State v. Harris

• Decision Date: 14 December 1978
• Docket Number: No. 45229,45229
• Citation: 588 P.2d 720,91 Wn.2d 145
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James L. HARRIS, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 145

91 Wn.2d 145

588 P.2d 720

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. James L. HARRIS, Petitioner.

No. 45229.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Dec. 14, 1978.

Michael J. Platts, Wenatchee, for petitioner.

E. R. Whitmore, Jr., Pros. Atty., Grant A. Mueller, Deputy Pros. Atty., Wenatchee, for respondent.

HOROWITZ, Justice.

This case concerns the exercise of the informer privilege where the informer for the state is a participant in the crime charged against the defendant. The principal question presented is whether the defendant is entitled to have disclosure of the identity and whereabouts of the informer, when the court neither knows nor takes any steps to ascertain whether knowledge of the informer's identity would be relevant and helpful to the defense.

Appellant James L. Harris was charged with delivery of a controlled substance, tried, and convicted in the Chelan County Superior Court. The events leading to the charge took place in October 1976, in an alley behind a tavern in Wenatchee. Four persons were present appellant Harris, Mr. Robert Morris, a police undercover agent, and an unnamed informer. The meeting was arranged by the informer. Appellant delivered to the undercover agent a bottle of Tedral, a drug containing phenobarbital, and allegedly bargained for and received $20 in return. Following the sale appellant and Morris were arrested and the informer left the scene.

At trial appellant testified, claiming he did not deliver the drugs, but that they were forcibly taken from him by the police officer. He had gone to the alley not to sell drugs, he claimed, but rather to find a bottle of liquor he had left there. He claimed he possessed the drugs through a valid prescription. Appellant moved for disclosure of the identity of the police informer, whose true identity and present whereabouts were, of course, unknown to him at that time. The motion was denied. Appellant was subsequently found guilty as charged.

On appeal the Court of Appeals concluded appellant's motion for disclosure was improperly denied, as the informer "was a material witness to the crime whose testimony could have corroborated either the arresting officer or Harris' testimony." State v. Harris, 18 Wash.App. 564, 568, 569 [588 P.2d 722] P.2d 84, 86 (1977). The court filed an opinion ordering disclosure and a new trial. The clerk of the Court of Appeals subsequently received a letter from the office of the prosecuting attorney, informing the court that in Robert Morris' trial the judge had ordered disclosure of the informer's identity, the informer testified, that his testimony supported that of the police officer, and that defendant Morris was convicted. This letter is not a part of the record. The Court of Appeals then filed an order amending its opinion. Disclosure of the informer's identity was still required, but the trial court was to hold a hearing to determine whether the informer's testimony "could benefit" appellant. If so appellant was to receive a new trial; if not, the conviction was to be affirmed. State v. Harris, supra at 568, 569 P.2d 84.

Appellant Harris contends the Court of Appeals erred in amending its original opinion and ordering a hearing to determine whether the informer's testimony could benefit him. Denying him the right to present to the jury the testimony and demeanor of the informer, it is claimed, deprives him of his Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury. We agree that if the informer's identity should have been disclosed, appellant is entitled to a new trial. However, as later appears, the record is insufficient to determine whether disclosure was necessary. We therefore hold the cause should be remanded to the trial court for an in camera hearing, to be conducted in accordance with the principles and standards set out below. On the basis of this hearing the court will determine whether the state should have been required to disclose the informer's identity at appellant's trial. If disclosure should have been required, appellant is entitled to a new trial. If disclosure need not have been required, appellant's conviction is affirmed.

