Bd. of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary v. People ex rel. Raymond

• Decision Date: 20 February 1901
• Citation: 189 Ill. 439,59 N.E. 977
• Parties: BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY v. PEOPLE ex rel. RAYMOND, County Treasurer.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

189 Ill. 439

59 N.E. 977

BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

v.PEOPLE ex rel. RAYMOND, County Treasurer.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1901.

Appeal from Cook county court; R. W. S. Wheatley, Judge.

Application by the people, on the relation of Samuel B. Raymond, county treasurer of Cook county, against the Board of Directors of the Chicago Theological Seminary, for judgment against its lands for general taxes. From a judgment sustaining the validity of the tax, the board of directors appeals. Affirmed.David Fales (Gwynn Garnett, of counsel), for appellant.

Julius A. Johnson, Co. Atty., Frank L. Shepard, Asst. Co. Atty., and W. F. Struckmann, Asst. Co. Atty., for appellee.

Appellant, upon the trial below, filed objections to the entry of judgment against its property. These objections were: (1) That the property of appellant, under its charter, was exempt from taxation. (2) That for a number of years prior to July, 1900, the county collector of Cook county in each year had made application in the county court of that county for judgment for the general taxes of the preceding year, and that at each of said applications appellant had claimed that its property was free and exempt from taxation under its charter, and said county court had rendered judgment sustaining such objections; that each of said judgments remains in full force and unreversed; that the proceedings leading up to the same were between the same parties; and that the only question raised on each of said applications was whether appellant's charter exempted all its real estate from taxation, although such real estate was not occupied by the institution of learning of the said appellant. The third objection seems to be that the effort of the county treasurer and ex officio collector of Cook county to obtain judgment for the taxes of 1899 against appellant's lands, described in its objections, under and in pursuance of the revenue laws of illinois, is in some way a violation of appellant's charter, viewed as a contract between appellant and the state of Illinois. It was stipulated in open court, on the trial of the cause, that some of the lots described in appellant's objections are vacant, and some are improved and rented to tenants; that all the income of the property described in the objections is used for the object contemplated in appellant's charter, and that all of said lots were bought by appellant or given to it for the promotion of the objects named in its charter; that appellant is the owner of other lots, upon which it has constructed buildings wherein is given instruction by professors and instructors to carry out the objects of its charter; that the lots occupied by the buildings, where said instruction is given, are not taxed; that since February 15, 1855, when its charter was passed, appellant, having accepted the same, has expended, in the erection and purchase of buildings upon the lands named in the objections, and upon other lots owned by it, an amount exceeding $200,000; and that a large number of students have been, and are being, instructed by said corporation according to its charter. The county court, upon the trial below, overruled the objections so made by appellant, and rendered judgment against appellant's property, not occupied by buildings used for the purposes of its seminary, and for the purposes of instruction by its professors and instructors, and in favor of the people for the taxes, etc., of 1899, and interest, penalties, and costs.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The first objection made by appellant to the entry of judgment by the county court against its lands is that its charter exempts from taxation all of its real estate. We have already passed upon this question in People v. Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary, 174 Ill. 177, 51 N. E. 198. In the latter case, we held that section 5 of the act of 1855, incorporating the appellant, which provides ‘that the property of whatever kind or description, belonging or appertaining to said seminary, shall be forever free and exempt from all taxation for all purposes whatsoever,’ refers only to property used in immediate connection with the seminary, and does not include other property which may be owned, rented, or held by the said seminary as an investment, even though the income thereof is used solely for school purposes. We are satisfied with the conclusions reached in People v. Board of Directors of Chicago Theological Seminary, supra, and decline to further discuss the question there passed upon and settled. The objection made by the appellant, based upon the ground of an alleged impairment of the obligation of its contract with the state of Illinois, is involved in this first objection, and disposed of by the decisions in relation thereto. It need not be separately considered. This court has merely construed appellant's charter, and given full force and effect to it as so construed.

2. It appears that in each year, for a number of years prior to 1897, appellant objected to the entry of judgment for general taxes in the courty court against certain of its lands, upon the alleged ground that said lands were exempt from taxation. It is insisted by the appellant that, in each of the applications so made for judgment for taxes against its lands, the issue was whether such lands, upon which its institution of learning was not located were subject to taxation or not. The contention, now made in the present case, is that the judgments so rendered by the county court in these former years in its favor, sustaining the objections so made by it, are in the nature of estoppels, and constitute a res judicata against the prosecution of the present proceeding.

It is well settled by the decisions of the supreme court of the United States and of this court that, where a former adjudication is relied upon as an absolute bar, there must be, as between the actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action. But it is also well settled that, when the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered. Where some controlling fact or question material to the determination of both causes has been adjudicated in the former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the same fact or question is again at issue between the same parties, its adjudication in the first will, if properly presented, be conclusive of the same question in the later suit, irrespective of the question whether the cause of action is the same in both suits or not. This is sometimes denominated an ‘estoppel by verdict.’ In order that the judgment in the first suit shall operate as an estoppel in the second suit, it must appear on the fact of the record, or must be shown by extrinsic evidence, that the precise question was raised and determined in the first suit. ‘In all cases, therefore, where it is sought to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action, the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the judgment conclusive in another action.’ Cromwell v. Sac Co., 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. Ed. 195;Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 333, 16 L. Ed. 650;Bissell v. Spring Valley Tp., 124 U. S. 225, 8 Sup. Ct. 495, 31 L. Ed. 411;Hanna v. Read, 102 Ill. 596;Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496, 35 N. E. 732;Leopold v. City of Chicago, 150 Ill. 568, 37 N. E. 892;Railway Co. v. Carson, 169 Ill. 247, 48 N. E. 402;Markley v. People, 171 Ill. 260, 49 N. E. 502;Young v. People, 171 Ill. 299, 49 N. E. 503. The burden of proof is always upon the defendant, who pleads res judicata because of a former judgment, to set up that jdugment, and show what was determined by it, and what is common to the subsequent action. The proof must be clear, certain, and convincing. 21 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, pp. 199, 200, 202. If there be an uncertainty as to what was the precise question raised and determined in the former suit, as, for example, if it appears that several distinct matters may have been litigated, upon one or more of which the judgment may have been passed, without indicating which of them was litigated, the whole subject-matter of the action will be at large, and open to any new contention. But this uncertainty may be removed by extrinsic evidence showing the precise points involved and determined in the former action. Markley v. People, supra.

The present action is not a prosecution for or upon the same claim or demand as that involved in the actions in former years. The present proceeding is an application by the county collector for a judgment for taxes delinquent for the year 1899 only, whereas the former judgments were rendered upon applications for taxes delinquent for other and different years. Hence, in the case at bar, the burden of proof was upon the appellant to show that the question, determined by the former suits and judgments, was precisely the same question as that which is involved here. But the proof is not altogether clear that the same question was involved in all the prior proceedings and judgments insisted upon as res judicata by the appellant. In some years, when objections were made, the proof shows the making of a general objection that the lands involved were exempt from taxation. From the general character of the objection, however, it does not appear whether the exemption claimed was based upon the language of appellant's charter, or whether the exemption was claimed under the provisions of the general revenue law of the state. Section 2 of the general revenue act provides that ‘all property of...