Keepseagle v. Backes
Citation | 454 N.W.2d 312 |
Decision Date | 12 April 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 890344,890344 |
Parties | Wade KEEPSEAGLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard J. BACKES, ND Highway Commissioner, Defendant and Appellee. Civ. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota |
Vinje Law Firm, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellant; argued by Ralph A. Vinje.
Steven F. Lamb (argued), Asst. Atty. Gen., North Dakota Dept. of Transp., Bismarck, for defendant and appellee.
Wade Keepseagle appeals from a district court judgment affirming a decision of the North Dakota State Highway Commissioner 1 to suspend Keepseagle's license pursuant to Ch. 39-20, N.D.C.C. We affirm.
On May 27, 1989, at approximately 6:06 p.m., Sergeant Jerry Seeklander of the North Dakota Highway Patrol stopped Keepseagle for speeding south of Bismarck on Highway 1804. Sergeant Seeklander detected an odor of alcohol on Keepseagle's breath and noticed that his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. Several field sobriety tests were conducted and Keepseagle was subsequently arrested for driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle in violation of section 39-08-01, N.D.C.C.
Keepseagle was transported to St. Alexius Hospital in Bismarck where a blood sample was drawn by a registered nurse in accordance with the State Toxicologist's directions for blood submission and collection. The sample was drawn at approximately 7:01 p.m. on May 27, 1989, and was mailed to the office of the State Toxicologist in Fargo on May 28, 1989. The blood sample was received at the office of the State Toxicologist on May 30, 1989, and was analyzed on May 31, 1989. The analysis indicated a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.11 percent by weight.
On June 7, 1989, Keepseagle requested an administrative hearing pursuant to section 39-20-05, N.D.C.C. On June 13, 1989, an administrative hearing was held regarding the suspension of Keepseagle's license. At the conclusion of the administrative hearing, the Commissioner's hearing officer made the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision:
Keepseagle appealed from the hearing officer's decision to the district court. The district court affirmed the administrative hearing officer's decision. Keepseagle raised the following issue on appeal to this Court: Does section 39-20-03.1, N.D.C.C., prevent the Highway Commissioner from suspending driving privileges when it cannot be shown that a blood specimen was tested within two hours of the appellant's having driven?
An appeal from a district court judgment involving a license suspension under Ch. 39-20, N.D.C.C., is governed by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, Ch. 28-32, N.D.C.C., and our review is limited to an examination of the record compiled before the administrative agency rather than the findings of the district court. See Greaves v. N.D. State Highway Com'r, 432 N.W.2d 879 (N.D.1988); Berger v. State Highway Com'r, 394 N.W.2d 678 (N.D.1986); Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Com'r, 369 N.W.2d 650 (N.D.1985); Dodds v. North Dakota State Highway Com'r, 354 N.W.2d 165 (N.D.1984). Our review of administrative agency decisions involves a three-step process: (1) Are the findings of fact supported by a preponderance of the evidence? (2) Are the conclusions of law sustained by the findings of fact? (3) Is the agency decision supported by the conclusions of law? Schmalz v. N.D. Workers Compensation Bureau, 449 N.W.2d 817 (N.D.1989); Falcon v. Williams County Social Service Board, 430 N.W.2d 569 (N.D.1988); Otto v. Job Service North Dakota, 390 N.W.2d 550 (N.D.1986).
Keepseagle's license was suspended pursuant to section 39-20-03.1, N.D.C.C., which in relevant part reads:
Keepseagle argues that the language "and the test shows [a .10 percent by weight] ... at the time of the performance of a chemical test within two hours after the driving [emphasis added]" requires that the blood test, i.e., the chemical analysis, be done within two hours after the driving or actual physical control of the vehicle. The Commissioner argues that the "performance of a chemical test" language refers to the performance of the driver, not of the State Toxicologist and that the statute is satisfied if the blood is drawn within two hours of the driving.
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, fully reviewable by this Court. State v. Bower, 442 N.W.2d 438, 440 (N.D.1989); Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 153 (N.D.1989). We have previously set out our standard for the interpretation of a statute as follows:
Six v. Job Service North Dakota, 443 N.W.2d 911, 913 (N.D.1989). We have also previously indicated that a statute must be construed to avoid absurd and ludicrous results or to require idle or unnecessary acts. Larson v. Wells County Water Resource Bd., 385 N.W.2d 480, 482 (N.D.1986).
While the...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Phipps v. NORTH DAKOTA DEPT. OF TRANSP.
...the moment at which the test is concluded for purposes of analyzing a motorist's breath to determine alcohol content. In Keepseagle v. Backes, 454 N.W.2d 312 (N.D.1990), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a blood test is complete for purposes of compliance with the two hour time limit......
-
Witthauer v. Burkhart Roentgen, Inc.
...statutes, we must presume that the Legislature did not intend absurd and ludicrous results or unjust consequences. E.g., Keepseagle v. Backes, 454 N.W.2d 312 (N.D.1990); Wallentinson v. Williams County, 101 N.W.2d 571 (N.D.1960). If we were to construe Sec. 28-01.1-04 as Burkhart suggests, ......
-
Broeckel v. Moore
...State Toxicologist would have issued a memorandum warning of such a possibility and suggested a method of correcting it. Keepseagle v. Backes, 454 N.W.2d 312 (N.D.1990) [statute requires only that blood be drawn, not analyzed, within two hours; if blood sample is drawn within two hours and ......
-
Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 960269
...in a manner that produces an absurd or ludicrous result. Estate of Laschkewitsch, 507 N.W.2d 65, 67 (N.D.1993); Keepseagle v. Backes, 454 N.W.2d 312, 315 (N.D.1990). If we adopt the City's proposed interpretation of the statute, political subdivisions would be immune for all the recreationa......