Sierra Club v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com.

• Decision Date: 26 April 1976
• Citation: 58 Cal.App.3d 149,129 Cal.Rptr. 743
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 36712.

Page 743

129 Cal.Rptr. 743

58 Cal.App.3d 149

SIERRA CLUB, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 36712.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

April 26, 1976.

Greene, Kelley, Halloran & Tobriner, Maribeth Halloran, Laurens H. Silver, San Francisco, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, for plaintiff and appellant.

Robert S. Daggett, Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent Half Moon Bay Properties, Inc.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roderick Walston, Richard C. Jacobs, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for defendant and respondent Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Commission.

CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.

The Sierra Club appeals from a judgment denying relief from a determination by respondent California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission that part of a development proposed by respondent Half Moon Bay Properties, Inc. (hereinafter 'HMBP') is exempt from the commission's control.

HMBP had claimed exemption from the requirement of obtaining a permit for development within the coastal zone permit area of a 270-acre recreational community at the sourthern end of the City of Half Moon Bay. The proposed development consisted of a golf course, lakes, open space, 567 townhouses, 61 single family lots, an apartment complex, and a hotel complex. Approximately half the development, including the apartment complex, 200 townhouses, 29 single family lots, and half of the golf course are outside the coastal zone permit area. The Central Coast Regional Commission granted HMBP an exemption from the permit requirement on the basis that, prior to November 8, 1972, HMBP had obtained a vested right in developing the property.

On appeal to the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission, the exemption was approved as to the construction of the golf course, main lodge, seven quest houses, golf and tennis pro shops, a perimeter fence, streets, utilities, retaining walls, steps from the development to the beach, tennis courts, a swimming pool, a gate house, and a sewage treatment facility for which a building permit had already been obtained. The exemption was annulled as to the construction of any other residential units.

Appellant thereafter sought judicial review of the State Commission's action, and the present appeal followed.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in reviewing the action of the State Commission by a substantial evidence standard instead of exercising independent judgment and reweighing the evidence in light of the whole record. Where the order or decision of an administrative agency affects a fundamental vested right, the reviewing court must exercise independent judgment to reweigh the evidence. But if the administrative order or decision does not substantially affect a fundamental vested right, judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c); Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.) Appellant argues that on either of two theories fundamental vested rights were involved in the present case: (1) that the public has a fundamental vested right to maintain the coast in its present state, or (2) the fact that HMBP was claiming a fundamental vested right required the trial court to exercise its independent judgment although appellant, not the developer, was seeking review of the administrative decision.

State policy is expressed in the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act as follows:

The people of the State of California hereby find and declare that the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource belonging to all the people and existing as a delicately balanced ecosystem; that the permanent protection of the remaining natural and scenic resources of the coastal zone is a paramount concern to present and future residents of the state and nation; that in order to promote the public safety, health, and welfare, and to protect public and private property, wildlife, marine fisheries, and other ocean resources, and the natural environment, it is necessary to preserve the ecological balance of the coastal zone and prevent its further deterioration and destruction; that it is the policy of the state to preserve, protect, and, where possible, to restore the resources of the coastal zone for the enjoyment of the current and succeeding generations; and that to protect the coastal zone it is necessary:

(a) To study the coastal zone to determine the ecological planning principles and assumptions needed to ensure conservation of coastal zone resources.

(b) To prepare, based upon such study and in full consultation with all affected governmental agencies, private interests, and the general public, a comprehensive, coordinated, enforceable plan for the orderly, long-range conservation and management of the natural resources of the coastal zone, to be known as the California Coastal Zone Conservation Plan.

(c) To ensure that any development which occurs in the permit area during the study and planning period will be consistent with the objectives of this division.

(d) To create the California Costal Zone Conservation Commission, and six regional coastal zone conservation commissions, to implement the provisions of this division.

(Pub.Resources Code, § 27001.) Appellant argues that this policy statement establishes a fundamental vested right in all the members of the public that the California coastal zone will be preserved and maintained in its present state. Inasmuch as 'the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource belonging to all the people' and 'the permanent protection of the remaining natural and scenic resources of the coastal zone is a paramount concern to present and future residents of the state and nation' (§ 27001), there appears to be no doubt that the interests of the people of California in the preservation of the coastal zone are, within the meaning of Strumsky, fundamental. But the Act does not establish any present possessory interest of the people of the State of California in property lying within the coastal zone. Although such possessory interest may be established over at least part of the coastal zone as a result of the planning function established by the Act (see §§ 27300 et seq., 27320), the only actual control over the coastal zone which has been vested in the public by the Act has been by way of the permit-granting function of the Regional and State Commissions within the coastal zone 'permit area.' (§§ 27104, 27400 et seq., 27420 et seq.) If the public's rights in the coastal zone were presently vested, the result would have constituted a taking of property from all landholders within the coastal zone. (See State of California v. Superior Court (Veta Co.) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 252--255, 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281; CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 306, 324--325, 118 Cal.Rptr. 315.) Appellant, as part of the public, has no vested right in the coastal zone.

Even so, appellant asserts that because HMBP was claiming to have a fundamental vested right to develop its property, the trial court should have exercised independent judgment in reviewing the administrative decision. But a party has no standing to assert that an independent judgment review rather than a substantial evidence review is required unless it possesses a fundamental vested right on its own behalf which was involved in an administrative agency's action. (See Northern Inyo Hospital v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 14, 23, fn. 9 at 23, 112 Cal.Rptr. 872.) The Sierra Club has no fundamental vested right of its own; therefore, it cannot assert the existence of HMBP's fundamental vested right to obtain an independent judgment review.

Appellant contends that the trial court should have made findings of fact as requested by appellant. But in administrative mandate proceedings in which the trial court is required to exercise a substantial evidence, rather than an independent judgment review of the record, findings of fact are not required. (Friends of Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 497, 518, 113 Cal.Rptr. 539.)

Appellant contends that where a building permit has been issued which would authorize the construction of several structures, and construction of some but not all of the structures had commenced prior to February 1, 1973, the structures not yet started are subject to the development permit requirement of the Act. As a general rule, development permits are required for any new construction within the coastal zone permit area commencing on or after February 1, 1973. (§ 27400; San Diego Coast Regional Com. v. See the Sea, Limited (1973) 9 Cal.3d 888, 891, 109 Cal.Rptr . 377, 513 P.2d 129.) There are two major exemptions from the permit requirement. The first exemption is the 'vested rights' exception, created by section 27404, whereby a developer who has obtained a building permit...