of their other functions." Miller, 335 F.3d at 897. For example, a state prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when engaged "in activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," but is only entitled to qualified immunity when "performing investigatory or administrative functions, or [when] essentially functioning as a police officer or detective." Broam, 320 F.3d at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has reserved deciding whether members of state parole boards have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their official actions. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 553, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). We have held, however, that parole board members are entitled to absolute immunity when they perform "quasi-judicial" functions. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909-10. Thus, parole board officials of the BPT are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for decisions "to grant, deny, or revoke parole" because these tasks are "functionally comparable" to tasks performed by judges. Sellars, 641 F.2d at 1303; Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1991) (). Absolute immunity has also been extended to parole officials for the "imposition of parole conditions" and the "execution of parole revocation procedures," tasks integrally related to an official's decision to grant or revoke parole. Anderson, 714 F.2d at 909.
We have also explained, however, that parole officials are not "entitled to absolute immunity for conduct not requiring the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion." Id."There is no reason to clothe actions taken outside an...
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