State v. Buckman

• Decision Date: 01 February 2018
• Docket Number: No. 93545-9,93545-9
• Citation: 190 Wash.2d 51,409 P.3d 193
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Brian Wallace BUCKMAN, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

190 Wash.2d 51

409 P.3d 193

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Brian Wallace BUCKMAN, Petitioner.

No. 93545-9

Supreme Court of Washington.

Argued June 6, 2017

Filed Feb. 1, 2018

Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave., Ste. 701, Seattle, WA, 98101-3647, for Petitioner.

Sara I. Beigh, J. Bradley Meagher, Lewis County Prosecutor's Office, 345 W. Main St., Fl. 2, Chehalis, WA, 98532-4802, for Respondent.

WIGGINS, J.

¶1 Brian Buckman pleaded guilty to second degree rape of a child. ROW 9A.44.076. After sentencing, Buckman learned that he had been misinformed of the sentencing range that applied to him. Based on this misinformation, Buckman now seeks to withdraw his plea as involuntary. Because Buckman's motion to withdraw is a collateral attack on his judgment and sentence, he must show both error—here, that his plea was involuntary—as well as actual and substantial prejudice resulting from that error.

¶2 We conclude that Buckman's plea was involuntary because he was misinformed that he might be sentenced to life in prison despite the fact that the statute provided that a sentence of life in prison could not apply to a 17-year-old, Buckman's age at the time of the offense. But we also hold that he is not entitled to withdraw his plea because he fails to show that the misinformation provided at the time of his plea caused him actual and substantial prejudice. As a result, we deny the motion to withdraw and remand for resentencing only.

FACTS

¶3 When Buckman was 17 years old, he had a sexual relationship with 13-year-old K.B.S. Law enforcement learned of the relationship when Buckman was 19; Buckman was subsequently charged in superior court with second degree rape of a child. In a written statement, Buckman acknowledged "dating" K.B.S. and stated that he had not understood their relationship to be unlawful. Buckman emphasized that K.B.S.'s parents had consented to the relationship. Buckman was told that his crime carried the possibility of life in prison. Under the statutes, second degree rape of a child has a sentence range of 86 to 114 months with a maximum term of life, as well as lifetime community custody. RCW 9.94A.507(5), .510, .515; RCW 9A.20.021(a), .076(2).

¶4 Buckman was also told about the possibility of a special sex offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) under RCW 9.94A.670. Under a SSOSA, the court sentences a qualifying defendant to a term of confinement up to 12 months followed by a term of community custody, and imposes appropriate conditions such as undergoing appropriate sex offender treatment. If the defendant violates the conditions of community custody, the court can modify the conditions or revoke the suspended sentence. Id.

¶5 The record before us does not disclose the discussions that led to Buckman's guilty plea. However, Buckman's sworn statement in support of his motion to set aside his guilty plea includes two relevant statements. First, Buckman asserts that he was told that the maximum sentence for his crime was life in prison and that "[u]pon this information, Buckman had pleaded guilty in exchange for a SSOSA sentence under RCW 9.94A.670." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 88. Second, the misinformation about his possible sentence "had forced his decision making to plead guilty for a lighter sentence under SSOSA's RCW 9.94A.670." CP at 90.

¶6 On Buckman's plea form and in his colloquy with the court, the State and the trial court told him that his crime carried the possibility of life in prison. Under the statutes, second degree rape of a child has a sentence range of 86 to 114 months with a maximum term of life, as well as lifetime community custody. RCW 9.94A.507(5), .510, .515; RCW 9A.20.021(a), .076(2). However, the statute specifically does not apply to individuals who are "seventeen years of age or younger at the time of the offense." RCW 9.94A.507(2). Buckman was only 17 at the time he had a sexual relationship with K.B.S. Instead of the possibility of life in prison and lifetime community custody, he was subject to a maximum sentence of 114 months and a maximum of only 3 years of community custody. RCW 9.94A.515 (rape of a child in the second degree is a level XI crime), .510 (seriousness level XI and an offender score of I yields a sentence range of 86 to 114 months); RCW 9.94A.701(1)(a).

¶7 Buckman was ultimately sentenced under the SSOSA. Buckman served six months in jail and was released on lifetime community custody. Buckman violated his community custody provisions and was resentenced to 114 months. At resentencing, Buckman's new attorney realized that Buckman, who was not yet 18 years old at the time of the offense, should not have been sentenced under RCW 9.94A.507.