The privilege of the government to withhold from disclosure the identity of police informers is known as the "informers' privilege." It is recognized in this state by both statute and court rule. RCW 5.60.060(5); CrR 4.7(f)(2). According to the leading United States Supreme Court decision on the informers' privilege, its purpose is to encourage citizens to communicate their knowledge to police in order to further and protect the public interest in law enforcement. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) (hereinafter referred to as Roviaro ). The privilege is not absolute, and if disclosure of an informer's identity "is relevant and helpful to the defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure." Roviaro, supra at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. Failure to order disclosure where required under the standards set out in Roviaro violates notions of fundamental fairness and is Prejudicial error. Roviaro, supra at 60, 65, 77 S.Ct. 623.

Appellant contends disclosure of the informer's identity in this case was required under the Roviaro standard to ensure he receives a fair trial, and further that he has a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to have a jury see and hear the informer's testimony. The trial judge cannot be allowed to determine in the first instance whether the informer's testimony could benefit appellant, it is claimed, as such a procedure would deprive him of his right to trial by jury of issues of fact which determine guilt or innocence. See State v. Price, 59 Wash.2d 788, 370 P.2d 979 (1962).

We agree with appellant that where disclosure is required under the standard set out in Roviaro and the trial court refuses to compel disclosure the defendant's remedy is a new trial. See United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1977); Thornton v. Georgia, 238 Ga. 160, 231 S.E.2d 729 (1977); People v. Stander, 73 Mich.App. 617, 251 N.W.2d 258 (Mich.App.1976). The rationale of the rule in Roviaro is that disclosure of the informer's identity under certain circumstances is a matter of "the fundamental requirements of fairness." Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S.Ct. 623. In other words, failure to compel disclosure under these circumstances will deprive a defendant of a fair trial. If a defendant does not receive a fair trial because of such a prejudicial error, the error cannot be harmless simply because a judge believes the testimony could not benefit the accused. In fact, if the accused is entitled to the information as a matter of fundamental fairness, it does not matter whether the testimony of the informer would support the accused or not. United States v. Tucker, supra at 208-09. The use the defense makes of the information, whether to compel the informer to testify or not, is solely for the accused to decide. Roviaro, supra, 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. 623. Therefore, if disclosure is required in the first instance under the Roviaro standard, the court may not thereafter substitute its own judgment regarding the potential benefit of the informer's testimony for that of the defendant, or its judgment regarding the reliability of the informer's testimony for that of the jury. In other words, the defendant must have a new trial.

It is not clear in this case, however, that appellant was in fact entitled to disclosure of the informer's identity at his trial. There is no fixed rule governing disclosure. The court must in each case balance "the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense." Roviaro, supra at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 629. The proper balance must depend on the facts of the particular case, "taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors." Roviaro, supra at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 629. Giving consideration to these factors, then, if the court determines that disclosure is relevant and helpful to the defense, or essential to a fair determination of the cause, the court may require disclosure. Roviaro, supra at 60-61.

The preferred method for making this determination without prejudicing the rights of either the state or the defendant is for the court to hold an in camera session at which the judge hears the informer's testimony and applies the Roviaro standard. This procedure has been held not to deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights. United States v. Doe, 525 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 2179, 48 L.Ed.2d 801 (1976); State v. Burleson, 18 Wash.App. 233, 566 P.2d 1277 (1977). Our courts have the power to hold an in camera session under CrR 4.7(h)(6).

After hearing the informer's testimony, the judge must decide whether to compel disclosure. Under the prevailing federal rule, it will not necessarily be required unless knowledge of the informer's identity would be "relevant and helpful" to the defense under the circumstances, and in consideration of the factors outlined above. See United States v. Doe, supra ; United States v. Freund, 525 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Soles, 482 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1027, 94 S.Ct. 455, 38 L.Ed.2d 319 (1973); United States v. Lloyd, 400 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Jackson, 384 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1967), Cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932, 88 S.Ct. 2292, 20 L.Ed.2d 1390 (1968). See also People v. Stander, supra.

It may be that even when the informer is a material witness, disclosure of his or her identity will not be required under this standard. In United States v. Doe, supra, on facts very similar to those of this case, the informer's identity was not required to be disclosed. The informer had arranged a meeting between...