¶8 Buckman filed a motion to modify or correct his judgment and sentence, then filed a motion to withdraw his plea.¹ In seeking to withdraw his plea, Buckman argued that he would "never have pled guilty" had he been properly informed that he was not subject to possible life imprisonment. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r (Buckman Br. Pro Se) at 7. The State conceded that he was improperly sentenced.

¶9 Disagreeing with both parties, the trial court held that Buckman had been properly sentenced. "Seventeen years of age or younger," the court concluded, means on or before a person's 17th birthday. Because Buckman had passed his 17th birthday (but was not yet 18) at the time of the offense, the court concluded that Buckman was not "seventeen years of age or younger" and that RCW 9.94A.507 applied. The court thus denied both Buckman's motion to correct his sentence and his motion to withdraw his plea.

¶10 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's statutory interpretation, holding that Buckman had been improperly sentenced. State v. Buckman, 195 Wash.App. 224, 229-30, 381 P.3d 79 (2016). However, the court found that Buckman had been properly informed as to the consequences of his plea for two reasons: First, the trial court told Buckman the correct sentencing range (86 to 114 months). RCW 9.94A.515 (rape of a child in the second degree is a level XI crime), .510 (seriousness level XI and an offender score of I yields a sentence range of 86 to 114 months). Second, the trial court accurately told Buckman the maximum penalty for the crime charged—even though that maximum was not applicable to someone, like Buckman, who was less than 18 years old when the offense occurred. 195 Wash.App. at 230, 381 P.3d 79. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Buckman had been properly informed, found that Buckman's plea was knowing and voluntary, and affirmed the trial court's denial of Buckman's motion to withdraw his plea. The court then remanded for resentencing only. Id.

¶11 Buckman thereafter filed a motion for discretionary review with this court, which we granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The standard of review in this case is de novo. Normally, we review CrR 7.8 motions to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. See State v. Hardesty, 129 Wash.2d 303, 915 P.2d 1080 (1996) (applying an abuse of discretion standard when the decision involved factual findings). However, the request for withdrawal in this case is based on a claimed constitutional error and resulting prejudice—both of which are issues that we review de novo.² State v. Gresham, 173 Wash.2d 405, 419, 269 P.3d 207 (2012) ; In re Pers. Restraint of Stenson, 174 Wash.2d 474, 488, 276 P.3d 286 (2012) (Prejudice "is a mixed question of law and fact" that we review de novo.).³

ANALYSIS

¶13 Buckman argues (1) that his plea is involuntary because he was improperly informed of his sentencing consequences and (2) that this error was prejudicial. See Buckman Br. Pro Se at 7 ("It is actual and substantial prejudice to accept a plea deal on the belie[f] that if you don't plead guilty there is a possibility you'll face the rest of your life in prison.").

¶14 Because Buckman was misinformed of his possible sentencing consequences, we hold that his plea was involuntary. However, Buckman fails to show that a rational person in his circumstances would have declined to plead guilty and would more likely than not have gone to trial; instead, he merely asserts without explanation that he would not have pleaded guilty. Because Buckman's prejudice claim is unsupported by argument and because it makes a subjective statement unsupported by evidence, Buckman fails to meet his burden and fails to adequately show prejudice.

¶15 We therefore hold that Buckman's plea was involuntary, but that Buckman failed to show prejudice arising from the error. We affirm the Court of Appeals on this basis and remand for resentencing.

I. Buckman's Plea Was Involuntary Because He Was Misinformed regarding His Possible Sentencing Consequences

¶16 "Due process requires that a guilty plea may be accepted only upon a showing the accused understands the nature of the charge and enters the plea intelligently and voluntarily." State v. A.N.J., 168 Wash.2d 91, 117, 225 P.3d 956 (2010). A plea is knowing and voluntary only when the person pleading guilty understands the plea's consequences, including possible sentencing consequences. In re Pers. Restraint of Stockwell, 179 Wash.2d 588, 594-95, 316 P.3d 1007 (2014). "[A] guilty plea may be deemed involuntary when based on misinformation regarding a direct consequence of the plea, regardless of whether the actual sentencing range is lower or higher than anticipated." State v. Mendoza, 157 Wash.2d 582, 591, 141 P.3d 49 (2006).

¶17 Here, Buckman argues that his plea was involuntary because he was misinformed of his possible sentencing consequences. See Buckman Br. Pro Se at 3. The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding that Buckman was adequately informed because he was told both the correct sentencing range and the correct maximum punishment for the crime charged—even though those statutory consequences were not applicable to Buckman. Buckman, 195 Wash.App. at 230, 381 P.3d 79. We agree with Buckman.

¶18 Buckman was plainly misinformed in two key respects. First,...